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A HERMENEUTIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN THE PROCESS OF CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT IN KOREA

BY

KWON-JAHNG JIN

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1993

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ISBN 0-315-82090-X

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled "A Hermeneutic Understanding of the Experience of Intersubjectivity in the Process of Curriculum Development in Korea" submitted by Kwon-Jahng Jin in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Date: December 15, 1992

A DEDICATION

This work is dedicated
to the memory of my grandmother and parents,
with love, respect and gratitude.

ABSTRACT

This study explores the meaning of the experience of intersubjectivity in the process of curriculum development in Korea. By the " Will to Power" of participants in a taken-for-granted technical rationality, the "Otherness" of the "Other" is reduced to sameness.

The study consists of four phases in which a new understanding of curriculum development emerges: curriculum development is not only a complex and moral activity, but also a process of creating historical context in our own historicity. The praxis process nurtures the dialogical community in which phronesis becomes a living reality and conflict, instability, disagreement and ambiguity are respected in the openness of our experience.

Following discussions which draw upon transcendentalism (Husserl and Heidegger) and distantiation (Buber and Levinas), Heidegger's notion of belonging together, Gadamer's notion of practical hermeneutics, Derrida's notion of difference, trace, and textuality, Kierkegaard's existential interpretation, Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, and based on a reflection of the current phenomenon of intersubjectivity in Korea as revealed in the texts, I argue that voices not understandings, are shared:

a) the "Other" should be an "Absolute Other" who speaks his own voice based on an under- standing of "belonging together."

b) intersubjectivity should be based on the affirmation of the difference of the participants who keep distance between them.

c) the "I" should be sensible with love and responsibility to the calling from the absolute "Other."

Chung Do, in which all participants' voices are vitalized and shared, creates the distance between participants and preserves the difference of participants' voices. Thus the participants are able to defer understandings and share their voices.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank my teachers, colleagues and friends for the various forms of advice and support they offered during the course of this study.

It is an honour to have had a most supportive supervisory committee. My sincerest gratitude is extended to Dr. Kenneth Jacknicke, my supervisor, for his steadfast and stimulating guidance and support throughout the study, from its inception to its conclusion. Through countless meetings, he helped me to concretize and enrich my pedagogical understanding.

I extend thanks to Dr. jan jagodzinski for his perseverant scrutiny and scholarly questions of my study. The time he willingly gave in his busy schedule is gratefully appreciated.

I am also indebted to Dr. Terrance Carson for his ongoing encouragement and direction through several meetings. He helped me to re-enter academic thinking and reading after my three year return to Korea. I am especially grateful for permission to participate in his reading group, "Question on the Other."

I would like to thank Drs. Larry Beauchamp and Don Massey for the supporting and probing questioning and helpful comments they offered on the final draft of my study. A special thanks to Dr. Beauchamp for his robust and kind chairing of the final oral exam on December 15th.

I also appreciated the insightful questions and comments of Dr. David Smith, my external examiner. These will certainly guide my future academic thinking.

I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Ted Aoki, professor emeritus, who showed me an example of being a true teacher during my early days as a graduate student. He helped me to organize the structure of my dissertation through face-to-face discussions and encouraged me by several long distance phone calls.

To the two Korean teachers who allowed me to use their diaries/journals I say 

Many thanks are extended to my colleague Ingrid Johnston for her painstaking and speedy proofreading, and of my office mate, Martha Munz Gue, and my friends Mmes. Mary Hallam and Karen Hansen for their assistance. Lastly, I thank the office staff of the Department of Secondary Education for their affable smiles and ongoing spontaneous kindness. These moments of contact often upheld the spirits of a frustrated, and sometimes disappointed and lonely foreign student.

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CHAPTER ONE

CONTEXTUALIZING THE QUESTION OF CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

A. In the Context of My Personal Experience in Korea: An Autobiographical Anecdote

This study initiated with my personal attempt to come to a better understanding of experiences of human inter-subjectivity in a curriculum development process in Korea, as a basis for working together towards a common goal. At the outset, I situate myself in a narrative of my experiences in Korea.

When I began teaching students at an elementary school in 1966, curriculum, more specifically texts and teachers' guides, limited my teaching. I relied heavily on the handed down curriculum and its materials, and was content to follow its guidelines; as a result I often wasted my own and the children's lives dealing with "meaningless tasks" (Macdonald, 1975a, p. 75). I disregarded the authentic meaning from the lived world of my students and myself. I rarely questioned the intention of the curriculum and the knowledge contained in it. I rarely tried to open up the questions of my being as it was encapsulized by the written curriculum documents and materials. I failed to realize the institutional power of the handed down curriculum which had a social power to define meanings to "enforce its point of view" (Golby, 1981, p. 233) without respect to childrens' authentic meaningfulness. I was busy indoctrinating my students with predetermined meanings on the basis of a dichotomized way of thinking. Unknowingly, I did nothing to cultivate various ways of thinking and had little "tolerance for others' way of knowing things" (Zais, 1986, p. 22).

But the longer I engaged in teaching, the more clearly I came to realize the discrepancy between the curriculum-as-planned and the curriculum-as-lived experience. I began, little by little, to recognize each student's individuality within a totalitarian mentality. At last, I could realize that for a teacher "as the primary curriculum developer" (King, 1986), curriculum implementation engages us in a dialectical relationship with the structure of written materials. It is a process by which we re-interpret the meaning of the structures in written materials.

Interpreting the meaning of written curriculum materials begins with our values and assumptions coloured by our own experiences and perspectives. It is a process whereby we connect and attune the written curriculum "to our own lives and our own presence" (Pinar, 1976, p. 78). This process is a largely private practice done in isolation from colleagues and curriculum practice makes this more public, while at the same time, creating an uncertainty in the validity of one's own practice. Curriculum implementation can be seen to bridge a gap between the abstract experience in written curriculum and the concrete experience of those in school settings (Aoki, 1987). Written curriculum, to be concrete in classrooms, means to re-create curriculum materials through the teacher's publicizing of private activities. This context forced me to raise some questions: What does it mean for teachers to interpret curriculum and to attune the written curriculum into a document for a concrete classroom situation? What does the written curriculum mean in relation to the educational situation? More fundamentally, what is the meaning of curriculum development?

Upon changing my job from that of a school teacher to a researcher at the KOREAN EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE in 1979, I adopted another view which led me to believe that teachers were reluctant to change and to innovate. While I gradually forgot my teaching experience in schools, I began to doubt my earlier view which I developed in schools. Following the doctrine of KEDI, I became convinced that curriculum development should be conducted "prior to classroom interaction" (Klein, 1986, p. 33) through a Research and Development model. I was following "the linear-expert model of curriculum development" (Macdonald, 1975b, p. 292). I was very concerned with uniformity and control without suspecting whose interests were served in the curriculum, and without recognizing that as a result of following the model, there was a danger that the model "could be co-opted by dominant forces" (Law and Barton, 1981, p. 245) in educational practice. I felt a need to control and monitor teachers by means of specific goals. I was unconsciously enforcing curriculum as "an important instrument used by societies to reproduce their perspective culture from

generation to generation" (Zais, 1986, p. 18).

After attending some conferences for curriculum development in 1980, I disregarded teachers' complaints that curricularists and knowledgeable experts did not listen to teachers' opinions. I was not concerned with the distorted communicative scene (Habermas, 1979) resulting from authoritative professors as a basis for expert "tyranny." I took for granted that the "overstanding" (Booth, 1979, p. 236) of teachers by a small group of planners and experts often coerced teachers without their agreement. I believed that planners' or experts' understandings of curriculum and its development are superior to those of teachers so that the formers' superior understanding should be accepted by the participants. Blind attempts at "overstanding" could do little but harm. These experiences have led me to ask: What is the relationship between participants of school curriculum development in Korea? What does it mean for the participants to reach agreement? What does it mean for the participants to develop curriculum? More fundamentally, what is the true feature of dialogue among them?

From 1980 to 1984, as a teacher educator at Dong Duk Women's University, Sang Myung Women's University, and Hong Ik University in Seoul, I took an equivocal stance, without any personal voice, between several curriculum perspectives, based on different philosophical backgrounds. The reconceptualists' propositions were not well recognized in Korea; the state-centered technical perspective textbooks were still in evidence for university students and KEDI.[1] I could not be an authentic teacher. I was an awkward eclectic. I was neither a generalist nor a synthesizer with a speciality.

We cannot give others our own understanding without regards to their historical situatedness. Teachers need to open up to the possibilities of exploring many disciplines in order to turn great ideas in a curriculum tradition into vibrant

---

[1]Hereafter, I will use an abbreviation of KEDI for Korean Educational Development Institute.

personal meaning. But I was, in a sense, inclined to rationalize technically oriented curriculum theory that I was familiar with, with the "power" which "is received as truth" (Cherryholmes, 1987, p. 307) in a Korean educational setting.

At that time, I was frustrated by my position of being unable to synchronize the different contradictory poles of curriculum development: the-state-developer pole and the teacher-developer pole; linear-expert pole and dialogical pole; and so on. I was trying to explain curriculum phenomena in terms of causality and efficiency in common with most professors in universities who were dominated and comfortable with a technical stance based on empirical curriculum theories which were pervasive in the Korean curriculum field. Even though I vaguely felt it was insufficient and inadequate to understand and practice curriculum development in Korea in such terms, I didn't have any deep and concrete knowledge or practical alternatives to help solve the problem. I could not help student teachers to understand curriculum phenomena ontologically, for example, in such a manner that they could search for authentic meaning among the participants of the curriculum development process. These contexts had led me to raise the questions: What does it mean for me to teach curriculum courses in a university? What do theory and practice mean? What does it mean for me to develop curriculum? What does it mean to implement curriculum? What does it mean for professors and teachers to explore curriculum theories and knowledge?

In the Fall term of 1984, I came to the department of Secondary Education at the University of Alberta with these problems. I was trying to re-think these issues in my own time and space. I believe that a very important first step in considering these issues is to understand and reflect on my own experience through self-understanding. Hence, I would like to ask the question again in an effort to understand it for personal insight and for improvement of school curriculum: What does it mean for participants in the curriculum development process to work together in the relationship of intersubjectivity for better education?

In this study I attempted to make sense of the different experiences of the educational process from the perspective of a school teacher, a curriculum developer, and as a teacher educator. I have attempted to open myself to historicality, which Heidegger (1962) calls "going on the way toward meaning," to interpret the action and language of inter-subjectivity in curriculum development.

Currently, in Korea there is a pervasive tendency for empirical studies based on a causal explanation of the curriculum development process which selects and organizes curriculum content in mechanical and functional orderliness in order to maximize efficiency, productivity, and control. What are regarded as important to curriculum studies are instrumentality and functionalism, actualized by a small group of planners, experts, and administrators with an organized administrative rationality. The apparent objectivity resulting from emphasizing instrumentality and functionalism, makes it difficult to comprehend the richness of intersubjective experiences of the participants in the process. As a result, the essential vividness of the experience, the question of the meaning of experience, and experience in and of itself becomes ignored as not being ultimately significant in itself, except as it reinforces the handed down notions or conditions (Smith, 1983, p. 19 f.). In this sense, Ricoeur (1970) notes: "Epistemology is only a part of this broad task: We have to recover the act of existing, in the positing of the self, in all the density of its work" (p. 45).

The meaning of the experience of intersubjective relations in curriculum development cannot be understood primarily as deductive causal reasoning, but rather as a hermeneutic process of uncovering the meaning "so that it takes on significance in terms of opening up possibilities" (Carson, 1982, p. 209). Hermeneutic understanding takes the form of demystification, a reduction of illusion, a battle against the masks behind which things appear to stand (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 30). Hermeneutic understanding allows for "letting something be seen by itself" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 180) and to share it with others in terms of present possibilities. The insight of hermeneutic understanding not only demonstrates the

heart of every day life but it will also "summon us to our potentiality-for-being" (ibid., p. 347).

What I am trying to initiate is a better hermeneutic understanding of our being-in-the-world (of the curriculum development process). What I know about this "world" leads back to more fundamental questions: "How do we exist as active intentional participants in the intersubjective relationship of the curriculum development process?" The study concerning the intersubjectivity of curriculum development process is a way to reflect on my preunderstanding as a curriculum researcher in order to arrive at a deeper understanding by dialoguing with, and reflecting on, the texts of the study.

Generally speaking, working together for curriculum development in Korea has been recognized as instrumental action for knowledge production based on technical assumptions, rather than practical action through endless reflection (praxis). These functional factors, whether or not they retard successful curriculum development, are confined by language or a mentality related to instrumental action, and prevent us from taking full account of the dynamics of the development process. Even though the participants in the process who explicitly adopt and agree to an indisputable normative stance may wish to improve the educational process, they cannot escape from their own situated horizons of knowledge and attitudes so that their understandings of the normative stance itself are very different from each other. As a result, there is an essential tension between the direction in which curriculum development process may be oriented according to an interpretive understanding of the process itself in hermeneutic reflection, and the direction in which it may be oriented according to a quasi-understanding of the process itself in the technical mentality. Our understanding of the process can be deepened and enlarged when we continuously engage in honest self-reflection about our pre-understanding of the process in our tradition. The previously mentioned questions about the intersubjectivity of the participants in curriculum development process point to a basic underlying practical question. "How should the participants work together in an intersubjective self-other

relationship for a better curriculum?" Answers to this question can be obtained by searching for a deeper understanding of intersubjectivity through hermeneutic self-reflection.

B. The Research Question

The purpose of this study is to question the curriculum development process for Korean elementary schools which conceptually have embraced the taken-for-granted state-centred technical rationality. This study attempted to search for a deeper understanding of intersubjective relations in a curriculum development process in Korea.

We should be aware of the conditioned status of educational research, especially the subjectivity of the research: all educational research cannot help but have intentions a priori to the research. These intentions are reflected in the questions that initiate the research and are expressions of our interests phrased in the viewpoint of our values. For researchers applying hermeneutic principles, these intentions and questions are not only conditioned by our values, but are also the conditions themselves for our manner of relating meaningfully through dialogue. Moreover, for Gadamer (1984a), our preunderstandings as researchers can be made conscious by our willingness to defend the appropriateness of our understanding through self-reflection, and to justify the legitimacy of our research.

These preunderstandings, prejudgments, or prejudices acting as historical potentiality-for-being affirm the conditioned nature of our being-ness, our being-in-the-world (as a significant condition of temporality) that affects all efforts to interpret human experience. Therefore, the journey toward authentic understanding will be based on the experience of having first projected some preunderstanding or prejudices regarding the problem or subject that we are seeking to understand. In this sense, as part of the research process we should be concerned with our tradition as a source of our prejudices. This study will reflect on the Korean cultural tradition and will relate this to educational and curriculum development in Korea where I, as a researcher, live my life.

On the basis of such understanding, this study attempted to open up to the possibility of authentic meaning in intersubjective relations in a curriculum development process through a dialectical reflection on my own experience of that process. The study was be carried out through my understanding of an ongoing dialectic between the intersubjectivity of the curriculum development process and my reflection on it, as a condition for authentic understanding to help broaden and deepen my horizon of understanding. In this case, my reflection on the curriculum development process originates from my reflection on my being as a subject of this study. That is, an ontological understanding of my being is the pivotal point of the direction of my study. Ontological understanding is grounded on "the horizon of our self-understanding" (Gadamer, 1985, p. 178). It means that it is possible for us to understand a text ontologically through "effective historical consciousness" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 324). The ontological truth of our authentic understanding is "more being than being conscious" (Gadamer, 1985, p.178). Therefore, in this study, I am concerned with the "living relationships" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 407) of intersubjectivity in the curriculum development process through hermeneutic experience, not with the "relationships between judgments which have to be kept free from contradiction" (ibid., p. 407). Furthermore, I attempted to search for new ways and directions toward which curriculum development might be oriented, and for ways to facilitate its improvement by going beyond the present situation.

C. Situating the Question About Intersubjectivity in the Korean Educational Context

The curriculum revision history in Korea can be classified into five periods following the Korean liberation from thirty five years of Japanese colonization:

* The transitional period after the liberation (1945 - 1954)[2] was based on American progressive education theory stressing democratic citizenship education;

1) the first period (1955 - 1962) was based on experience-centred curriculum theory stressing 'learning by doing' of educational experience;

2) the second period (1962 - 1972) was based on experience-centred curriculum theory stressing individual autonomy, productivity, and usability of knowledge;

3) the third period (1973 - 1980) was based on discipline-centred curriculum theory stressing teaching of the structure of disciplines, inquiry process, and the spirit of national identity;

4) the fourth period (1981 - 1986) was based on a synthesized position utilizing curriculum theories stressing the well-rounded person;

5) the fifth period was between 1987 - present. In this period, the curriculum theory and philosophical background are very similar to those of the fourth period. The degree of the revision of curriculum was very partial.

Studying the curriculum revision history in Korea, we can note some common phenomena:

Firstly, the directions in which curriculum revisions were oriented in their attempt to develop better curriculum were influenced by foreign curriculum theories, especially those introduced from America. I doubt if there was any significant consideration given to the relevance of the theories for the Korean educational situation before foreign curriculum theories were adopted. The lack of such consideration resulted in some negative trial and error experiments in Korean educational practice. Contrary to the curriculum developers' expectations, school teachers often understood neither the philosophical and theoretical

---

[2]Korean curricularists do not usually include this period in curriculum revision history because, in this period, the state developed quasi-curriculum was very similar to syllabi for teachers, not "real" curriculum.

foundations of the written curriculum, nor their essence and main points. Hence, they continued to teach students in a traditional mechanical way. The ideas and intentions of the written curricula were left as slogans at the level of the written curriculum documents themselves, and were rarely disseminated nationwide to individual school teachers. And even when they were disseminated to individual school teachers, they were not fully reflected in concrete classroom practice. This situation arose because teachers lacked a full understanding of the curriculum themes and tended to implement them in educational practice without authentic reflection or awareness of the similarities and differences between the cultural, historical, social, and political backgrounds of Americans and Koreans. As a result, this phenomenon caused the stagnation of educational progress in Korea as educators relied on familiar educational practices which were devoid of any philosophical base.

Secondly, we can recognize the current main stream of thinking about curriculum by reflection on the history of Korean curriculum revision. Korean curricula had been revised on the basis of the one theory of curriculum development dominant at the time: moving from subject centred curriculum, to experience-centred curriculum, to discipline-centred curriculum theory. But currently, curricularists have been asked to reconsider the fact that they cannot understand curriculum through one approach. For example, considering technical-systemic, discipline-centred, human-centred, and social-reconstruction approaches to curriculum development often cause discord and conflict among them. Even though the various approaches may have appropriate assumptions and principles for "solving" educational problems, it is very difficult to systematically resolve educational problems with only one approach to understanding and developing curriculum.

Thirdly, both the development and implementation of Korean school curricula are under strong government control and supervision. This centralization of curriculum authority functions not only to restrain teachers from actively participating in the process, but also to enforce teachers to practice curricula

rigidly in schools. As a result, teachers have been alienated from their profession and have come to be passive consumers of the handed-down curriculum in instructional activities. In addition, the centralization of curriculum makes it easier for some specific political groups to intervene in educational affairs for their own interests.

In order to solve the problems now evident in Korean curriculum history, there was much discussion about curriculum development. But most of it was related to selecting curriculum content and organizing it effectively. There has been little questioning of the curriculum development process with a technical-empirical rationale, or of the lived relationships of the participants in the process. This silence in the field of Korean curriculum study will only result in the silencing of serious educational problems.

Curriculum development is a process that helps participants make numerous decisions about selecting and organizing curriculum content. Therefore, the focal point for studies about the curriculum development process should be on an ontological basis so that participants with various interests can work cooperatively in the curriculum process. This context has led me to ask: How could the participants in the process work together for better curriculum? What is the meaning of curriculum development as an intersubjective process for participants in the process?

D. Hermeneutic Research Approach to the Study

My reflections on the intersubjectivity of the curriculum development process were based on three kinds of experiences: my own experiences as a curriculum implementer at the elementary level, as a theorist at the university level, and as as curriculum developer in KEDI.

My study tried to search for an ontological understanding and hence had little concern for statistical claims, predictive validity, or broad generalizations. This study is, however, generalizable in the sense that readers share in an experience and understanding of making "good" curriculum for a better education.

The study included an examination of materials such as diaries of two school teachers who had participated in the process, minutes of curriculum development meetings, autobiographic stories based on my memories, planning documents for curriculum development, and curriculum documents. The major concern of this study focused on the planning and process of curriculum development. Curriculum content and curriculum implementation are discussed in relation to curriculum development as each is an important part of the total process.

Hermeneutics for the Study of Intersubjectivity in the Curriculum Development Process

> As embodied being, we are never isolated, self-contained monadological individual: never *first* individuals, *then* sociable beings. Rather, we are *from the beginning* participants in a shared world, a shared flesh: What Merleau-Ponty called inter 'corporeality' (Levin, Spring 1990, p. 92).

Our interpersonal encounter with the other presumes, sine qua non, that beneath cognition, and preceding personal experience, there is always operative a pre-personal structuring of our perceptual experience which informs the character of our perception with a protomoral compass. Levin, in the quoted passage, implies that he rejects any trace of a view of the awareness of other selves as derived by analogy with one's own self experience, or one's own self experience as derived by imitation of the other. By virtue of this corporeal intersubjectivity of selves who live out of a common sensibility of mutual attunements and forms of responsiveness, our intertwining experiences make it possible for Merleau-Ponty to formulate, as an ideal, a "community of embodied subjects"; an ideal life, based on the realization of our pre-given social disposition - our pre-given moral dispositions (Merleau-Ponty quoted by Levin, Spring 1990, p. 92).

For Merleau-Ponty, the "primordial generality" of the lived body in the corporeal intersubjectivity plays a central role in his explanation of self-others-world. The body expresses meaning and entails a oneness with a unified field or world, as well as a oneness with others.

For Levinas, the Other is not simply an alter ego, an appresented analogue of my self. We are not relatives. There is between us an absolute difference. The absolute Other, according to Levinas, demands my absolute commitment to him, my absolute responsibility to him as a permanent face. It has never been consciously assumed and it can never be discharged. Encounter with the Other forces an essential change upon me. I am now no longer defined by myself but by the Other. The self acknowledges itself to be fundamentally guilty before the Other, Levinas' corporeality is metaphysical because it is ethical. And "it is ethical not because it is either a code of ethics or a metaphysics of ethics with which Levinas is concerned" (Llewelyn, 1985, p. 185).

> The face I welcome makes me pass from phenomenon to being in another sense: in discourses I expose myself to the questioning of the Other, and this urgency of the response - acuteness of the present - engenders me for responsibility; as responsible I am brought to my final reality (Levinas, 1969, p. 178).

Levinas attempts to show the language concealing phenomenon, lulling us into its own labyrinthean complacency, in terms of a pacific exigency: an inescapable ethical responsibility to the Other.

At this point, having inquired into Merleau-Ponty's and Levinas' main ideas about intersubjective relationships of human encounters with one another, I drew the following conclusions:

1) Intersubjective relationships in interhuman communication must be of corporeal intersubjectivity in co-presence.
2) The selves as subjects in the relationship must be decentered.
3) The acts of subjects must be a social commitment, in co-response, called on one another from one another.

4) Duties and responsibilities must be considered as the praxical problem of all us in our everyday intercourse in society.

5) For the study of praxis based on mutual attunement and understanding, dialogical, "hermeneutic place" (Schrag, 1986) must be constituted as its foundation.

> ... because everything (in the world and out of it) is included in the realm of "understanding" and understandability in which we move...there would be no hermeneutical task if there were no mutual understanding that has been disturbed and that those involved in a conversation must search for and find again together (Gadamer, 1976, p. 25).

As mentioned before, the corporeal intersubjectivity in co-presence, and the absolute responsibility in co-presence, are based fundamentally on mutual understanding. This implies that hermeneutics, which is an art of interpretation and a way of mundane practice, must be the foundation on which intersubjective relationship in interhuman communication stands. The speech acts and the acts of understanding, in actuality, closely corresponded to each other: "Their correlation consists in that every act of understanding is the reverse of an act of speaking, and one must grasp the thought that underlies a given utterance" (Schleiermacher quoted by Muller-Vollmer, 1985, p. 10). The ultimate task of hermeneutics as a critical, emancipatory endeavour is precisely that of maintaining the openness of human discourse, whether spoken or written, as an infinite - open dialogical event. The primary human reality is persons in dialogue through which self-and/or mutual understanding is at all possible. Dialogue is the ultimate context in which the Other is to be understood. And the understanding in human practice is the basic root for the intersubjectivity to be possible at all. Dialogical moment is the co-disclosure of the self and Other in a hermeneutics of every day life textured as an amalgam of discourse and social practice.

Understanding of hermeneutic experience is a *poiesia* which is a production of one's understanding text through the imagination, which finds its roots in nonobjectifying forms of life whose character is linguistic, whose mode of life is

wondering and co-responsive. Hermeneutics "remains cognizant of an *apercu* to that which is Other, an alterity, that is produced from out of but, hopefully, not reduced to discursive presence" (Lilly, 1986, p. 231).

This study is an unending dialogue with myself relating to the understanding of intersubjective experience for the purpose of forming new horizons in "spiral successive, more encompassing understandings" (Leibniz, 1989, p. 250), in which the interpreter himself is shaped by the process itself. This fusion of horizons in which "one attempts ... to make the other as strong as possible so that his statements obtain some intelligibility" (Gadamer quoted by Risser, 1991, p. 103) in various new voices, may be possible by juxtaposing my prejudices with a tradition which is "not an object but the world horizon that embraces us" (Gadamer, 1985, p. 190).

Human understanding involves self-understanding (Hoy, 1980, p. 653). To understand is to understand oneself in front of the text" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 143). The truth of the text is in fact the truth of ourselves, or about the world which it unfolds in the interpreter's appropriation. The comprehension of the condition of the appearance of things is related to the structure of human subjectivity which is not the correlate of objectivity. Subjectivity grounded in an ontological participation of being-in-the-world constitutes an objectivity. All understanding flows out of this ontological constitution. Understanding at this primordial level is not epistemological, nor methodological but ontological, i.e., it attests to the fact that we belong to being (van Den Hengel, 1982, p. 194). In this sense, my study is to understand myself in front of the experiencing of intersubjectivity as a text "in the space of difference" (Silverman, 1986, p. 88) between cultures and traditions. Our belonging to being "is more directed toward the intentional unity of discourse in circular process" (Ricoeur,1976, p. 11) in my historicity. Heidegger (1962) sees hermeneutics as "an interpretation of the meaning of being" (p. 424). Through hermeneutic rationality it is possible to promote the understanding of communicative and symbolic patterns of interaction (Giroux, 1981, p.11). We can search for "forming a relationship between inner and outer, part and whole"

(Bleicher, 1980, p. 26). Hermeneutics, for Gadamer, is a way of experiencing which is prior to all methodical alienation, because meaning can be experienced (Gadamer, 1976).

Through hermeneutic awareness, we can hold ourselves open in a conversation with somebody else about our shared world in the "polarity of familiarity and strangeness on which hermeneutic work is based" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 262). I can understand ontologically the meaning of experiencing living relationships of intersubjectivity so that I can move to a further unending determination of new horizons. I can move to a reciprocal sharing of new horizons with the text, or others by fusing of horizons in "a commonality of openness" (Barry, Spring 1986, p. 21). It is the dialectic of repetition of new horizons "to efface itself in its own creation. What occurs at some particular time of course can never be exactly repeated" (Sartwell, Fall 1989, p. 24).

"Method" of Interpretation

> ...there are no facts, everything is in flux, incomprehensible elusive; what is relatively most enduring is - our opinions. ...no, facts are precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact 'in itself': perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing (Nietzsche quoted by Megill, 1985, p. 86 f.).

Nietzsche captured the concept of interpretation in a completely new and radical sense. "The will to power" changes completely the idea of interpretation: it is no longer the manifested meaning of a statement of text, but the text's and its interpreter's function in the presentation of life. In fact, interpretation as an inherent and working out form of understanding is "a laying open of the 'mood and direction' of human existence" towards meaning (Smith, 1983b, p. 57).

This study was initiated to search for ontological meaning through such powerful interpretations on the basis of hermeneutic understanding in my temporal historicity. Such meaning, 'meaningfulness' as coined by Heidegger, "provides the ontological possibility that words can have meaningful significance" and "is not something man gives to an object: it is what an object gives to man

through supplying the ontological possibility of words and language" (Palmer, 1969, p. 134). This meaningfulness is in itself immanent in the texture of this study. How, then, can I achieve meaningfulness in my study? Which method will guarantee meaningfulness as comprehended by our existence in historicality?

To what extent is method a guarantor of truth? In his book Truth and Method (1984a), Gadamer claims that truth and method are in unresolved tension, not identical certainly, but not dichotomized either. The title of the book, Truth and Method, did not intend that the antithesis it implies should be mutually exclusive (Gadamer, 1983, p. 58). What is an antithesis that is not mutually exclusive? It might be more accurate to say that, for Gadamer, truth and method form a contrast that is never raised to antithesis. Method is not the way to truth. Truth eludes the methodical person (Smith, 1983b, p. 58). "Method is incapable of revealing new truth; it only renders explicit the kind of truth already implicit in the method. The discovery of the method itself was not achieved at through method but dialectically, that is, through a questioning responsiveness to the matter being encountered" (Palmer, 1969, p. 165).

> Thus, I look as my own point of departure the critique of the idealism and methodologism in our era dominated by epistemology; ...That was the impetus that induced me to go critically beyond the discussion of method...(Gadamer, 1989, p. 22).

Gadamer seeks to defend what is appropriate for the humanities against encroachment by the ideal of "scientific" knowledge. He attacks the concept of "method," arguing that method as it is understood in the positive science has no role to play in humanities. "Gadamer is constantly battling against the intrusion of method into hermeneutics and the *Geistewissenschaften*" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 45). In deliberately opposing method and in saying that "hermeneutics is a universal aspect of philosophy, and not just the methodological basis of the so-called human sciences" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 433), Gadamer tends to give the impression that method has no place in hermeneutic interpretation.

I am not sure about Gadamer's understanding of "method," in his book Truth and Method (1984a), and whether or not he sees the seeds of the possibility

for his theory of understanding to be used as a method in human sciences. He says that "I can also understand why one could believe that it is possible to recognize methodological 'immanence' in my holding fast to the hermeneutical circle" (Gadamer, 1989, p. 26); the true hermeneutic method which is not really a method seeks to bring out of the dark these aspects of experience; what the tool of method does not achieve must be achieved by a discipline of questioning and research (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 446 f.). MacIntyre (1984) argues that in this sense, even though Gadamer insists that his work is not a methodological treatise, his position on the nature of the phenomenon of understanding has profound implications for the social sciences (p. 46). Madison (1988) extracts some general rules to understand human sciences from Gadamer's propositions of hermeneutics (pp. 25 - 39).

"Gadamer used the title Truth and Method to contrast hermeneutic openness to the truth with the arbitrary limitations of all precise methods" (Shapiro and Sica, 1984, p. 8). The hermeneutic openness is not merely a subjective human process, a way of being human. Hermeneutic openness to the truth, by contrasting methods, implies all method is already an interpretation of our temporal historicality. It is historical life which is the final arbiter and ground of truth (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 59). We can understand the meaning of intersubjectivity by hermeneutic inquiry not as a set of objectivated practices and procedures, but an attentiveness and openness to all human historical life in curriculum studies. In this sense, I would affirm that the method of this study is a hermeneutic circle as a process of understanding in openness. As a researcher, I will affirm the dialectical encounter with the tradition being researched. Hence, it will be possible to begin to interpret the meaningfulness of understanding as "being." The viewpoint of the historicality and linguisticality of hermeneutic experience is necessary to satisfy the "methodological" expectations of this research in such a way that the ontological significance of research, and the understanding of intersubjectivity, can be made clearer. The process of this study has a life of its own and is often filled with developments and events which are not anticipated

nor intended. This in itself shows the importance of the study and the conditioned historicity of the researcher - the situatedness in tradition.

According to Nietzsche (1964a), all searches for causes, for subjects and so forth are moral searches in the sense that they seek to uncover who or what is responsible for things being as they are. Knowledge is in its essence a "*regressus in infinition*" p. 76, §575[3]), ultimately a moral ideology in which men engage themselves in order to better survive. Therefore, with the will of defense of the will to truth, we should open up our-selves to hear the voice of openness through hermeneutic awareness and reflection.

> Just as one who uses a tool does not treat that tool as an object, but works with it, so too the understanding in which Dasein understands itself in its Being and in its world is not a way of comporting itself toward definite objects of knowledge, but is rather the carrying out of Being-in-the-world itself (Gadamer, 1989, p. 23).

Method is not something external to the reflective attitude in our hermeneutic inquiry. In fact, the researcher, in a sense, embodies the method in his/her reflective, doubting, attentive stance towards meaningfulness in the endless repetition. The method, in this sense, is an integral part of our hermeneutic reflective attitude, and not simply a "method" that is external to what it is to be a researcher as a being-in-the-world.

Hermeneutic Questioning

In questioning, Heidegger (1977) argued, one exists as a "shepherd of Being" (p. 210) and human nature comes to itself:

> Only as a questioning, historical being does man come to himself; only as such is he a self. Man's selfhood means this: he must transform the being that discloses itself to him into history and bring himself to stand in it (1959, p. 143).

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[3]Nietzsche's works are generally cited by section numbers because the section numbers (that is the numbers of aphorisms) are numbered consecutively and are standard in all editions, both English and German.

The starting point of experiencing as a human being is in all true questioning, without which we cannot have experience. Human experience can be experienced through the negative nature[4] of our experiencing itself. With the questioning, dialectical experience has its own completion in that openness to experience that is encouraged by experience itself (Gadamer, 1984a. p. 319).

Gadamer (ibid.) argues that questioning raises the historicity of our thinking and knowing (p. 337). Experience resulting from questioning is the experience of human finitude. Being experienced is the consciousness of finitude which is the understanding that something exceeds understanding, a consciousness of history and our own historicity. This conscious openness to experience consists of dialectical dialogue. Tradition is not simply a series of events that we come to know; it is experience that we come to understand. Dialogue consists of mutual concern with a common topic. The relationship in dialogue must be reciprocal; each must belong to the other; what the other says is something addressed to him. "Someone who is open in this way to tradition sees that historical consciousness is not really open at all, but rather, if it reads its texts 'historically' has always thoroughly smoothed them out beforehand, so that the criteria of our knowledge can never be put in question by tradition" (ibid., 1984a, p. 325). The openness of hermeneutic consciousness is to know that we ourselves still have something to learn from tradition; and it involves the same openness to experience. Being experienced, being open to experience, and being conscious of finitude means that one understands what one does not know.

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[4]Gadamer argues that experience has its dialectical fulfilment not in a conscious knowing (unlike Hegel's suggestion that knowledge is acquired through a self-objective consciousness) but "openness to experience that is encouraged by experience itself" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 319). According to Gadamer, dialectic of experience as a principle of dynamic change is fulfilled in the negative moment of the dialectic. This notion of negative inherent in the dialectical encounter is crucial point for Gadamer's hermeneutics.

Genuine questions are different from pedagogical and rhetorical questions[5] in that they not only apparently, but actually do, reveal that something is questionable and bring it onto the stage of possibility and openness. The questions are not boundless, but limited by the horizon of the question (ibid., p. 327). They are bounded by a horizon within which openness consists in the possibility of the things being this way or that. "That open question is not infinitely open means that it too is leading question and gives direction, but its openness consists in its leading in several possible directions to several answers" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 207). A question is "thought's movement, kinesis, the work (*ergon*) of a thing" (Caputo, 1987, p. 188), "a piety of thought about meaning" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 114).

"There is no such thing as a method of learning to ask questions, of learning to see what needs to be questioned" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 327). A universal question without limits and without horizon has no possible answer. As Gadamer suggests, Socratic dialectic[6] is an art of questioning, not a method. Genuine questions remain open so that questions can still occur to the respondent answerer and questioner alike. Openness to this occurrence is hermeneutic consciousness such that the interpreter does not dispense with these prejudices. "The art of questioning is that of being able to go on asking questions, i.e., the art of thinking. It is called dialectic, 'for it is the art of conducting real conversation"

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[5]Ladelle, in a "book review of Kenneth Burke and Martin Heidegger, With a Note Against Deconstruction written by Samuel B. Southovell (Philosophy and Rhetoric, 23 - 1, 1991, pp. 75 - 80) names this rhetoric question as "a mere prelude to an assertion." In the articles, for Heidegger, the question of Being is significant, then, because it is a real question, a question that disrupts the arrogant self-assurance of Western metaphysical thought and forces it to reflect upon itself.

[6]Palmer (1969) envisages Socrates' approach as a model of the dialectical encounter in questioning: --- in Socrates' vacillation --- from different angles lies the willingness to risk everything and be instructed by the subject matter itself. Beneath the artful shiftiness of Socrates the serious intention to let the subject under discussion lead the way (p. 234).

(ibid., p. 330). In addition, "we say that a question too 'comes' to us, that it 'arises' or 'presents' itself more than we raise it or present it" (ibid., p. 328).

For Gadamer, (ibid.), the task of hermeneutics is conversation with the text (p. 331). The interpreter is drawn into conversation with the text. The task of hermeneutics implies transforming fixed assertions into conversation and bringing the bygone and static past back into the process of history.

In dialogue, questioning is reciprocal. "To open a conversation with a text means to understand the question to which text is an answer[7] as an open question" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 210). To open a text to discussion means to open its topic to the possibility of an interpreter's interpretation. The interpreter does not make assertions but asks questions. The text asks of him as well. Thus, "the reciprocity of questioning is realized when the interpreter puts a question to the text by which he in turn is put in question" (ibid., p. 210). The question asked by the text emerges with the interpreter's own questioning and the dialectic which is the fusion of horizons. We need the text in order to place our own prejudices at risk and point out the doubt of what we take for granted. We can disclose new possibilities for questioning and extend our own horizon by fusing it with that of the text. Hence, we can open ourselves to history. In this manner, questioning makes us go beyond the horizon of the question itself by the guidance of the text itself. In fact, "the question and ultimate answer both belong to the research, and the subject of the research is merely the medium through which the question finds the answer" (Grumet, 1985, p. 9). Mutual understanding is reached in conversation itself. "Every conversation presupposes a common language" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 341). Reaching a common understanding, a common sense, depends upon the achievement of a common language in which the partners can communicate.

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[7]Gadamer presupposes "the structure of question and answer " (1984a, p. 333) in dialogical experience. All this experience reflects this presupposition: "Every experience worthy of the name runs counter to our expectation" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 319).

Experiencing The Curriculum Development Process as Text

All human experience that "we are endeavouring to understand from the centre of language" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 422) or "all kinds of signs in which psychic life expresses itself" (Ricoeur, 1979, p. 73) is text to be understood and interpreted. In fact, according to Riceour (1981), human action is an open work as a text, which opens up new references. Therefore, all significant events and deeds are opened to the practical interpretation through present praxis (p. 208). In this study, the living relationships of the intersubjectivity of participants in Korean curriculum development is the text as a work of discourse. For Palmer, the attitude of interpreter/researcher is one of expectancy, of waiting for something to open from the text:

> He is not so much a knower as experience, the encounter is not a conceptual grasping of something but an event in which a world opens itself up to him. Insofar as each interpreter stands in a new horizon, the event that comes to language in the hermeneutical experience is something new that emerges, something that did not exist before (Palmer, 1969, p. 209).

The text of intersubjectivity, to interpretive educational research, is significantly the hermeneutic experience that finds fulfilment through the emergence of relationships which did not exist before. The meanings from the interpretation are the sense of a text; a process of making-sense; what the text speaks about in the tradition; those which become the space of a critically reflective self constitution. Such meanings are the appearances which are expressed on the lines of the text. But hidden intentions and assumptions can be read behind or between the lines as well; what is "behind what is said" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 333) in order to understand the text at the latent deep level. Consequently, this study represents the issues of meaning and existence that in themselves signify (through the potential of awareness and understanding) the hidden meaning of the interactions in the process. The tacit meaning, or rather the implicitly conditioned nature of living relationships can be interpreted by exploring mainly the language actions and attitude of one to another that mediate

the relationship.

Post-structuralists argue that texts are autonomous and make claims that are fictional. For Eagleton (1983), meanings come from "the binary opposition with which classical structuralism tends to present a way of seeing, typical of ideologies" (p. 133). To understand a text one must go back and forth between what is present and what is absent. One must read the silences of a text as well as what has appeared. The ideological commitments of a proposed transcendental signified can be illuminated by surveying the boundary of the text and determining what is and what is not. Ryan (1984) described text as "the issue or web of differential relations and references that...envelops both linguistic processes and the historical world" (p. 39). What is expressed as centre, and what purports to ground meaning for and in a sign, Cherryhomes (1987) argues, is an illusion (p. 303). The reason is that what is put forward presupposes another signifier that already exists and that in turn presuppose still others. "If we attempt to trace the central ideas back to their origins, we find either that they continually lead to prior ideas or contradict themselves" (p. 303).

Ricoeur (1979) argues that what is interpreted is neither the author's intention nor the arbitrariness of the reader (pp. 73 - 102). Rather what is interpreted is the proposed world as unfolded in front of the text, which we could inhabit and which would project our own possibilities: the initial intention towards a world and the reflexive orientation towards a self.

Actually, the interpreter does not come from a zero-point. We interpret a text with a prejudice of meaning which is formed by our own tradition. Thus it is possible to say that "a text is understood only if it is understood in a different way every time" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 275 f.). Even though the interpreter evolves himself with its meaning, Gadamer argues (ibid.), being aware of one's bias, based on hermeneutic reflection which fulfils its function of bringing something to a conscious awareness, can make " the text present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one's pre-meanings" (p. 238). So it is said that the new meaning "is not only mine or the author's but common" (ibid., p.

350): a transformation into a communion in which we do not remain what we were.

In this study I will try to understand the meaning of intersubjectivity of the participants in the Korean curriculum development process. The reason that I chose the experience of intersubjectivity is to prevent the study from becoming an abstract discussion, and to make the research questions emerge from actual concrete situations. This experience is a text in hermeneutic understanding in which tradition and prejudices are embedded; it presents the tradition and prejudices of Korean educators.

> The story a man is acting out determines his actions more than a verbally stated rule he is following (Novak, 1970, p. 25). There is no place, apart from a standpoint. We are always living out a story (Novak, 1971, p. 62).

This study, to inquire into the meaning of intersubjectivity was initiated by confirming my standpoint which was "as critical a focus as theory is in human science" (ibid., p. 55) and mainly based on personal reflections of my experience as related to the curriculum development, the "situated event" (King, 1986, p. 36). Autobiographic writing and process, in fact, " is designed to create dissonance, to dislodge the comfortable fit of self-as-object, self-as-place, self-as-agent" (Pinar and Grumet, 1976, p. 79).

What I tried to search for was meaningfulness of experiences as text. Schutz (1964) tells us that the meaningfulness does not lie in experience, rather those experiences are meaningful only when they are grasped reflectively. This self reflection comes from conditioned and existential laws: my historicality and my linguisticality. Therefore, this study to search for meaning of intersubjectivity could not help but start from my autobiographical reflection on the experience related to the curriculum development process.

> We are voices in a chorus that transforms lived life into narrated life and then return to life, not in order to reflect life, but rather to add something else, not a copy but a new measure more, to life (Fuentes quoted by Madison, 1990, p. 168).

"Story telling as a negation of power" (Grumet, 1985, p. 25) has come to be

the very reflective and participating moment when the narrator would be protected from having to accommodate to the forms and expectations of the ideological present that it addresses. At the very moment of appropriation involved in the writing of a narrative there emerges an awareness of self which is lost in the ordinary language structure and a way of living within conventional public forms. "Action reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance of the historian, who indeed always knows better what it was all about than the participants. ...Even though stories are the inevitable results of action, it is not the action but the storyteller who perceives and 'makes' the story" (Arendt, 1958, p. 192). Arendt argues that narrative must be hidden from the actor himself because to him the meaningfulness of his act is not in the story. But, as time has passed, to me as an autobiographical writer as well as a storyteller of others' stories, what has been left is not the consequences of my act but only the stories of my act. Memory is irreducibly mixed thinking. It does not function as some wharehouse from which perfect thoughts can be taken out but presents an aspect to and/or from which thinking can turn. As a storyteller of my self's story and the stories of other selves' stories, I have brought some new meaningfulness, something more to life - the curriculum development process. An experience is no longer just something that flows past quickly in the stream of consciousness - it is meant as a unity and this attains a new mode of being. Thus, the world which expresses one's past experience, Gadamer argues, emerges in biographical literature and ultimately stems from its use in autobiography. Everything that is experienced by ourselves is part of the meaning that belongs to the unity of self and thus contains an inalienable or irreplaceable relation to the whole of this life. I can, therefore, grasp my "whole movement of life" through autobiography which expresses my past experience. Actually, autobiographical reflection, which is the mode of being of experience, takes then the time to assimilate experiences and is their real being and significance, rather than their original content as such. The experiences which establish themselves in memory are not soon forgotten.

Hegel argues that "the essential nature of the historical spirit does not

consist in the restoration of the past, but in the thoughtful mediation with contemporary life" (quoted by Gadamer, 1984a, p. 150). The meaning of our experience, the historical spirit, remains in the present in our memories through our thoughtful meditation - autobiographical reflection. One could memorize many things and forget others. "One wants to preserve one thing in memory and banish another. ...Forgetting belongs within the context of remembering and recalling in a way that has long before ignored; forgetting is not merely an absence and a lack but,...a condition of the life of mind" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 16). Thus we can get new broader memories which are new prejudices opening up the possibility of new broader horizons in a new open hermeneutic circle. Gadamer (ibid.) puts it in this way:

> Only by forgetting does the mind have the chance of total renewal, the capacity to see everything with fresh eyes, so that what is long familiar combines with the new into a many levelled unity (p. 16).

Hence, these points explain why and how hermeneutically autobiographical reflection is so significant for the study, why I needed to explain past experience in a previous section, and why I started the study by remembering my personal past experiences of intersubjectivity; in other words, how remembering can be the text for this study. To Gadamer(1985), remembrance always comes to us in such a way that the re-presenting offers a brief respite from forgetting. "Remembrance of being is no way the memory of a prior knowing now presencing. It is a memory of a prior questioning, a memory of a lost question" (p. 187). Of course, this remembrance is related to my own experience of curriculum development process as an event as well as to written documents, written curriculum materials, and participants' speaking act, written or spoken, as a discourse. This study is reliant on my memories and written materials. Thus, remembrance is the source and context of my narratives of past events and the context of the written materials which are related to the curriculum development process.

The meaning of my experiencing of intersubjectivity in this study is discussed, therefore, through storytelling of my own and others' experiences

related to the curriculum development process in Korea. The hermeneutic experience from the text of intersubjectivity offers the moment and locus for this study. It has the structure of a practical performance taking place as a unity of action - projection and critical reflection within the purview of the agent. Hermeneutic experience is the process of coming to greater self understanding constituting a change in the present itself, thus creating a need for further rethinking of existing interpretation and self-understanding.

The Korean Educational Development Institute was requested in 1980 by the Ministry of Education to conduct research on and to develop curricula for kindergarten, elementary, junior, and senior high schools. In response to this, KEDI developed the curricula of the schools on the basis of the overall synthesis of the basic research done by KEDI since 1978.

After reviewing the curricula developed by KEDI, the Ministry of Education decided to use them as the standard nation-wide curricula for Korean schools. The figure on the next page illustrates the general principles and procedures of planning for curriculum change. The variables such as political and social changes in society, changes in educational point of view in understanding learners and subject matter, and problems of the existing curriculum are considered as important factors which can directly and indirectly affect curriculum change.

The first step of the procedure identifies the stage where the Ministry of Education, which has the power to decide curriculum change, makes the decision considering the above variables, and states in what way the change is to be implemented. The Ministry of Education also decides at this stage if it will request KEDI to develop a new curriculum.

The second step is the actual development stage of a new curriculum. It consists of developing the general outline of the new curriculum and the specific details for each subject. The former has to be first and the latter next.



Figure 1: Curriculum Design Procedure
Source: Korean Educational Development Institute; the plan of KEDI for the fourth curriculum revision with the approval of MOE[8] (1980).

[8]The MOE is the abbreviation of the Ministry of Education in Korea. Hereafter, I will use this abbreviation for the Ministry of Education.

The third step indicates the reviewing stage. In order to review the new curriculum, the Ministry of Education strikes an examining committee consisting of supervisors, school teachers, and curriculum and subject specialists who are nominated by the Ministry of Education. The committee reviews and examines the newly developed curriculum very carefully through several meetings. After passing this examination procedure, the curriculum is promulgated by the government as the new curriculum.

The fourth step shows the final stage of the procedures. The new curriculum is distributed and applied to each and every level of school in the country.

Explanation and Understanding

This study is concerned with making the intersubjective curriculum development process visible and understandable. This approach attempts to make the intersubjective act meaningful, relying mainly on understanding. Winch (1958) says, "understanding is grasping the point of what is being done or said. This is a notion far removed from the world of statistics' and causal law: it is closer to the realm of discourse and to the internal relations that link the parts of a realm of discourse" (p. 115). The hermeneutic process of understanding has as its task a discovery of knowledge and the transformation of it into communion in the sense of *verstehen* that cannot be attained by the strict or empirical-analytic sciences.

Basing his ideas on a *Lebensphilosophie*, Dilthey makes the "epistemo-logical" distinction between human or social science and natural science: *Geisteswissenschaften* and *Naturwissenschaften*. The cognitive task of natural sciences is to explain by means of causal principles or hypothesized correlations among the effective variables. Human or social sciences seek to provide for an understanding of the ways in which man subjectively and culturally experiences the social world. According to Dilthey (1962), we explain nature, but it is man/woman we must understand. Understanding involves the capacity to grasp the inner realities of the human world. To understand is not to explain causally, but is

rather to transport life into every form of expression of an alien or distant life experience. We understand ourselves and others by re-experiencing. Because I am a living being, a part of life, I can reconstructively understand other objectivations - the forms of expressions - of Life. Thus, to understand is to interpret. Interpretation is the means whereby we can come to know in its own otherness what is humanly other, in effect to coincide imaginatively with it. To Dilthey, the goal of interpretation is to achieve a reproduction. Thereby *Geisteswissenschaften* become respectable disciplines by being assured of their own unique epistemological status as well as their own scientific objectivity - with the method: "Understanding." Dilthey assigned himself as his task to secure for the *Geisteswissenschaften* their epistemological foundation. In the Diltheyan view of cognitive activities of natural sciences and human or social sciences, explanation (*Erklärung*) and understanding (*verstehen*) are viewed as two different, and even antagonistic, modes of inquiry.

> Philosophy's central concern is to be a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up into areas which represent
> reality well, those which represent less well, and those which do not represent it at all...(Husserl quoted by Madison, 1988, p. 43).

In Husserl's view, all the particular sciences are a form of totality organized in a hierarchical order with phenomenology at its head, as an all embracing science self-grounded on an absolute foundation: transcendental subjectivity - *Lebenswelt* (life-world). The life-world is the immediate flow of unreflective life, the ground out of which arises all scientific thematization and theorizing, the world as we actually live it, a world, therefore, which precedes the distinction between subjective and objective. Husserl argues that life-world is the prescientific world of lived experience, from which and of which all scientific constructs are mere idealizations, abstractions, and interpretations.

For Nietzsche, whatever has value in our world has value only because it has been given value by man: "only we have created the world that concerns me!" (Nietzsche quoted by Megill, 1985, p. 91). Nietzsche very rarely seems to admit an

objective account of a thing, entirely without interpretation; he, for all practical purposes, finds the subjective side of the dichotomy, of explanation and interpretation, interesting and even to some degree relevant. He thinks that an attempt to throw a net of interpretation over the world has a positive enjoyment and nobility. He rejects as vain the attempt to acquire a certain and objective knowledge and opts instead for the beautiful possibilities by interpretation (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 206, §10).

Generally speaking, hermeneutics is the reflective inquiry into an understanding of the world, which is the fundamental mode of our being-in-the-world and the all-embracing form of the constitution of the world, and of all the various forms and modes in which understanding manifests itself. If we accept this notion of hermeneutics, natural sciences are all included in the scope of hermeneutics, which is universal. All scientific structure and theories should be based on hermeneutic practice which is culminated by the interpretation of our experience. Thomas Kuhn (1977) introduces us to the essential judgmental quality of scientific rationality. For him, scientific reasoning is not a matter of induction or deduction or self-evident reasoning based on the adequate theoretical representation of objective reality, but is a matter of interpretation and persuasion through actual scientific praxis.

In this sense, scientific explanation is not something opposed to understanding. Explanations are a way to narrate the world, and are themselves interpretations of the flux of our experience. Explanation has been invented in order to achieve a sense of understanding. A pure explanation of human affairs by means of a purely intellectual process (even though I think it is impossible) is inevitably reductionistic. Because of this phenomena, Winch (1958) resists the attempt to incorporate explanation into the human or social sciences. He argues that we can hope to understand what is human only if we resist all attempts to explain it. Therefore, in hermeneutic practice, explanation could be used as a legitimate stage in understanding in which there is always self-understanding. Explanation cannot explain understanding fully. It is simply one way in which

people attain a partial understanding. Explanation can be used without creating a problem for understanding when it is recognized for the partial, non-totalizable mode of understanding it is. Ricoeur (1981) places explanation in the "hermeneutic arc" (p. 161). He suggests it as a useful means for a structural explanation of text. He argues that we can reach the deeper understanding of a text by the dialectic of understanding and explanation.

> With the term "understanding" we have in mind a fundamental *existentiale*, which is neither a definite *specis of cognition* distinguished, let us say, from explaining and conceiving, nor any cognition at all in the sense of grasping something thematically. Understanding constitutes rather the Being of the "there" in such a way that, on the basis of such understanding, a *Dasein* can, in existing, develop the different possibilities of sight, of looking around, [Sichumsehens], and of just looking. In all explanation one uncovers understandingly that which one cannot understand; and all explanation is thus rooted in Dasein's primaly understanding (Heidegger, 1962, p. 385).

According to Heidegger, explanation is a derivative of understanding. Explanation is in the nature of a complement to understanding, not of a dialectic with understanding. Explanation is confined, by its very nature, to the partial in the hermeneutic circle. Explanation of the partial should be refined by the understanding of the whole in the hermeneutic circle. Gadamer (1989) puts it this way. "In the case, a hermeneutical principle can be applied: In case of conflict [bei Anstöβe] the larger context should decide the issue...the word beautiful in the line is applied to a lamp ...the poem as a whole is asserting and is a message..." (p. 50).

> The curious fact about speaking understanding solely by means of explanation is that such an attempt makes it absolutely impossible to achieve any kind of genuine self-understanding, since the self is precisely that which eludes all explanation (Madison, 1988, p. 48).

Interpretation and Validity

This study aims at searching for meanings, not pre-given but produced through intersubjective relationship from the narrated text, by me and others, as discourse related to the curriculum development process. Meanings, even from the

same texts, are in flux along with our lived-experience, and the meanings especially in this study are dependent upon the methodology with which I have carried out my study and by my point of view. Even though Gadamer would not admit that among understandings, there is no authentic understanding or quasi-understanding, I will argue that there may be better understanding or less understanding according to the approach to the text and the process which produces understandings. If there are no differences between the quality of meanings without regards to the methods and the process, we do not need to consider the validity of interpretation in this section. I would begin by stressing that it is naturally admitted that, according to common conceptions of method, it would be incorrect if interpretations using the same method and text should vary in their sensitivity to the themes investigated, and obtain different understandings of the text. But within hermeneutic practice searching for meaningfulness from texts, it would be an advantage that interpreters vary in sensitivity; they may be able to obtain a broader and richer understanding and interpretation of the text focused upon. Therefore, I discuss the validity of interpretation with the aim of achieving sensitivity, and a better and richer understanding. I am reminded of the importance of this by Nietzsche: "The man of action." Nietzsche (1977) says the man of action binds up his life to reason and its concepts which rob it of its multiplicity, and human experience of its original richness and validity, in order to avoid being swept away and losing himself; while the scientific investigator builds his hut close to the building site of the tower of science in order to be able to help with its construction and to find protection under its bulwarks (p. 88, §2). Thus the truth which man has created plays an absolutely indispensable role in human life. The problem is that they take it to be a portrayal of reality itself so that it rigidifies and impairs the richness and immediacy of lived experience.

Validity means "whether one has in fact investigated what one wished to investigate" (Kvale, 1983, p. 191). One form of validity is content (internal validity) and the method by which the study investigates the content it intended to investigate (Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley, 1963). According to Merleau-

Ponty, the relation between observer and object, between the seer and the visible, is not one of simple identity but rather involves a complex interaction and mutual interrogation: "intertwining" or "reversal" (quoted by Bien, 1978, p. 104).

As Merleau-Ponty says, in human sciences, especially hermeneutic studies which deal with such complex phenomena as the meanings of corporeal intersubjectivity, we cannot grasp the authentic meanings by means of fixed, monologic scientific methods. Ricoeur (1981) claims that the validity of interpretation can be achieved by "guessing," based on "judgments," which are closer to a logic of probability than to a logic of empirical verification. In this sense, validity is not verification. Validation is an argumentative descriptive discipline requiring the reflexive, non-hypothetic method appropriate to itself in order to persuade others. "To validate is to investigate...validity is concerned with making sense of a situation" (Cherryholmes, 1988, p. 102). Therefore, "The promise of validity as certainty, rigor, and positive knowledge is false and dangerous when paraded clothed in technical expertise" (Ibid., p.121). In his book, Radical Reflection and the Origin of the Human Sciences, Schrag (1980), explores what he terms "the evident crisis in the source in the current science of man...tottering Tower of Babel" (p. ix). To remedy this crisis he suggests a return to the source from which arises the intended phenomena of the human sciences of man. That is to say, the methodological procedure appropriate to interhuman communication study. These procedures which are processes of interpretive understanding and meanings are formations which organize the original world of experience into the phenomena of human existence. "If the origins are not to be occluded, the phenomena should be permitted to speak for themselves and thus guide the construction of methodological theory and this rejection of the primacy of method is that methodology is no longer the absolute presupposition of inquiry but is itself a part of the experimental furniture" (ibid., p. 102 f.).

According to Heidegger, the process of inquiry into human being is ultimately circular. By this circularity, I mean that not only the structure of the whole process of the study of human beings, but also the concrete interpreting

moment of a text moves forward repetitiously in spiral circularity in a hermeneutic circle in openness. In order to protect the interpretation, understanding should be appropriated in a hermeneutic circle in openness. This openness means both that the interpreter opens himself up to the textuality of the text and that the textuality of the text opens itself up to the interpreter: co-responses. In the hermeneutic circle, understanding is a production through interpretation of one's understanding of a text. In this circle, "there is no proving or disproving but only a certain letting-be-seen" in our wondering (Caputo, 1987, p. 81). With this repetitious, spiral circularity of our understanding in the openness, it is possible to prevent its circularity from collapsing into vicious metaphysical solipsism and avoid an artificial aperture on the world through metaphysical hypostatization.

CHAPTER TWO
UNDERSTANDING THE TRADITIONS IN CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

A. Introduction

As a starting point of this study, it is necessary to understand our traditions of curriculum study and of intersubjectivity. By examining our traditions, we cannot only understand how the past relates to our present situation and even future expectation, but also how it gives the shape and meaning to the numerous activities that commit us to curriculum studies. To review the related literature is a process which allows tradition to speak to us in the present on the basis of our prejudices. It shows how to make my preunderstanding and tradition meet together and become fused dialectically into a newly deepened and broadened horizon.

For Gadamer, tradition is "the world itself that is communicatively experienced and constantly given over to us as an infinitely open task" and "one that is always handed down to us" (Gadamer, 1985, p. 181). Gadamer himself warns us against reifying tradition and taking it as something simply given. Furthermore, tradition is not "a seamless whole" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 153). Gadamer argues (Rainbow and Sullivan, 1979) "in truth the confrontation of our historical tradition is always a critical challenge of this tradition.... Every experience is such a confrontation" (p. 108). Therefore, attempting to understand the experience of traditions through a process of critical understanding and awareness will further enlarge my horizon which can help open doors to greater and more authentic meaning.

If we wish to develop improved school curricula and to understand the meaning of the intersubjective relationships of the participants in the process of curriculum development, we need to critically examine the two fundamental bases related to curriculum development. Even though these bases are, due to their very nature, inseparable from one another, for the convenience of discussion I have categorized them into two aspects:

1) The content: the curriculum content including assumptions, or theoretical and philosophical background which might be selected, organized (or oriented) for better curriculum,
2) The form: praxis as an intersubjective practice through which the curriculum content might be organized and objectivated into written curriculum.

In this chapter, I critically examine the above-mentioned two factors concerning the major question of the study. In addition, in recognition of the need to converge current thinking about curriculum in the Korean education system, I have included a reflection on the Korean education situation and thinking in the last part of this chapter.

B. Current Perspectives of Curriculum Theories

In The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Thomas Kuhn (1970) drew upon data from the natural sciences to argue that doing science in any area proceeded from a conceptual framework. This framework, or perspective, is a loosely connected set of ideas, values, and rules which govern the conduct of inquiry and the ways in which data are interpreted and in which the world may be reviewed. The framework has definite boundaries.

Curriculum theorists have also given attention to the question of perspective. Curricularists see the curriculum phenomena through their particular paradigmatic views. Such perspectives are themselves interrelated and sustained by a host of commitments and standards which predispose one's thinking about schooling and education. Each perspective sustains and bestows different characteristics and purposes for the enterprise itself. By identifying various perspectives below I shall inquire into the lenses that form one of our important traditions in order to shape a broader horizon for the study.

Instrumental Interest of a Scientific-Technical Perspective

The scientific-technical perspective is dominant in curriculum studies. An assumption of this perspective is that educational affairs contain law-like regularities which can be identified and manipulated as can objects in the natural world. That is to say, the fundamental assumption of this perspective is that science provides the most valid knowledge, a unity of language, a unity of laws, and a unity of method. In this perspective, knowledge is considered as neutral-objective facts to be gathered and manipulated for empirical verification and through causal explanation. Knowledge exists not as interpreted understanding, but as objective facts identified through "scientific methodology and its orientation towards self-subsistent facts of which law-like connections can be grasped descriptively" (Giroux, 1981, p. 43). Since knowledge is assumed to be objective, it is also considered as value free. It is assumed that the norms and procedures of the "order" of natural science are to be operating guides for educational affairs, and that educational designs and operation which are formulated on the basis of the methodology of natural science can be replaced by others so that the educational researchers are considered as conducting value-free inquiry as well.

Historically from Bobbit (1918), curriculum study has intended to become a discipline with a firm foundation in natural science. The curriculum field "has sought to develop a rationality based on objectivity, consistency, 'hard data,' and replicability" (Giroux, 1981, p. 48). The main aim, in this perspective, of "curriculum study is to find the most efficient and effective way of planning, implementing, and evaluating curricula" (Reid, 1981, p. 103). Curriculum theorists deal with educational affairs in a means-ends rationality. In this rationality, theory is used to serve a utilitarian purpose and is linked to criteria that can be verified empirically. The main points of the rationality are the notions of objectivity, control, neutrality, and productivity. In this perspective, the curriculum language used is especially technical, instrumental, and defines knowledge in terms of empirical verification.

As the bases of an empirical, analytical, behavioral, and objective research methodology and the press for accountability, quantitatively expressed data and statistical virtuosity become more stressed. This perspective of curriculum study became ubiquitous. In other words, it became the governing perspective for the conduct of educational research in curriculum studies. Traditional-technical propositions overwhelmed the curriculum field by an approach that translated their rationalities into a theoretic recipe for curriculum studies.

This perspective has important consequences for the way we study human beings and the lessons we draw for curricular thought and practice. This, in general, seems to have achieved many significant results supported by factual evidence. But, "the evidence itself has been gathered in a framework governed by the Newtonian closed system paradigm" (Doll, 1986, p. 14) which is inherently the very factual objective knowledge itself. Therefore, it is doubtful that the significant results from this perspective can also be supported by other evidence apart from the factual evidence.

This perspective believes that schooling is a pre-determined process to which teachers and students adapt, not one they create. Human beings are never free agents in the full sense but always the objects of internal and external force. According to Tyler's rationale, there is little room for teachers to participate in and interpret their curriculum creatively with ready made curricula. They cannot help satisfying the need to pursue the pre-established curriculum desires and directions. This has been termed the "bureaucratic model" by Kliebard (1975a, pp. 51 - 69). Kliebard (ibid.) argues that Tyler's proposition tends to regard children simply as input inserted into one end of a great machine from which they eventually emerge at the other end as output, replete with all behaviors (p. 67). Such a mechanical conception of education contributes only to a human being's regimentation, rather than one's autonomy. This perspective limits considerably what is thought to be worth studying in human beings.

In this perspective, the prime purpose of curriculum research is to enable us to predict and control the process of schooling. Researchers test hypotheses to

the effect that one instrumental method will lead to a more accomplished student than another. But we still have to decide whether such a method is worth adopting in principle and, if so, whether its effectiveness in certain perspectives is not offset in others. If we believe that teaching is an art, we may be inclined to say that teachers should be allowed to use a variety of methods they find more congenial.

Practical Interest of a Deliberate Perspective

Diagnosing the curriculum field as moribund, Schwab (1969), in his essay, "The Practical: A Language for Curriculum," explained that the curriculum task is essentially a practical one (1970, p. 2). He characterized the theoretic discipline as being in concert with knowledge and therefore inappropriate to the problems of actual teaching and learning because:

> Theory, by its very character, does not and cannot take account of all the matters which are crucial to questions of what, who, and how to teach, that is theories cannot be applied, as principles, to the solution of problems concerning what to do with or for real individuals, small groups, or real institutions located in time and space (ibid., p. 1 f.).

Schwab seems to be objecting to theory that leads to closed axiomatic systems when applied to human affairs which results in the separation of fact and value (Reid, 1981). His main criticism seems to be of the scientific-technical method, which focuses on "curricular ends and means in terms of *apriori* notions of control, planning, and innovation" (ibid., p. 162). The assumptions of this perspective are "dramatically opposed to those of the radical perspective, being broadly allied to those of classical liberalism. They comprise an emphasis on the individual as a morally responsible person, a belief in the possibility of improvement through working with present institutions and in the efficacy of consensual approaches to the identification and solution of problems" (ibid., p. 167). Therefore, the deliberative theorists argued that "the central concern of curriculum studies should be precisely to improve people's capacity, both individually and collectively, to make good decisions about teaching and learning,

and that it is possible for this to be done in a scholarly and theoretical way" (ibid., p.167).

The mode of operation that Schwab advocates is the method of practical deliberation, which is different from theoretical inquiry. Schwab objects to curriculum theory that is connected to causal explanation, precise measurement, and hypothesis testing. Therefore, curriculum theory is to be seen as reducing inadequacies and engaging in the particularities of the case.

Deliberative curricularists prefer the reasoning approach which offers advantages that result from the process as well as the product. By stressing key words - "action," "judgement," "deliberation," "appreciation," "criticism," "responsibility," "argument," and "justification," the process introduces a fresh and more appropriate metaphorical climate into curriculum theory and practice which may help us to avoid the kinds of errors into which we are led by thinking and using the imagery of engineering and design (Reid, 1978, p. 68 f.). Through the process, we increase the ability of the educational system and the wider community to be sensitive to, and to trace curriculum problems.

Deliberate curricularists urge us to be more concerned with the practical than the theoretic. Though I agree with much of their analysis and the need to focus on the practical, I cannot agree with their claiming that the inherent weakness of theory is the major cause of the lack of progress in educational research. Rather we may blame the abuse and inappropriate use of theories which are not grounded in the educational phenomena, in the concrete everyday lived experiences. Furthermore, I would like to ask whether its conflicts and disagreements signify "illness, dissolution, or moribundity" (Cherryholmes, 1987, p. 295). These metaphors result from a misconception of curriculum and its dynamics. Perhaps it is that internal conflicts and turmoils are not anomalous but are characteristic of all fields of studies. Contrary to their arguments, the conflicts and turmoils in the curriculum field may activate curriculum theory and practice. The problem is what the theories are like, that is, the quality of theories. In fact, refocusing only on the problem has become problematic. Enforcing a prescriptive

science of education into the actual educational situation has left us with what might be called "technical reality" (Pinar, 1978). This situation results from the educational commitments of prescriptive educational science in an attempt to bureaucratize, systematize, technologize, instrumentalize, and control education in the mentality of causality.

An additional problem with the deliberate perspective is latent in the above-mentioned critique. That is to say, what is problematic is the nature and the origin of theory; however we define curriculum, curriculum means the congregation of experiences which are experienced by students. Curriculum theory and practice are processes by which we make decisions about the content of the experiences and the way to teach them. This process can be conducted by the participants' discussions and agreements about their various interests, viewpoints, and experiences. If we consider the criteria participants use to make decisions about curriculum development and implementation, we realize these are based on their theoretical backgrounds, reflecting their own knowledge, viewpoints and experiences. What we have to be aware of is whether the theories are connected with the concrete educational situation. The theories we have to consider are not handed down conceptual theories alienated from teachers and participants, but practical theories which originated from concrete educational situations in which the participants and teachers are involved. Even many of the metaphors preferred by deliberative curricularists can be significant in educational situations through theoretical studies based on a close connection with educational practice.

Deterministic Interest of a Structural Perspective

With its insistence on structure, the structural perspective runs counter to the traditional humanistic assumptions of most teachers so that this perspective might appear to offer little for them. Nevertheless, a structural perspective can be of immense benefit to teachers in their educational commitments. The reason is that all teachers, because of their task to foster students' understanding, "are centrally concerned with structure of thought" (Gibson, 1984, p. 30). In that sense,

most teachers are structuralists. The structural curriculum perspective had its origin in the late 1950's. Its fundamental assumption is that "society, culture, and the individual psyche contains structures that can be grasped objectively as opposed to interpreted from particular points of view" (Kneller, 1984, p. 99). The nature of structure which is a whole and an arrangement of parts, and which is complete in itself, has internal coherence.

In the structural perspective, the parts of a structure are governed by laws or rules intrinsic to the structure which give the parts properties they do not possess in isolation and which do not exist separately from one another. As an example of this, Piaget stresses that the child is the active agent of his own growth. Piaget does much to inject a theory of human competence that is so noticeably absent elsewhere. For him, children construct their structure of mind. But even here, human activity is subject to controlling laws:

> Observation and experiment show...that logical structures are constructed, and that it takes a good dozen years before they are fully elaborated; further, that this continuation is governed by special laws (Piaget, 1971, p. 62).

There is, however, always a dialectic between individual and structure. Piaget discovered a dynamic in the development of human intellect that ensures a flow as the laws of composition of structured whole which guaranteed both stability and change, and emergence and transformation.

Bernstein (1982) also explains a school's "code" of control as structure; "the collection code" and "integrated code" (p. 304 f.). He examines the reproducing of the class structure through these two codes. The knowledge code has two main functions: classification, or ordering of subject matter; and framing, or student-teacher relations. In terms of the knowledge code, the collection is marked by strong classification and strong framing. Subjects of study are clearly demarcated and generally traditionalized. The teacher is firmly in control. In the integrated code both classification and the teacher's authority is more subtle and personal. The two codes socialize students differently, both alienate working-class students.

A structure, the structural curricularists argue, is self-regulating. Its parts change, but in a way that does not violate the structure itself. In addition, structure exists everywhere: in the physical world; living things; mind; social life; language; everyday life; and so on. Piaget's notion of intellectual development in which all children pass through a sequence of stages is held by many to be universal and invariant.

The structural perspective is prone to emphasize general structure at the expense of individual. It underestimates the extent to which individuals experience the educational process differently. It tends to ignore students' instincts and emotions and elevates structures above human history and social conflict. That is to say, this perspective, on the basis of a determinate view, "transfers political initiative and responsibility from self-conscious human beings to structural entities" (Sarup, 1978, p. 193). Structural curricularists need to inquire into a conception of knowledge and of consciousness, as both are an expression of the material world and are a creative transforming agent of history. To move beyond a deterministic view, we need to stress not a summated conception of consciousness of structure but a dialectal conception of the relationship between human consciousness and structures.

Situational Interest of a Phenomenological Perspective

Husserl (1982), as the founder of phenomenology, argues that: "In contrast to all idols, to the powers of tradition and superstition, of crude and refined prejudices of every sort", we need to go "back to things themselves" (p. 35). This means that any object in a field of study within the lived world must be taken directly, as it is presented in experience. As a result, phenomenological curricularists argue that teachers must start with the classroom experience and the relationship between themselves, the students, and the subject matter of instruction. Therefore, educational practice should not be distorted to fit metaphysical or "scientific" prescriptions. It is a praxis with its own legitimate ways of accomplishing its ends (Scudder and Mikunas, 1985, p. 126). Criticizing

behavioral sciences which make teaching more a technology than an art, curricularists holding this perspective seek appropriate grounding to enhance understanding of the meaning of education and being educated.

The first task of education is to elicit the meanings present in the students' language and their experience of institutions. The curriculum brings to awareness that which is already implicit in the daily experience in this lived world. Thus, "the curriculum development moves from explication and enhancement of everyday meanings to appropriation of scientific refinements and extensions of the students' experience and return back to the lived world in which experiences are interrelated" (ibid., p. 134). In this sense, curriculum planning should be considered "the purpose and possibilities of particular groups of students and teachers in specific school settings" (Zaret, 1986, p. 49).

Teaching is primarily a dialogue about the world between student and teacher. In this perspective, "the dialogue is world-centered rather than student-or teacher-centered" (Scudder and Mickunas, 1985, p. 41). A teacher's calling is to open the student's world in its meaningful relationships, instead of reducing the student to an object destined to learn through the appropriation of meaning. Here, the teacher can be a bearer of that meaning. Education is an expansion of the student's world and an enhancement of one's meaningful relationships to the world and others through dialogical enculturation.

A phenomenological perspective has advantages because it takes into account how individual students and teachers can experience the educational process. But we need to be concerned not only with its historicity and being limited in individualistic consciousness, but also the philosophy of history and culture to explain why education exists and what it can mean to different people. For the former concerns we need to pursue a critical perspective, and for its latter concerns, a hermeneutic perspective.

Emancipatory Interest of a Critical Perspective

Critical theorists came together in Frankfurt, Germany in the 1920's and were labelled the Frankfurt School. Their influence grew slowly but reached a peak during the late sixties and early seventies, when the writings of Herbert Marcuse seized the imagination of leftist students and intellectuals the world over. Today, mainly through the disciplinary synthesis of Jurgen Habermas, a new generation of critical theorists has become a force in many academic fields such as history, sociology, and education.

In an age dominated by natural science, critical theorists attempted to replace nature by culture, science and history as the focus of philosophical concern. An emancipatory interest guides critical theory, with the aim of improving the human condition through critical self-reflection so that human beings will be fully conscious subjects and actively determine their way of life. Critical thinking becomes a mode of reasoning which enables one to use this capacity individually or collectively. In critical theory, the aim is to examine the assumptions that legitimatize the existing socio-economic structures, in order that human beings can emerge from their own submersion and acquire the ability to intervene in reality as it is unveiled" (Freire, 1970, p. 110 f.). Dialectical thinking and reflection are focused on the conditions depicted in society's claims, and are directed towards emancipation from the oppressors.

Bowles and Gintis (1976) have used the principle of correspondence to show that the school cannot be free of the socio-economic influence of the society in which it is located. School perpetuates the values and attitudes that are conducive to the production of the dominant culture. Schools have the function of implementing selection mechanisms such as tracking and sorting which are related to the political and economic classification of the society.

> The educational system helps integrate youth into the economic system, we believe, through a structural correspondence between its relations and those of production (ibid., p. 131).

Apple (1978, 1979, 1981) focused his attention on the relationship between knowledge stratification and social stratification and how it is ultimately linked to power and ideological control. In the efforts of the school to help pupils ameliorate their problems, the classification of individuals, social groups, or social problems tend to confirm and reinforce these previously granted relations of domination.

For Bourdieu (1977) cultural reality is not neutral but already structured. Educational systems "reproduce" and "legitimatize" the social order by transforming knowledge: "cultural capital" that reflects the world view of the dominant class (ibid., p. 91). School does not reduce existing inequalities; it reinforces them through gearing the knowledge to those upper and middle class students who already possess the cultural and linguistic capital. Giroux (1981) explains why teachers are usually not aware of the assumptions that they bring to the classroom:

> Mass culture, teacher training institutions, and the power of the state all play a powerful role in pressuring teachers to give unquestioning support to the basic assumptions of the dominant culture (p. 55).

Two main purposes which critical theorists pursue are: (1) to demonstrate that structural inequalities in the society are reproduced by the curriculum; and (2) to effect the transformation of the society through curriculum change (Reid, 1981, p. 164). Assuming that human problems are mainly the result of material conditions, critical curricularists focus on the external socio-economic forces acting on the school that have treated students as the collective objects of the reproductive process. In addition, conflicting linkages between dominant and dominated groups are often difficult to trace explicitly. Therefore, we still need to pay more attention to the reality of the concrete situation in which educational commitments take place and to the interaction and conflict inside the school.

Interpretive Interest of a Hermeneutic Perspective

To break away from the dominant instrumental rationality, curricularists such as Pinar (1981, 1986, 1988), Grumet (1981, 1985, 1988), Macdonald (1976, 1979, 1988), and Phenix (1975) sought an interpretive pedagogical approach. They concerned themselves with seeking to understand "internal and existential nature of educational experience" (McNeil, 1977, p. 314). Their interest lies in "intersubjective consensus, understanding and communicative discourse" (Giroux, 1981, p. 12). They are not concerned with changes in behavior or with decision making, but more with discovering "temporality, transcendence, consciousness, and politics" (McNeil, 1977, p. 314).

Hermeneutic perspective curricularists see the curriculum as "the collective story we tell our children about our past, our present, and our future" (Grumet, 1981, p. 115). Therefore, they emphasize in curriculum inquiry, "acts of interpretation as well as observation" and the need to "engage in the critical reflection that permits us to reclaim our own histories and surpass them through the acts of remembrance and interpretation" in temporal ambiguity (ibid., p. 115). Pinar and Grumet (ibid.) see "curriculum as a collection of signs subject to such interpretation, as evidence of the boundary that divided manifest from latent content and so they extended the horizon of curriculum theory to encompass the hidden curriculum as well as the obvious one" (p. 36). "My school, my city and then the world itself are full of meaning for me. I cannot encounter them without interpreting them" (Kneller, 1984, p. 68). Understanding of meaning is like reading a text, rather than observing an object. A text always has meaning, but the author is absent, or from another culture. Therefore, hermeneutics claim the nature of that interpretation is the heart of understanding.

This view would be congenial to many teachers, since their ideal role is to understand human beings and human creations, and share the understanding with others. Teaching is more of an art rather than a science of technology. Teachers must ask what their subject means to them and what it can mean to their students. The heart of the teaching-learning process is to attune students' attitudes in

response to what the topic itself has to say to them. Therefore, the teaching-learning process is like a dialogue in which the participants are carried by something larger than themselves toward an insight they had not anticipated. A genuine discussion is not planned in advance. Students and teachers risk themselves and speak spontaneously.

In addition, with regards as to how to approach a text or its analogue, hermeneutic curricularists urge students to bracket the author's intention and let the text speak for itself. Students should open themselves to the text and ask what the text says to them through their understanding of the meanings of what is said and unsaid, and what is seen and unseen. Students are encouraged to integrate their learning with their lives, enhancing their personal experience. Hence, in this tradition, students can be "the interpreter of Being" (Crowther, 1981, p. 15).

Accepting meaning and language as polysemic may lead the students to relativism, the belief that nothing profoundly matters. They may well come to believe that moral and intellectual principles are personal matters. Here I see the need to graft the poststructualist's insight onto a hermeneutic perspective. "Truth is historically situated" claims Cherryholmes (1987, p. 301). Foucault (1980) argues "truth is not a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular efforts of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics of truth'" (p. 31). We need to inquire into the genuine features of truth and even morality in our historicity. "We need a way of thinking/speaking that gives power no place to hide" (Shapiro, 1985, p. 19). We need to make an effort to search for endless traces of the central ideas back to their origin as presence in their absence (Derrida, 1976).

With these "repetitive" (in Caputo's term) efforts and being aware of the distorted features of truth by power, we have to attune ourselves to how things open up and what they say to us. (Through this resoluteness to hear the real voice which things themselves tell us, we can see the deep layers of truth which are not absent and hidden but present and false.)

C. Intersubjectivity

In outlining the purposes of the study, I discussed my major concern about the experience of intersubjectivity in the living relationships of the participants in a curriculum development process. While I am mainly concerned with intersubjectivity, I discussed various curriculum theories. These theories and processes are not only my prejudices resulting from an inquiry into the tradition themselves, but they are also the lenses or backgrounds from which participants avoid falling into easily reached agreements. I therefore, need to think about intersubjectivity itself as profoundly personal and social relationships.

Intersubjectivity means a capacity to experience the Other directly as being conscious like oneself and as sharing a common experience. Intersubjectivity can be defined as the experience of an individual subject in a relationship one with another.

In his Cartesian Meditation, Husserl (1960) raised the question of how the Other is experienced (p. 89). One of his works was to show that all experiences are intersubjective: the world is given primarily to a community of subjects who share a common world. Intersubjectivity is always presupposed in the understanding of objectivity. In Being and Time, Heidegger (1962) directed our attention to the historical world in which we are born (p. 424). The presence of others is always there in all the signs of the world. What is present to others is also present to oneself in the process of distinguishing one's own perspective from that of others, where one sees the same thing as others, "from there" and "from then."

Intersubjectivity emerges in the dialogical process and is sedimented in the individual's experience. In the dialogical process we can "encounter a locus of commonality underlying a relationship between independent personalities" (Scudder and Mickunas, 1985, p. 59). This commonality is made possible by communication in the I-Other relationship. Communication would be disrupted if the events and objects of the common world were expressed differently by the communicative partners. Communication is possible only if an object has shared

meaning. Dialogical communication requires common significance. Partners in communication cannot engage in dialogue until they come to share a common meaning. Communication allows an individual to expand the scope of his world by the use of experiences borrowed from others. Without communication, our views and experiences would be located within the narrow range of our private perceptions and thoughts. We discover our limits only when we expose our views in a communicative encounters. Communicative partners decenter us from our own egocentricity and open us to experiences which both contest and expand the horizon of our lived world.

> The concrete researches of many sociologists and philosophers have aimed at certain forms of social intercourse which necessarily precede all communication ..., all these are just a few examples of the endeavor to investigate what might be called the "mutual tuning-in relationship" upon which all communication is founded. It is precisely this mutual tuning-in relationship by which the "I" and the "Thou" are experienced by both participants as a "We" in vivid presence (Schutz, 1964, p. 163).

Schutz's explanation of communication grounds the notion of "mutuality." Mutuality is a relation which is not composed of two discrete ontological subjects, but is a "commonness" which emanates from the intersubjectivity, the experience of the Other. The structure of the commonality, mutuality, is fundamental to the interpersonal communication process. The communicative process is an orientation with the task of maintaining intersubjectivity. Self and the Other experience are not disjunctive but accentuating moments of total experience. The Other points to me and I discover the Other in myself. Therefore, the interpersonal communicative experience is a mutually changing acceptance and transmission. In this sense, intersubjectivity and communication should not be considered separately. They are different layers of the same identity. Intersubjectivity should be considered through communication, and by the same token, communication, through intersubjectivity.

Concept of Meaning

The experience of the Other, intersubjectivity, cannot be deduced from subjectivity. Intersubjective communication, which mediates the experience of the Other, results from our encounter and involvement with others. Communicative relation is not a logical progression. It is a spontaneous and multi-dimensional human interaction. A human being, in communicative interaction, is temporally transcendental. One refuses to be confined to any one or other of one's present determination. One goes beyond one's situation to situate oneself in it, to grasp it more firmly in reflection. This is fundamental in our praxis conceived of as interactive communication in the I-Other relation. It is possible through communication in intersubjectivity to understand the Other as an independent subject, not as an object. Intersubjectivity is transcendental subjectivity.

> We submit the peaceful production of waste, to being educated for a defence which deforms the defenders and what they defend (Marcuse, 1964, p. xl).

Herbert Marcuse explains a modern mass production-consumption society where antithesis is annihilated, and only the thesis-passive acceptance is pervasive. We no longer distinguish our authentic experience from that of others. The mass media simplify and flatten out events into formulas so that our experience of others and meanings are stereotyped and made rigid, into only an one-dimensional view which is announced, advertized, and finally brainwashes us. Meanings and intersubjective relationships are contaminated and undermined by the industrial society. The blind mass in industrial society which has made reality more homogeneous has already consumed diversity and our sense of reflection so that "today's novel feature is the flattening out of the antagonism between culture and social reality through the obliteration of the oppositional, alien, and transcendental elements in the higher culture" (ibid., p. 57). Mass media which weigh the exchange value of commodities by producing an "advertized image" (Baudrillard, 1981) do not allow us any room for meaning to arise, only formulas. Communication is reduced to convention, passive acceptance. Authentic meaning

can lie only in the relationships of human being with human being through free communication. Communication is the appearance of meaning itself.

> When entities within-the-world...have come to be understood...we say that they have *meaning*.... But that which is understood, taken strictly is not the meaning but the entity, or alternatively, Being. Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility...of something maintains itself.... The *concept of meaning* embraces the formal existential framework of what necessarily belongs to that which an understanding interpretation Articulates. *Meaning is the "upon which" of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception* (Heidegger, 1962, p. 192 f.).

Meaning is a fore-structure, an "organizing component" (Caputo, 1987), of our understanding. The meaning can be sensed out of movement through the interaction of communication in the temporal lived-world. We cannot absolutely purify meaning out of the flux of our experience in our historicity. Meaning is intersubjective and dialectical, not ego-centric, or self-contained. To understand meaning in language involves human living relations which are not reducible to the logic of language. Meaning arises out of our praxis.

> If there is to be pure expression at all...and, consequently, pure meaning..., it must take place wholly within the internal sphere, in the *absence* of indication; it would be a 'silent monologue' (Derrida, 1973, p. xxxv).

Meaning is spatial and bound with position and perspective. Meaning is temporal due to its endless flowing in the flux of our experience. By the above-quoted paragraph, one might deduce that communication clouds and impairs meaning. If we consider that the meaning arises from the logic of language, it might be right. But, if we accept that the meaning arises from our intersubjective experience as a fore-structure of understanding, it is wrong. Meaning comes from our dialogical encounter with others. Meaning is not constituted in the identity of language, but in the difference of a sign's designative process in our repetitive experience of the flux. Sign is not identity, complete, but is interdependent, partial.

> The verb 'to differ' seems to differ from itself. On the one hand, it indicates difference as distinction, inequality, or discernability; on the other hand, it expresses the interposition of delay,...(ibid., 1973, p. 129).

'To differ' makes things differ from themselves and the other. One sense of 'to differ' is a mediation of meaning in the form of detour or delay. It means to redirect through the mediation process by deferring action or judgment. The other sense of it is nonidentity or nonsimilarity. This makes the other to be the other, not the same. It is continuous reforming of perspectives. It makes the opposition and mediation of meaning possible in the play of discourse as a functional condition. It makes it possible for us to transform ourselves from passive acceptors of pervasive, one-dimensional, distorted meaning into active meaning creators; by making space, the others become the other and speak the *différance*. Man is constituted in the *différance*. Meaning is not pure, full, but combinatory in the interaction of communication with others. Lingual logical determinations are dependent on our living language usage through dialectical thought based on the sedimented meaning validated in our intersubjective experiences.

We need to break the wall of Derrida's notions of signs in language itself; deferring, differing, and tracing of origin as repetitive movement toward the "dangerous" future. Meaning is grasped by us in the very moment of our meditation of understanding as an application. The meaningful meanings which are activated by the free play of signs should be transferred into our experience by getting out of the cocoon of language. Meaning can be grasped by our experiential existence, being-in-the-world, in the Dasein's hermeneutic situation.

Derrida's powerful notions of *différance* and trace in our intersubjective communication could be made meaningful through their graft onto Heidegger's notion of the language of Being or onto his student Gadamer's notion of universality of human linguisticality. Because to defer, to differ, and to trace are related to signs which are conceptualized by historical-cultural sediments of language into our experiential being-in-the-world. Meaning in language as understanding is synchronic as it shows itself in a specific culture's use of

language; diachronic as it shows itself through the historical movement of language, through the possible changes which language undergoes from the time past, time present, to the time future (Hyde, 1982, p. 23). Heidegger emphasizes the "projective character" of understanding in its movement toward the future. Understanding not merely reveals the language of Being as something that was or is, but also as something that can be; the "potentiality of understanding." As understanding, our being-in-the-world is guided not merely by its past and present concern, but also by its future development, what it can become.

> *Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own possibility-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of* (Heidegger, 1962, p. 184).

Heidegger also envisages the synchronic dimension of meaning as understanding in language. Understanding is the realm of linguistic possibilities that constitutes its intersubjective world view delineating the culture's present limits of rationality. In culture's understanding "in advance" as "fore-having," any particular act of interpretive understanding is made possible. A culture's fore-having is its linguistic resoluteness that forms the context for the patterns of understanding. Meaning is "known only through the praxis which creates it" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 96).

> One speaks not only of what one knows, so as to set out display of it...but also of what one does not know, in order to know it (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 102).

Meaning is constituted in what is expressed in our intersubjective communication. Meaning, which is never exhausted, is a constant creator of the world in an intersubjective relational presentation.

Language and Communication

The study of the characteristics of language and intersubjectivity clarifies how language in communication, as a meaning-giving-activity in intersubjectivity, makes ideal existence possible. In this section, by inquiring into some of the major characteristics of language based on Merleau-Ponty's explanation about language,

I hope to explain more clearly the nature of communication and intersubjectivity.

> ... that moment when the significative intention (still silent and wholly in act) proves itself capable of incorporating itself into my culture and the culture of others...of shaping me and others by transforming of cultural instruments (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 92).

These cultural instruments are words and ultimately language itself as a total system. By speaking, these creative speech expressions and meanings of cultural instruments become a part of language so that we can say that language precedes speech and follows upon it. Here, we can see Merleau-Ponty's distinction between speaking speech and spoken speech (Merleau-Ponty, 1975). According to him, spoken speech is the stock of accepted relations between significations and signs. It is sedimented language which consists of the sediments of past successful efforts of expression. On the other hand, speaking speech is an operation of the language across signs which creates itself in its own expressive acts from its will to create new meaning. "Speech is the operation through which a certain arrangement of already available signs and significations alters and then transfigures each of them, so that in the end a new signification is secreted" (ibid., 1975, p. 13). While spoken speech consists of words and the rules for their usage, "speaking speech may often say as much by what it does not say (and by words it does not use) as by what it does' (Jacobson, 1979, p. 148).

Merleau-Ponty sees language as a system in which, by a definite number of words, we are able to express an infinite number of things. "It is a movement of transcendence from signifiers or words to signification or meanings, which calls a kind of meaning into existence and makes the world exist for us in a new way" (ibid., p. 154).

> It inaugurates on its own account a ***style*** of ***the explication of object and a style*** of our movements with respect to them. This mute or operational language of perception begins a process of knowledge which it cannot accomplish. However firm my perceptive grasp of the world may be, it is entirely dependent upon a centrifugal movement which throws me toward the world. I can recapture my grasp only if I myself spontaneously posit new dimensions of its signification. Here is the beginning of speech, the style of

> knowledge, truth in the logician's sense. It is called forth from its first movement by perceptual evidence which it continues without being reducible to perceptual evidence (Merleau-Ponty, 1975, p. 124 f.).

For Merleau-Ponty, language is situated because it is produced by human beings and is founded on human perception. He argues for the rediscovery of the transcendence which turns the perceived world into the spoken world by returning to the subject in the act of speaking. Even though words, which for Merleau-Ponty consist of phonemes, are usually taken to be signs, marks of thought, and summations of discrete significations, are wholes, not summations. They function diacritically, and normally present significations only in relation to the other words, through contexts, as unities cohering with other unities. Words are not signs; rather, in the act of speech, they suggest themselves to us, and arouse other words. Language has a spontaneity which accounts for the way language can possess us rather than merely being a possession or tool of ours. Language is "a surpassing (operated by the subject on the significations at his disposal) which is stimulated by the usage made of words in his environment. Language is "an act of transcending" (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p. 63). It is "made up of significations in the state of being born" (ibid., p. 88), and therefore, is a type of movement - moving equilibrium, a transcendence which has a style of its own. Therefore, significations are flowing, not fixed. This spontaneity and partial autonomy of language has the ability to conquer new meanings. Language is never totally acquired. It always remains, not only as institution but also possibility. Further, the relative, autonomous language can never be pure or transparent; it retains a component of opacity.

> A language is less a sum of signs (words, grammatical and synthetical forms) than a methodical means of differentiating signs from one another and thereby constructing a linguistic universe...that it expresses a world of thought... "In language, there are only differences without positive terms..." (ibid., p. 31).

Ordinary language forms a system on the one hand, and it requires the combinations and interaction of signs, on the other hand, to convey a meaning. Language signifies through these finite, yet meaningful, situated and transcending characteristics. Language needs the interaction of signs for signification; meaning arises through their combination. This suggests to us that language is not transparent, but is rather expressive communication and representation at the same time. Merleau-Ponty, as a result, envisages that language has a function of appealing to others as representative, and self-expressive (ibid., p. 310). Language is wholly the will to understand and to be understood (ibid., p. 97). Language is a manifestation of intersubjectivity in fact.

Merleau-Ponty summarizes communicative competence as a form of intersubjective act by pointing out that speaking subjects project through words a meaning which we apprehended bodily as an intention which our lived bodies assume: taking up another's intention is not thinking on my own part, but a synchronizing of my existence, a transformation of my own being (1962, p. 184). Thinking is intersubjective in the sense that it is bodily intentionality operative in a structure of behavior:

> The phonetic gesture brings about for both the speaking subject and his hearers, a certain structural coordination of experience, a certain modulation of experience; exactly as a pattern of my bodily behavior endows objects around me with a certain significance, for me and for others (ibid., p. 193).

Transcendental Intersubjectivity

Edmund Husserl's lifelong ambition was to grasp the genesis of an "objective" or intersubjectively shared world and thus to elucidate the link between ego and alter-ego, between subject and fellow-subjects. He stands in the great and long tradition of those for whom truth manifests itself in the intuition of perception and in the view of theoretical knowledge. His transcendental intersubjectivity occupies a special place in the system of his phenomenology. "It seeks to answer the questions that 'egology' leaves in its train, in the very egology

with which phenomenology takes its start" (Theunissen, 1986, p. 13).

Starting from the premise of the ego, Husserl seeks to explain intersubjectivity by construing the Other basically as an "other I" or alter ego. My ego is the initial object. The most important of the preconditions that have to be fulfilled in order for "the Other" to become a philosophical problem is that my own subjectivity is made the object of philosophical reflection. The subjectivity is a "concrete ego existing with an individual content made up of subjective processes, abilities, and dispositions" (Husserl, 1960, p. 29). The entire life of consciousness centered on the ego is investigated in its individual being, pure ego that has been purified of all worldly content. "The Other" as the I that he is for himself, is quite different from the I that I am for my self. The "I"'s experience can have individual being for its object, which can be linked with extramundane individuality. With this extramundane individuality, we can think the transcendental experience and, further, individuality of transcendental subjectivity. I am not only this extramundane subjectivity but am also It - I, in my factical existence. It - I is distinguished by ownness, individuality, facticity, and historicity.

Egology in Husserl's transcendentalism stresses the relatively "mediated" and decadent status of the alter ego. The Others as the worldly objects in the theory of intersubjectivity are not yet the other human beings to me, still not my fellow human beings (ibid., p. 107 f.). Therefore, where we experience an Other, we still do not experience him, himself, not his I, his experience, his appearances. Before all else, his body is constructed; it appears to be immediately experienced. This is what reveals and conceals the Other, only because it precludes any direct access to the interiority of the Other; "*medicacy of intentionality*." The experience of the Other is a matter of a kind of making co-presece, a kind of appresentation. The central trait of Husserl's theory is the medicacy or mediated character of the I - Other relation: the objective world could be constituted through an empathic relation with "the Other in general"; due to the constitutive functions of my body and my subjectivity on the levels of analogical perception and empathy, putting oneself in the standpoint of the Other, mediation through the world ultimately

coincides with mediation through the ego. Theunissen (1986) offers a brief synopsis of the five basic steps involved in the move from the ego to alter ego for Husserl:

> The first step toward the Other, in the first instance toward the Other in general, is the apperception of the (alien) physical body as an organic body on the basis of the analogy with my own body, which, in part at any rate, is constituted as a physical body. The second step is, in a psychological direction the experience of the psychic life of the alien, while in a transcendental direction, it is the experience of the pure alter ego. Inasmuch as the vehicle of the first step is a quasi apperception of analogy, the second makes use of the purified analogizing as empathy.... So we come to the third step, the constitution of the objective world out of the identification of the primordial worlds. In the objective world I apperceive - that is the fourth step - the Other as a unitary object complete in itself and situated in space and time. In this way the Other loses the meaning "Other in general" and becomes another human being. In the fifth and last step, I finally transfer the objective unity "human being" to myself in that I empathetically prensentify myself how and as what the Other represents me (p. 81).

For what I contribute to the Other through empathy, the transformation of his ego into the world object "human being," now has to be allowed to happen to me on the basis of the self-appresented similarity of the mode of being of ego and alter ego. " The comprehensive representation that Others have of me, or could have, serves to make myself a social 'human being' and this in quite another way than by a directly apprehended inspection" (Husserl quoted by Theunissen, 1986, p. 81). The so constituted I also appears to be the "objective," "real," or "empirical" I that I observe in the natural attitude. This natural I is precisely the human I as *an* I, and indeed, as a ***mundanized*** I.

The constitution of my self, as a human being, through the mediation of the Other is carried out in two steps. The first step is empathic insight into the alien presentation of my physical body as a part of the alien sphere of ownness. My physical body takes part in the alien primordial positing of my organic body as a pure physical body like a thing among many other things, for the Other an environmental object, in no way different from the tree or stone. But this

consideration of my body as an ordinary physical body certainly makes possible my humanizing self-apperception. First making of me a human being is the mundanization of my I. This is the second, the very key step in the constitution of my human being. That the Other understands me as a human being means not only that he constitutes me as a unitary object but also, in turn, he coposits my I in that worldly object. I become a human being through the Other; I not only become a worldly mundanized I but also an I in the specific sense in which the naturally intended I is such. My human I is worldly because it is integrated in the objective world, which means that my humanness is situated among other beings. My I's being my human being means that I, as an individual, already am "a member of the community" (Husserl, 1960, p. 129). On the basis of this communalization in community my I can be a human being with the "person," the human with the personal I. This "human community" (ibid., p. 129) makes it possible to talk of it as of the personal world of mankind.

My integration in the association of mankind through being a member of a community "brings with it an objectivating equation of my existence with the that of all Others..." (ibid., p. 129). The equation is then also the form of the human community which is that of the "we," "all of us" (Husserl, 1970, p. 182) in the manner of "reciprocal being for one another" (Husserl, 1960, p. 129), in which I as subject encounter the Other as object. "Inasmuch as equalization, as collectivization, is an integration in the we, confrontation appears within the horizon of the community as an I-Thou relation. However, I am 'an' I only as one among the many that, in their totality, make up the universal we of the human association" (Theunissen, 1986, p. 88).

According to Husserl, the encounter of the Other as a bodily phenomenon is situated in a spatial world and experienced chiefly through visual perception, a perception transforming the Other into an object and, at best, into a nondescript fellow-being among a multitude of similar beings. While the Other, at the level of appresentation of his body, is principally present as object in the world, transcendental empathy posits him as subject for the world; I experience the Other

as object in the world and, at the same time, as the subject for the world. The Other is another I. The other I becomes an analogue of my own I. He introduces "mirroring" (Husserl, 1960, pp. 28 - 35). This has two meanings; in its relation to empathy, mirroring, and in its relation to the correlate of empathy, mirror image. But, Husserl tends to go beyond the representation of analogy and mirroring in the direction of identity. The I is identical with the I that is the Other, but I is not identical with the Other. The Other is something more than I; The Other is something more than the I of the Other and appears in the transcendental purity as mirroring and mirror image of the I in the alter ego. While I am myself the ego in the alter ego, the alter in the alter ego is the there copresent with my here. Because of the here and there, "other is phenomenologically constituted as a *modification of my self*" (ibid., p. 115); he is "an appresented I that I myself am not, but, relative to me, a modification, an other I" (ibid., p. 116).

Husserl thinks of the perception of the alien body as the "sphere of experience and not of simple reproduction, as with memories (Husserl quoted by Theunissen, 1986, p. 158). What I can do is only to place myself empathically in his world in that I adopt his standpoint and presentify the world which is present to me from here. I am unable to encounter what I myself have already not experienced, in the Other. I can only transpose myself into the Other by transposing myslf back into my past I.

In Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity, I, the absolute unique ego, constitutes the Other as well as everything else. For Husserl, the appropriation of the meaning of the Other, within me and from me is to be found in advance as a fact. Every alter ego as such receives its meaning and value in my ego. I precede the Other; I as the all-constituting originary constitute the Other, which is itself all constituting. Therefore, the constituting of the Other is a constituting of the constituting. "Just as I constitute what is constituted by the Other, so I constitute the Other itself as constituting, therefore, as the one that is equally, for itself, the originary I that among other things constitutes me and, indeed, constitutes me as constituting. In this sense, according to Husserl, the Other also precedes me

entirely" (ibid., p. 161). The Other is for me a constituted-constituting, so I am supposed to be for the Other his constituted-constituting. But in Husserl's explanation, this does not mean that I might be constituted as constituted by the Other. I understand myself simply as constituting, not as constituted by Other, even though the fact that the Other also constitutes me by my consituting the Other as constituting. The other does not enter my awareness in the sense that I exist for *him*: nor does he figure as primordial subject and I originally as his object. Moreover, the Other as thematized from a transcendental vantage point is from the beginning only one among many others who inhabit my world; he is not the unique individual related to me in singular fashion. The distinction between the intimate Thou and the world of strangers has no place in the sphere of primordial transcendental constitution.

Husserl tends to go beyond the representation of analogy and mirroring in the direction of identity. From the standpoint of experience, the I of the Other is my own I. These propositions undergird solipsism. In rejecting the equimordial of the Other, Husserl reveals the undeniable limitations of his attempt to overcome the transcendental solipsism of pure egology through the theory of intersubjectivity.

Being-with-the-Other

Heidegger treats co-being, or being-with, as a structural characteristic of existence or Dasein; the ontological rather than merely ontic-factual status of the I-Other relation; finally the rejection of the visual perception paradigm. Heidegger, in contrast to Husserl, proceeds from the truth of observation back to the disclosure of inner-worldly beings in the course of practical interaction with them.

According to Heidegger, the characteristics of I are personality, which remains identical through changes of behavior and experience, and substantiality

(1962,[1] 150). Heidegger lays out the "being" as "presence-at-hand"; the being of the I is "undetermined" (150). As presence-at-hand, the I is a simple subject without a world. The concept "presence-at-hand " means a static occurrence in which the performative character that belongs to the historical I is denied, and an emptily abstract being in which I is withheld from the fullness that arises out of its habitual relatedness. Accordingly, Heidegger charges being with inner worldliness and, finally, with pure thingliness. According to Heidegger, the worldliness that the abstraction from the ontic world confers upon the I, is not only an occurrence within the world but also the directedness toward the world, being in the midst of, namely, of inner-worldly beings.

Dasein, for Heidegger, emerges unscathed as "concrete human being," and Heidegger's ontology appears as the movement away from what is a dehumanizing interpretation of a human being as a real-worldly fact to the clarification of the true human worldliness and facticity. Heidegger shows that the mode of being of human Dasein, as the specifically human "existence of the factical self," is totally different from that of all other entities and it carries within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution. Transcendental constitution in the constitution of being of Dasein is the "project," "projection of the world," throwing the projected world over what exists. Heidegger brings the "I" within the sphere of Dasein. The being-in-the-world includes three moments: "self," which is consolidated around the project; "being-in" which corresponds to the there; and "world" which is aligned with thrownness. Here, the "I" has its ground in Dasein as self.

Heidegger thinks that Dasein, as existing factically, always exists in certain basic and determinate modes: authenticity and inauthenticity. Factical existence cannot be grasped in general as a substantial substrate of Dasein, but only as a mode of being of this entity. For Heidegger, being with and toward Other is

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[1]Hereafter, in this section, I will quote only the pages of Heidegger's Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, Tubingen, 1953. [Translated by Macquarrie and Robinson, New York, 1962.])

deeply rooted in Dasein. Dasein is "essentially in itself being-with" (156). Heidegger's notion of being with another "leads to structures of Dasein that are equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world" (149). The Being-in-the-world of Dasein is essentially constituted through being-with. The Being-in-the-world is original and being with is the constitutive moment of what is in itself "with-like being-in-the-world, and in such a way that without it Dasein could not be what it is. The same holds for "caring for" as well as "taking care of." Taking care of and caring for are "possible fundamental modes" of being with (220). The formal elements of Being-in-the-world are altogether tinted by Being-with-one-another. The being with the Other belongs to Dasein. Dasein is concerned with its self and is, at the same time, for the sake of the Other" (160). According to Heidegger, the understanding of the Other that resides in the being-understanding of Dasein as such is a "caring for" (157) which is a mode of practical interaction in the world which "is always already the one which I share with Others" (154). "Being-with means...always being with one another in the same world" (282).

> The Others who are thus 'encountered' in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of equipment are not somehow added on in thought to some thing that is proximally just present-at-hand. These things are encountered from out of the world in which they are ready-to-hand for Others, which world is also always already mine from the outset (154).

The Other, as an entity encountered within the world, is subject to Dasein's own world projection. In order to be encountered in my world, Being-with has to be free. Dasein-with characterizes Dasein's Other, insofar as it is freed for a being-with through its world. Free given Being of the Others is Dasein-with because the Other is in the world with me in a humanly characteristic manner. The Dasein with the Others is multiply encountered out of the inner-worldly ready-to-hand, in connection with equipment. That is, Others are encountered environmentally, out of the world in which the concerned circumspective Dasein essentially dwells. The Other is essentially mediated by equipment, the medium of the world is interproposed between me and Others (153). "While I live through my

own for-the-sake-of-which concretely as impulse and goals of my comportment, the Other, since I do not actualize it as a self, remains in the same functional abstractness into which the alien I is dissolved" (Theunissen, 1986, p. 183).

> Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in *subjection*...to Others....One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power.... This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the Other,'...Being-with-one-another concerns itself as such with *averageness*, which is an existential character of the "they,"...Every secret loses its force.... This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the "levelling down"...of all possibilities of Being (164 f.).

"I" is not the one who stands over against Others, but one among Others, also pertain to the central truth of the We. "I" in the community of the We, is carried over to the they as 'subject' of everyday Dasein, namely, that, as one among Others, he is himself an Other, an 'alter-ed' I. And the they itself belongs to the Others, and indeed the being-with-one-another completly resolves one's Dasein into the mode of being of the Others. Dasein, as one among Others, through practical interaction with beings, entirely directed by the they, can make its appearance; in utilizing such public means as news papers, every Other is like the next Other. Here, the "they self" is the "self of every Dasein," the inauthentic self. Heidegger calls the self of everyday Dasein an "inauthentic" one. It is fascinated by its world, has the kind of being which is absorbed in the world; does not understand itself from itself but out of the world. The inauthentic self is completely fascinated by the world and by the Dasein-with of Others in the they as the origin of lostness in the world - as phenomena of that specific disclosure of the they that falls together with publicity. The they has always kept Dasein from taking hold of these possibilities of being" (164). "When Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern" - that is, at the same time, in its being-with- and -towards-one-another - "it is not itself" (163).

In order to be authentic, Dasein should be freed from the domination of the Others, or individualized, because being inauthentic arises in the they. According to Heidegger, individualization is supposed to make being-with-one-another possible, which is presented as authentic (344). Being concernful alongside and solicitous being-with has to be authentic.

> The nonrelational character of death,...individualizes Dasein down to itself. This individualizing makes manifest that all Being-alongside the things with which we are concerned and all Being-with Others will fail us when our potentiality for Being is at issue (307).

The aloneness that arises from the nonrelatedness is the prime fact of being authentic of Dasein. Authentic being-with-one-another results from individualization by nonrelatedness. Inauthentically existing Dasein hides from itself its ownmost possibility and is incapable of achieving the possibilities. It is also incapable of respecting those possibilities of the Other that are accessible to him within the world.

For Heidegger, the distinction between the authentic and inauthentic being-with-one-another arises from the differentiation of solicitude into the "leaping-in and dominating" and the "leaping-ahead and freeing" (159). In everyday inauthentic being-with-one-another, Others dominate over me in that they dissolve me in their kind of being and I act in place of the Other or as an Other; "put oneself concernfully in his place," by which I make his possibilities my own and the Other is "thrown out of his place" (158). Heidegger envisages, in the leaping-ahead and freeing, "Dasein's resoluteness toward itself," in opposition to the Other, "is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality for Being and to codisclose this potentiality in the solicitude that leaps ahead and liberates" (344). "This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care - that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a '*what*' with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become *free* for it " (158). The Other upholds my freeing, not only as that inner-worldly being which is encountered within the horizon of my world,

but also as its ownmost existence, as freedom, freedom of the Other for himself.

Later Heidegger (1969a), in his book Identity and difference envisaged the nature of the *belonging* together of man and Being. He argues that, in the manner of the *belonging* together, man and Being should be mutually challenged that "man is delivered over to the ownership of Being and Being is appropriate to the essence of man" (p. 36). He emphasizes the event of appropriation "into which we must enter." According to Heidegger, the words "event of appropriation" can be called a happening, an occurrence, and can be translated into the Chinese Tao. "What it indicates happens only in the singular, no, not in any number, but uniquely" (ibid., p. 36).

> The event of appropriation is that realm, vibrating within itself, through which man and Being reach each other in their nature, achieves their active nature by losing those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them (ibid., p. 37).

The being-with-one-another, through the "event of appropriation," in the realm of "vibrating within itself" achieves its active nature, in the original sense of what *belonging* is, which is to recover the *belonging* in its fuller sense. Joan Stambough (quoted by Aoki, 1989) helps us in understanding "*belonging*" by way of *Ereignis*, a common word in the German language meaning simply 'event':

1) It is abstract in its being distant from everyday life, yet being so close to us we cannot see or hear it;
2) It is concrete in its etymology which shows that *Ereignis* is rooted in *eigen* (own), offering us the notion of coming into one's own, that is, coming to where one truly *belongs* (p. 15 f.).

"It is *enownment*. *Belonging* as *enownment* is a reaching out to each other, an extending of a gift one to another, such that in the reaching one can, if appropriately attuned, catch sight or hear the claim "of Being" (Aoki, 1989, p. 16). That Heidegger's notion of "the event of appropriation" gives us very powerful hints for intersubjectivity of being-with-one-another, namely, the event of appropriation allows being-with-one-another to be in an essential togetherness which rests, not in togetherness, but in *belonging*. Indeed, the event of appropriation is a letting-*belong*-together, a letting be into one's own" (ibid., p.

16). "*Ereignis* is *eignende Eraugnis*" (Heidegger quoted by Stenstad and Maly, Summer 1986, p. 128). "*Eignen* means to be suited for; to be one's own way of being, from *eigen*. *Eraugnis* (from *Auge*: eye) is a bringing-before-the-eye, a bringing to sight, a bringing into place so as to be in sight" (ibid., p. 128). "We have heard when we *belong* to the matter" (Heidegger, 1975, p. 66). We hear the possibility of the disclosure of and of the lighting up of another being. In this case, lighting means both disclosure and freeing. Therefore, we have to attune to *belonging* together, in order to hear the voice, but not by physical ears. This attunement is "Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its own greatest potentiality-for-Being" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 206).

Levinas (1969) criticizes Heidegger: The way in which we "live from" and enjoy the element that we need cannot be explained in the light of Heidegger's analysis of how Dasein uses a piece of equipment or an implement: "Dasein in Heidegger is never hungry. Food can be interpreted as an implement only in a world of exploitation" (p. 134). By giving priority to structures such as Being-towards-death, thrownness and care, Levinas would say, Heidegger has neglected to take the love of life into account. "Heidegger,...conceives of the relation with Others as enacted in the destiny of sedentary people,...Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relation with Being in general, remains under obedience to the anonymous, and leads inevitably to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny" (Levinas, 1969, p. 46 f.). According to Levinas, the I-Other relationship is an ethical relation, a practical interaction, and cannot be grasped on the basis of an ontological fundamental explanation of comprehension (1989, p. 123 ff.). "... the comprehension of the Other is inseparable from his/her invocation" (ibid., p. 125). "The essence of discourse is prayer" (ibid., p. 127). When we have grasped the Other in the opening of being in general, as an element in the world where we stand, where we are perceived on the horizon, we have not looked The Other in the face. We have not encountered his/her face. The being is a human being accessible as a neighbor,

accessible as a face. "In relating to a being in the opening of being, comprehension locates a signification on the basis of being. In this sense, it does not invoke a being, but only names it, thus accomplishing a violence and a negation; a partial negation which is violence" (ibid., p. 127). In response to Heidegger's late ideas, especially his notion of *Ereignis*, signifying a "gathering" or "appropriation" that allows a coming together without fusion or indifference, or his idea on the relation between thinking and "holiness," Levinas would say that the thoughts are based on fundamental ontology as well. From Levinas' perspective, an important question would be raised: "what is the role of being-in-the-world in the face-to-face encountering of Other?"

Dialogue: "I-Thou" Relation

Buber criticized "I-It" connections as typical relations of domination and subordination based on a design of subjectivity. Challenging the notions of abstract and general consciousness and of the constitutive function of subjectivity, he insists on the need to differentiate between subject-object (or "I-It") relations derived from egological intentions and a genuine interpersonal encounter where "I" and "Thou" meet in an "in-between" sphere. Human "I-Thou" relations are, Buber writes, immediate, not egologically mediated, that is, a human bond predicated on the full reciprocity and equal primordity in engagement of partners.

For Buber, the world can neither be known other than through things nor other than with the active sense-spirit of the loving man. The loving man sees what is unique in a thing, resulting in the experience of kinship with and of looking into it. Through the beloved, whose self he realizes, the loving man confirms the mysterious countenance of the all, through the encounter, not through a perfect unity. Because man is limited in his ability to form and shape the world, the encounter takes place between man and the active self of things. He is powerfully aided by the active self of things responding to this loving experiencing of them, so that the force of worlds joins his own force to bring his deed to effectiveness.

The active form of encountering between man and man is really simple immediacy and togetherness. Only man, without the intention of utilization, who is simply and directly present, can directly communicate with others. To Buber, God is eternal Thou. Buber's thought focuses on the immediate meeting of God and man and the theophany that presents human life and history as the result of meeting God. God will ripen in man. Yet Who changes and ripens is not God Himself but the depth and fullness of man's encountering with God and the ways in which man expresses this meeting and makes it meaningful for his daily life. Man's form of recognizing God and his conception of God cannot come into being without his cooperational, creative participation by going to the meeting. Buber's notion of meeting God as eternal Thou extends to that of Thou as a mortal human being.

Buber's idea of "I and Thou" consists of an extended definition of man's primary attitudes and relations: "I and Thou"; "I and It." I-Thou is the primary word of *relation*. It is characterized by mutuality, directness, presentness, intensity, and ineffability. As we can see in the above paragraph, the Thou in "I-Thou" may include not only man but also things, even God. I-It is a primary word of *experiencing* and *using*. It takes place within a man so that it cannot be between him and the world. Therefore, it is entirely subjective and not in mutuality. It is a typical subject-object relationship. It is mediated and indirect. Hence, it is comprehensible, orderable, and significant only in connection, not in itself. The It in "I-It" may include not only man but also things, even God. Therefore, the two I's are not the same thing; "The primary word of *I-Thou* can only be spoken with the whole being. The primary word of *I-It* can never be spoken with the whole being" (Buber, 1958. p. 3).

> With no neighbor, and whole in himself, he is Thou and fills the heavens. This does not mean that nothing exists except himself. But all else lives in his light (ibid., p. 8).

If a person only lives in his/her world, he/she is not a person, because all real living is meeting. This meeting with Thou of a person and of nature is also a

meeting with God. A person meets a person as a real person. A person faces a person as one's Thou, he/she is no longer an object among objects which can be experienced and described, or a specific point of space and time, but space and time in meeting. The present of time of the I-Thou relation is not the abstract point of past and future, but a real, filled present which is intensity and wholeness. The man who experiences It does not go out of himself to do so; It does not respond but only passively allows itself to be experienced. The man who knows Thou must go out to meet the Thou and step into direct relation with it; the Thou responds to the meeting. "As I become *I*, I say Thou." This relation is suffering and action not only because one must choose and be chosen but also because one must suspend all partial actions in order to act with the whole (Buber, 1958, p. 11). Relation is love, not emotion or feeling which remains within the I. "Feeling dwells in man; but man dwells in his love." Love is not clinging to the I in such a way as to have the Thou only for its content, its object, and is not the enjoyment of a wonderful emotion; love is the "responsibility of an *I* for a *Thou*" (ibid., p. 14 f.)

In the dialogue between the I and Thou, both personality and knowledge come into being. The knowing of the I-Thou relation takes place in the between, the reciprocal relationship of whole and active beings. Personality is neither an individual matter nor a social matter. It comes into being by those who enter into relation with us. To be fully real, the I-Thou relation must be mutual. The mutuality is neither simple unity or identity, nor any form of empathy. I-Thou is the word of relation and togetherness, in which the members of the relation really remain themselves so that each one remains different from the other. Thou is not another I.

Buber, by contrasting man with the rest of nature, draws two modes of human life consisting of twofold basic movements: the primal setting at a distance; entering into relation (Quoted by Friedman, 1960, p. 80 ff.). The second movement, based on the assumption of the first movement, entering into relation with the world, is a synthesizing apperception of being as a whole and unity.

Humans can only enter into relation with the world or being by setting the world or being at a distance from themseslves as an independent opposite. The distance is a necessary condition to entering into the relation, but is not sufficient. Human community can be established by these two modes of human life. In human community, persons confirm each other in a practical way about their personal qualities and capacities. It is this mutual confirmation that enables humans to establish present history and culture. The entering into relation means entering the I-Thou relation, not the I-It relation. The distance is the presupposition for both I-Thou and I-It relation. Distance precedes the I-Thou and I-It relation which make human existence. By setting at a distance, the primary state of things is elaborated. The failure to set at a distance (thickening of distance) into I-It relation changes the whole situation of the other being into one's object.

> He who lives the life of dialogue knows unity: the unity of *life*, as that which once truly won is no more torn by any changes, not ripped asunder into the everyday creaturely life and the 'deified' exalted hours; the unity of unbroken, raptureless perseverance in concreteness, in which the word is heard and a stammering answer dared (Buber, 1947, p. 25).

The lived unity of the life of dialogue, born out of response to the essential mystery of the world, makes the authentic I-Thou relationship possible. "Man's being," which "is contained only in community..." (ibid., p. 136 f.), happens to the Other in the sphere of between I-Thou relation through dialogue. This sphere of between is an essential common remainder, while two individuals meet, where the reciprocity is fully actual or directly capable of being realized through completion or intensification. The essential problematic of the sphere of the between is the duality of being which proceeds from the essence - what one really is - , and seeming - which proceeds from the image - what one wishes to appear to be. The origin of the tendency toward the appearance is found in man's need for confirmation. It is not easy for a thing to be confirmed by the Other in one's essence, so that one looks to appearance for aid. For dialogue, one must overcome this tendency by paying dearly at times for essential life.

According to Buber, dialogue can be conducted through mutual confirmation, which means one confirms one's partner as the existing being, even while one's partner is opposed to the others. I legitimize him over me as the one with whom I have to engage in dialogue, and I may then trust him also to act towards me as a partner in a similar situation. The help that men give each other in achieving their own being helps them to achieve fullness of life by overcoming the tendency toward appearance.

Dialogue makes the other present as whole and one. One must not contribute one's spirit to be diminished and distorted. No-one can be there as a mere observer; every-one must be ready to share with the others. Therefore, each must be seeing the Other or experiencing the other side. Experiencing the other side is to feel an event or thing from the side of the person in the dialogue, as well as from one's own side; this inclusiveness realizes the other person in the actuality of his being.

Man's wholeness does not exist apart from his real relationship to another being. But the true person is required to detach and shut himself off from others. This attitude is alien to his innermost being "that is whole" (Buber, 1947, p. 167): "Man wants openness to the world, he wants the company of others" (1958, p. 39). Through the whole, man can share in absolute meanings which he cannot know by himself.

"Only the man who has become a Single One, a self, a real person, is able to have a complete relation of his life to the other self" (Buber quoted by Friedman, 1960, p. 93). The Single One does not need to hold himself aloof from the crowd. He is bounded in relation to the destiny of the crowd. He takes into his life the otherness. The essence of dialogue is responsibility. This means responding by hearing the unreduced claims in all their crudeness and disharmony and by answering them out of the depth of one's being as a Single One. "The 'single One,' then, is the man whose aloneness means not only self-containment but a readiness to respond out of the depth of his being" (Friedman, 1960, p. 94).

> The humanly right is ever the service of the single person who realizes the right uniqueness purposed for him in his creation. In decision, taking the direction thus means: taking the direction toward the point of being at which, executing for my part the design which I am, I encounter the divine mystery of my created uniqueness, the mystery waiting for me (Buber quoted by Friedman, 1960, p. 95).

In a soul's achieving of unification, the soul becomes aware of the direction which is ultimately identical with the awareness of one's created uniqueness, the special way to God. This decision is both the current decision about his immediate situation and, through this decision, with the whole being for God. Direction is apprehended through one's inner awareness of what one is meant to be; the direction is that which enables one to make a decision. Direction is not meeting but going to meeting, and it is a precondition of a dialogue. Buber's notions of the direction of true decision, the wholeness of the Single One and the relation with the concrete dialogical man can be more exactly understood through trust which is realization of one's faith in the actual totality of one's relationships to God, to one's appointed sphere in the world, and to oneself. It is the substantiation of trust in the fullness of life that brings together those notions.

For Buber, the tragedy in our present time arises from the fact that men cannot and do not respond to the address that comes to them from that which is over against them. It is, in its deepest meaning, an integral part of life. We can only overcome the tragedy through the trust in our relation with the eternal Thou, in the ultimate oneness of the world with God.

Theunissen (1986), commenting on the discussion between "I-It" and "I-Thou", notes that both modes can be construed as an ego-based attitude - in the Husserlian sense of the term - in which I am intentionally directed toward something. Everything antithetical rests on the basis of this commonness. In addition, he says: "As 'theology' the philosophy of dialogue can be the philosophy of God. But the kingdom is not God.... to become genuine theology, or discourse about God Himself" (p. 384).

While partly admitting Theunissen's critiques of Buber's understanding, I have nevertheless gained important insights from Buber's notions, related to my concerns, not only with the fundamental ontological investigation of the I-Other relationship, but also with a practical investigation of the interpersonal relationship of I-Thou.

> I must always demand more of myself than of the other, and this is why I disagree with Buber's description of the I-Thou ethical relation as a symmetrical co-presence....This essential asymmetry is the very basis of ethics: not only am I more responsible than the other but I am even responsible for everyone else's responsibility! (Levinas in dialogue with Kearney, 1984, p. 67).

Ethical Relation

In Totality and Infinity (1969), Levinas deploys the phenomenological method to describe two basic modes of existence:

(1) the way of totality in terms of Being-as-a-totality which strives for control, power, and a neurotic desire to make the Other like myself;

(2) the way of infinity in the metaphysical relationship which decentralizes our experience and opens us to the infinite otherness of transcendence.

He makes an attempt to systematize the experiences of Other by opposing them to a fundamental ontological thought which reduces the Other to the Same and the multiple to the totality, making autonomy its supreme principle. In the matter of existence, the adaptation of the Other to the measure of the Same in the totality is not attained without violence, war, or bureaucracy, which alienate the Same itself. Philosophy, as love of truth, aspires to the Other as such, to a being distinct from its reflection in the I-it searches for its law, it is heteronomy itself, it is metaphysical.

The advent of the Other can present itself directly, outworldly, and eminently, that is, by a visage. I experience the Other out of myself, not as an object, but as someone who commandingly comes towards me. He stands higher than I; he comes from out of the height which typifies the Other as height and

highness at the same time. The revelation of the face is language. The Other is first intelligible before culture and its alluvisions and allusions. His visage speaks to me and forces me to think. In front of the face, I make demands of myself - the more I respond to it, the more the demands grow. The Other who reveals himself by his visage is the first intelligible. This is to affirm the independence of ethics with regard to history.

I's self does not arise from one's subscription in a genus or species. Individuality does not originate from concept. If we try to integrate I's selfhood into a thematic closed system, we will possibly abstract and lose the concrete sense of I's selfhood which is subjective. "I am defined as a subjectivity, as a person, as an I, precisely because I am exposed to the other. It is my inescapable and incontrovertible answerability to the other that makes me an individual 'I'. I become a responsible or ethical 'I' to the extent that I agree to depose or dethrone myself - to abdicate my position of centrality - in favor of the vulnerable other" (Levinas in dialogue with Kearney, 1984, p. 63 f.). The ethical I asks if I has a right to be and excuses myself to the Other for my own existence.

> The relationship with the other is not produced outside of the world, but puts in question the world possessed. The relationship with the other, transcendence, consists in speaking the world to the other (Levinas, 1969, p. 173).

I-Other relationship initiates from speaking. In dialogue, human relations and personality in language are not predetermined but emerge in an open system. Through this open system, we need to be understood by Others in order to understand ourselves in the nexus of the I-Other relation which should not be reduced to a dialectical counterpart of it with the Other. Bringing it into a dialectic already presupposes the idea of totality. This relation is an orientation, a direction from oneself to the Other. The difference and sameness between oneself and the Other emanate from the interhuman I-Other relationship through exterior language. Dialogue "is not situated in a homogeneous or abstract medium, but in a world where it is necessary to give and aid" (ibid., p. 123).

Speaking delineates an original relation. The understanding in speech is inseparable from his/her invocation. The person with whom I have a relation, I call into being. But in so calling, I call to him/her as well. He/she is my partner in the relation which ought only to have made him/her present to me. When I have spoken to the Other, I have already neglected the universal being "that the Other incarnates in order to remain with the particular being he or she is" (Levinas, 1989, p. 125). A human being is the sole being whom I am unable to encounter without speaking to him in this way, this very encounter. In every attitude in regard to the human there is the salutation and invocation. Therefore, perception is not projected towards a horizon. The connection with the Other, which could not be reduced to the representation of the Other, but rather to one's invocation, is called "religion" by Levinas. "The essence of discourse is prayer" (ibid., p. 126). Through this religious relation, the Infinite is rejoined through a human face, is irreducible to understanding, and has an ethical resonance. The religious relation is one with a being as a being. A being as such, not an incarnation of universality of being, can be only in a relation in which a being is spoken. This being is the human being accessible as a neighbor, as a neighbor with a face.

The movement in discourse is transcendence by desire, which distinguishes itself from the privation of need. The desired does not fill it, but deepens it. Desire is an effort to achieve, an exteriority founded on a lack which is constitutive of human as well as incomplete. All desire felt and expressed in dialogue is a desire for meaning and consideration achieved when they are always contextual and open-ended. Desire is an emotion which brings a satisfaction, a request for aid to overcome a human lack. Consciousness is within the world of people. Truth resides in sharing association with others in the world, so that communication is rooted in the people's commitment. We come into a relation with others in a language which embodies the ethical relation.

Because the world can be understood through the discourse of the Other, the affirmation of communication comes not from oneself but the Other. Through the presence of the Other, one achieves to have the possibility of knowledge about

one's reality in a temporal flowing multiplicity which forms no totality. Communication with the other is a creative intention to integrate the world, others, and oneself. "To conceive of separation as a fall or privation or provisional rupture of the totality is to know no other separation than that evinced by need" (Levinas, 1969, p. 102). One desires to communicate to make sense. This sense never can be fully achieved, but it conveys light to new crevices in the world. The meaning comes from the distance. "The separation is not only dialectically correlative with transcendence, as its reverse; it is accomplished as a positive event....The possibility for the home to open to the Other is as essential to the essence of home as closed doors and windows" (ibid., p. 173). "Familiarity is an accomplishment, an *en-ergy* of separation" (p. 155). The Same in the totality can never be Other. I do not consume the Other, neither define the Other, I only relate with the Other. Although the Other is accessible to me as a human being, as a neighbor, as a face, and although I have domination over him/her, I do not posses him/her. In this encountering, the Other does not enter into the opening of being where I already stand and wait in the field of my freedom. The Other can not come to meet me on the basis of being in general.

> I cannot negate the Other, in violence, in grasping him or her on the basis of being in general and in possession. The Other is sole being in which negation can only announce itself as total: *murder*. The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill (Levinas, 1989, p. 127).

The triumph of the power to kill Other is, in reality, its defeat as power. At the very moment of realizing my power to kill the Other, the Other has escaped me. When I have comprehended the Other in the opening of being in general, in the world where I stand, that is, he/she is perceived on the horizon, I have not looked the Other in the face. I have not encountered him or her. To have a relation face to face is to be unable to kill the Other. To speak in relation with face to face is to be unable to kill. Speaking, or the relation with the face, the event of collectivity, is a relation with a being itself, as a pure being. The face signifies otherwise. It signifies of itself. The vision of the face is no longer vision

but audition and the face.

The rudimentary function of language, through which discourse comes to be the self-interrogating or questioning of the Other, is teaching. Authentic teaching is ethical. The fact that real teaching is an ethical relation characterizes authentic, multivalent communication as ethical. This attitude toward language and discourse shows the primordial human relation in the world to be social. The individual understands the very notion of self and the Other from the fabric presented essentially through the language structure in the ethical relation. People and artifacts are placed in commonality by language. In this way, a common world can be instituted by the generality of language. The ethical relation at the foundation of such a generality is the underlying intention in social fabric.

> Man's relationship with the Other is better as difference than as unity: sociality is better than fusion. The very way of love is the impossibility of reducing the other to myself, of coinciding into the samness (Levinas in dialogue with Kearney, 1984, p. 58).

For Levinas, to share a commonality of language with the Other and to exist in the lived-world of community in communication is to "dwell," which represents a personalization of Heidegger's Being-there in a different aspect. People are thrown into existence and taught how to dwell within society through discourse. The notion of dwelling in the ethical relation expressed by the Other implies expectancy, care and intersubjectivity. Dwelling is not anonymous, rather it is a subjective process in a social fabric already there before the "I." The discourse does not terminate with the I and the Other, rather it is indeterminate in the ethical relation through expression. Communication creates appreciation of the absolute Other through the I's love for the Other, with I's responsibility for the Other. In the ultimate sense, the responsibility consists in thinking the I in the absolute passivity of the self, in other words "a form of vigilant passivity to the call of the Other which precedes our interest in Being" (ibid., p. 65). This passivity is like the very act of substituting oneself for the other being (being otherwise than or beyond being), of being his hostage, and in this substitution not only being otherwise but also otherwise than being (Peperzak, 1978, p. 175). The relation by

which Other and I are connected and separated is not a component of our being-in-the-world. Other and I are not found. Other's being Other is his/her invisibility; my being me is the origin of all responsibility: responsibility for Other, for others, for all others, and also for me - unlimited responsibility (Levinas, 1981). The most basic mode of the responsibility is the approach to the face. The face of Other is not in front of me, but above me. The face is the Other who requests me "not to let him die alone" (Levinas in dialogue with Kearney, 1984, p. 60). The face talks to me. My duty to respond to the Other suspends even my natural right to self-survival. My ethical relation with the Other is one of love, based on responsibility, originating from the fact that the self cannot survive without the Other and cannot find meaning within the ontology of sameness. I owe more to the Other than to myself. One transcends self through the face or text of the Other. Levinas understands communication as a metaphysical relation between the I and the Other. Philosophy, according to Levinas (1981), who explains the word "philosophy" as meaning understanding on the basis of love, must go beyond from the profound reflection of ontology. "The human only presents itself to a relation that is not a power" (1989, p. 129).

> It is clear that the two philosophers are legitimately doing different things. Heidegger wants to discover what is most immediately basic in Dasein's relation to the world of things, and he finds that it is not their objective presence-at-hand but Dasein's use of them as pragmata. For Levinas, on the other hand, man's biological needs are analyzed first,and the pragmatic use of things is considered in another context. The difference between the two types of analysis could be regarded as complimentary rather than as contradictory (Keyes, 1972, p. 133).

Keyes argues that Levinas' critiques of Heidegger results from his misunderstanding of Heidegger, his falsifications of Heidegger, and/or his different concern from those of Heidegger. Heidegger's ontology, claims Keyes, cannot totalize because Being's disclosure and concealment are too closely connected to allow what is disclosed to become a plenum capable of swallowing the Other. Disclosure comes as a blinking of the eye. He proposes a question: if Heidegger's

statement about authentic Being-with-one-another were translated into practice, would its effect be totalitarian? I also agree with Keyes' argument, even though I admit that Heidegger has less to say about intersubjectivity than Levinas does. Relevant to this point, I remember the hermeneutic circle in terms of its traditional sense, not as recasted by Heidegger and Gadamer. That is to say, in the traditional concept of hermeneutic circle, our understanding comes from the circularity in the part and whole.

> It is in the name of the name, then, that Derrida hopes to lengthen the time of that "long colloquy" - not a story or even a dialogue in the conventional sense but a colloquy - in which we are participants. This desire is something like, although not identical with, a hope Gadamer expresses at the end of "*Destruktion* and Deconstruction": that philosophical dialogue would expand to encompass radically different partners from a worldwide "heritage of humanity." Two hopes, two names - Gadamer and Derrida - and two ethical sensibilities, one attuned toward speaking for the other, and the other toward letting the other speak. This is a good deal for our ears to hear at once. Still, it is hard to imagine how we would have to - or want to - choose between the two (Michelfelder, 1989, p. 54).

In the studies of intersubjectivity, there are many controversial issues among several thinkers: ego-alter ego and I-Thou (or Other), in and between, positive constitution and passive perception, ontological relation and ethical relation (or religious), etc. Theunissen (1986, pp. 361 - 384) grasps the difference of the two poles as mutually complimentary to one another, not contradictory. In his view, the characteristics of the two directions reside in genetic or developmental treatments of the I-Other relation, a conception starting from a transcendentally construed ego and leading through various steps to a genuine I-Thou (or Other) encounter. The adopted starting point, we are told, is justified primarily by the ego's prevalence in civilized settings, especially in light of the loss of (prereflective or prehistorical) "origin," one must concede that for us there is no other reality than that which is transcendentally attainable. He characterizes the latter as existential praxis which achieves human existence. The existential praxis of the latter is the practical accomplishment of existences that, in meeting each

other, are brought out of alter-ation themselves.

In the context of Hegelian thought, according to Theunissen, the same genesis appears as the history of the human spirit, which comes out of its being-for-itself into otherness, and eventually wins itself back again out of alienation through mediation with the Other. On the first step, the I is nothing but an I; on the second, it is with the Other in such a way that itself becomes an Other; on the third, it is with itself in being-with-the-Other. On such premises, he grasps the former as the originality and the latter as the originality of the goal, of the completed end. The beginning would be my individual I, the goal of self that proceeds from the meeting. I think his characterization is unreasonable. In reality, it may be very difficult to explain the two poles in the same measure. It may not be a case of complement, but a case of choice or, furthermore, one of adoption out of necessity.

From that perspective, I will focus on a couple of issues from the viewpoint of existential praxis. For Levinas (1981, p. 59), our relationship with God in terms of time and ethics can be, and should be, extended to our relationship with the Other. Our relationship with time is the most profound one we can have. To desire eternity as a going towards God is to desire to perpetuate oneself, to be always. To accept time is to accept death as the impossibility of presence. To be in time is to be for God. The relation implied in the preposition *towards* is ultimately a relation derived from time. The mode of man's relationship to the Other, and to the absolute Other or God, as a diachronic relation irreducible to correlation, depends on our humanistic concern for our fellow human being in time. By means of my ethical concern by and for the Other I can go towards God. The ethical concern predisposes me to the meaning of my other than Being, otherwise than Being.

I now propose to examine how far-reaching the differences in the seemingly contradictory propositions about intersubjectivity are in reality. I will focus on the "face" of Levinas and the "openness" of Heidegger as very important bases for my discussion of intersubjectivity in chapter four.

Levinas: the relation with Other is accessible as an expressing face.

Heidegger: Being-with-one-another opens itself up to the Other in order to let the Other be and let the Other say himself/herself.

Levinas is critical of Heidegger's claim that the intersubjectivity of I-Other is different from understanding things because the relation of I-Other is based on the human face expressing and speaking already and always. The face, by Caputo (1987, p. 268 - 293), is a shadowy place; a hall of mirrors, a place of reflection, a place which we manipulate in order to gain an effect, and sometimes a place which is the setting for language. The body and face lend discourse a spontaneous support that it is hard to produce consciously, but even they betray us when we are out to keep our feelings hidden. The face is a complex, fluctuating, wavering spot in the flux, a good example of the *da* in *Da-sein*. The face is one of those places of opening (Heidegger) and breakthrough (Ekhart), where the bottom drops out, where the surface opens up, where shadowy formations replace the rock-hard identities of being and presence (Derrida). The face instantiates *a-letheia*. For Heidegger, *a-letheia* is a hyphenated, fluctuating play in which things are never reducible to what they are. The face, especially the eyes of the Other, lure us into mystery and confusion, shadowy and dark recesses. They are *windows of the souls. We express and perceive the feelings, emotions, thoughts through the face. If the face heard sad news of the Other, it makes a sad look. The sad look on the face is expressing the perceiving of sad news. Here we cannot distinguish the expressing and perceiving.* The face is the *sur-face* window of the soul to and for abyss.

For Heidegger, the major point of intersubjectivity is letting being be by the being-with-one-another. Heidegger explains this by an old idea, *Gelassenheit*, based particularly on the idea of Meister Ekhart. The ethics of *Gelassenheit* is letting be, everything is liberated and set free. Ekhart saw the life and love of God to be ubiquitous, not confined to just a few privileged souls (Caputo, 1989, p. 61). Furthermore, he did not think that the presence of God was confined to *churches* at all, or that God necessarily prefers the Latin language, but that the German

vernacular in which he preached would do just fine. Heidegger, by the *Gelassenheit* tends to let being go, and let being be. Heidegger explains the openness of truth by the notion of *a-letheia*. *A-letheia* is no longer even a Greek word but a concession on the part of thought of the ineradicable *lethe* from which all things spring up and to which they return (Caputo, 1987, p. 270). Heidegger thinks that thinking is in the end directed by that *lethic* dimension, that the de-limitation of conceptual thinking issues in a *Gelassenheit* toward the *lethe* the concealed heart of *a-letheia*, the mystery which withdraws, which never hands itself over in a form we can trust. We can merge the *a-lethe* movements, movements of emergence from and return to *lethe* by the our "openness to the mystery" - *a-letheia*.

Levinas' "face" and Heidegger's "openness to the mystery" do not go this far. I have already mentioned the face as "window." We can reach the abyss of Other in the flux, originated from and returned to face, through the "face" by an "openness to the mystery." If we granted the *a-letheia* of face, how can we imagine, without an "openness to the mystery," our perceiving the truth? The face is a gate on "openness to the mystery," on the road to the truth. The fluctuating expression of face results in the fluctuated being let be.

I would suggest that a good clue for understanding intersubjectivity of I-Other, in Heidegger's terms, can be found in Caputo's argument, that it "is found in this notion of *Gelassenheit* as 'openness to the mystery', as a deep respect for the world, for others, for the gods. *Gelassenheit* is the thoughtfulness that lets the self-withdrawing be, which understands that we are but pointers bent in the direction of what withdraws, and that the ultimate ethical posture is the humble bow of one who bends in its direction" (Caputo, 1989, p. 62).

D. A Personal Reflection on the Curriculum Field in Korea

In the previous section, I discussed our tradition as a current horizon for me, in relation to my experience of the intersubjectivity of participants in curriculum development. Here, I confirm my new prejudice as a new horizon

resulting from the dialectic between my previous prejudices and the traditions in hermeneutic understanding. My reflection in this section is a part of these prejudices. This reflection could be continuously challenged and broadened throughout the process of the study, in an open hermeneutic circle, because of my situatedness-in-the-world and "the inevitably incomplete nature of our attempt to grasp and signify our practice" (Pinar and Grumet, 1981, p. 37). Therefore, the point of my reflection for this study is a temporal boundary which is changed and broadened as the study progresses. This temporality becomes an essential dimension in my hermeneutic understanding of my prejudices, as contextualized in the Korean educational situation. Huebner (1975) puts it this way:

> The present is the moment of vision when Dasein, finding himself thrown into a situation (the past), projects his own potentiality for being. ...The point is that man is temporal; or if you wish, historical. There is no such a 'thing' as a past or a future. They exist only through man's existence as a temporal being, This means that human life is never fixed but is always emergent as the past and future become horizon of a present (p. 244).

In Korea, there has been little discussion about the curriculum development process. Most studies are related to a causal explanation of the curriculum development process with an empirical "scientific" rationale and I have not been able to find any studies which attempt to gain an ontological understanding of the living relationship of the participants in the process. This particular silence of the field of Korean curriculum study cannot help but result in a stagnation in the improvement of school curricula.

The first stagnant tendency in Korean curriculum studies is the "narrowness" of the viewpoint of curriculum towards theory and practice. Educational theories and practice, especially in the curriculum field, are almost all based on Tyler's and Bruner's propositions. The Korean educational situation is heavily influenced by and has not escaped from Tyler's (1949) and Bruner's (1960) scientific-technical perspective about curriculum.

Within this scientific-technical view of curriculum, education is regarded as a huge machine. Students are viewed as material objects which we can and must transform into pre-planned products of education, and curriculum is viewed as all the procedures of this mechanical production. Kliebard's (1975a) description of the dominant contemporary scientific-technical view of curriculum explains the Korean educational situation in precise terms:

> The curriculum is the means of production and the student is the raw material which will be transformed into a finished and useful product under the control of highly skilled technicians. The outcome of the products is carefully plotted in advance according to rigorous design specifications, and when certain means of production prove to be wasteful, they are discarded in favor of efficient ones (p. 84).

Korean curriculum studies are controlled by the scientific-technical rationality with its propensity for precision and effectiveness. They are in danger of becoming part of the total technicalization of our society. This trend, in turn, threatens to decisively affect Korea's place of being in the world. From this perspective, education is regarded as a rigorous science that is concerned with the question of how vast amounts of information can be transmitted effectively.

In this view, only consensus, stability, and agreement are emphasized as the norm for curriculum, and conflict, instability, disagreement and ambiguity cannot be the objects of curricularists' concern. Hence, curriculum content comes to consist of only fixed, handed down objective knowledge, not the educational experiences which shape students' personal commitment to learning (Vallance, 1986, p. 29). In regard to this phenomenon, Gadamer (1979a) warns that when we take the offering of the past as fixed fact we lose the power of learning from it in any creative way, and in losing that power, we lose the ability of seeing ourselves as potentiality shaping the future, of hearing the "message of desiting," as Heidegger would say.

The price for a "scientific" perspective is too expensive in terms of students' and teachers' creativity and their participation in classroom activities in the process of education. From this perspective, curriculum is seen as a "linear course

to be run" (Doll, 1986, p. 11). Teachers come to be passive reproductive agents of handed-down fixed knowledge. They are not aware that they "confuse what is possible and efficient with what is pedagogically desirable" (van Manen, 1986, p. 89). Teachers have lost the view that they share their lived world with students and neglect the future complexity and depth of that world in which we live together. They lose their capacity to attune themselves in order to see what their everyday eyes do not see.

Secondly, one of the most important but perplexing questions concerning curriculum may be: what deserves to be taught and learned at school? What kind of knowledge should be in the curriculum? In the field of curriculum studies in Korea, empirical knowledge is excessively emphasized compared to personal knowledge. Most curricularists in Korea consider knowledge in terms of utility, objectivity, and hierarchical order. Curricularists discuss curriculum under the assumption that knowledge has a value as a means to attain something. For them, knowledge is justified by its utility. This viewpoint of knowledge can produce serious alienation in the classroom situation by destroying the authentic relationship between teacher and students. They have been deprived the meaning making potential in their own experience of knowledge. Michael Polanyi (1968) stresses an important aspect of human knowing that has a tendency to be disregarded by scientists, that is, he argues for the importance of personal knowledge as opposed to objective knowledge:

> Tacit knowing appears to be a doing of our own, lacking the public objective character of explicit knowledge...tacit knowledge is in fact the dominant principle of knowledge...(ibid., p. 24).

Under the dominance of objective knowledge, personal knowledge is not regarded as reliable, and is considered as mere opinion or feeling. It is, therefore, believed that this kind of personal knowledge should be eliminated from educational settings in order for education to be more serious.

Classroom teachers are very familiar with Bloom's taxonomy and Gagne's hierarchies of learning. Korean school classrooms are influenced by the notion

that knowledge can be clearly distinguished and divided into categories: the cognitive, affective, and psycho-motor dimensions. Teachers are usually concerned with the cognitive domain exclusively. This perspective might break down all human knowing into a step by step procedure. The term knowledge is used to denote a memory level of intellectual activity.

Thirdly, both the development and implementation of Korean school curricula are under strong government control regarding "research, development and distribution" without any consideration for the existing situation of each school. There is no room for teachers to participate and interpret their curriculum creatively in accordance with their students' needs when they closely follow a ready made teachers' guide, teachers' manual, etc. They cannot help but pursue the pre-established curriculum directions when teaching its content and in so doing they lose "the consciousness of everyday life in its active, creative, and productive vitality" (Macdonald, 1975a, p. 83). Smith (1983c) explains that teachers have the mentality of "a public one-way affair" and cannot be concerned with "the importance of giving children imaginative space for their own reflection about what is going on in their lives, in the classroom or otherwise" (p. 92).

This situation results from the view that curriculum works towards predetermined goals and objectives. In this situation, education forgets that curriculum planning is not only "a complex and moral activity" (Zaret, 1986, p. 46) but also a process to "create the historical context - classroom context and personal context - for current efforts" (King, 1986, p. 37 f.). Furthermore, Pinar and Grumet (1976) argue that the way for curriculum content to move is "not manipulation and elaboration of artifacts and activities 'out there', but backward in a certain sense, toward and in fact 'inside' the users" (p. 106). Currently, curriculum is reduced to the planning of means to achieve certain ends. This tendency causes the problem of dualism between curriculum and instruction.

The administrative structure establishes norms by stipulating the organization of educational arrangements. These arrangements are sometimes explicit statements of the rules. The language used in those proposals predefines

the way it is to be interpreted. The government prepares school curricula which define the objectives and the content that should be taught in the schools.

This tendency results in teachers not questioning the externally imposed intentions of curriculum. Teachers accept the objectives and interpretations of state curriculum developers. In this situation, school education is degraded by having its meaning defined as an institution serving certain already fixed ends. Curriculum becomes understood as subject matter, a thing apart from that which has to be learned. In a classroom situation, teaching and learning are organized depending on what and how the subject matter is presented in the curriculum and inquiry is already patterned without regard to the existential classroom situation.

In the process of curriculum development in Korea, in the name of open dialogical understanding, some of the participants oppress others with their authority on the basis of their knowledge, position, gender, and even age without being aware of any responsibility or love for others or students. Others submit to their superiority and authority so that communication is limited to announcements, not genuine dialogue. This distorted dialogue confines the intersubjectivity of the participants in the curriculum development process within a closed vicious circle and even destroys it. As a result, the process cannot break down previous fixed horizons and it does not allow us to go beyond our current situation into new broadened horizons by means of dialogue on the basis of hermeneutic understanding. Gadamer (1985) says that we may "get over every fixation through the future development of dialogue" (p. 190). Dialogue, because of the very nature of the dialogue through which we can affirm our existentiality and understand not only the other but also ourselves, allows us to move beyond the-taken-for-grantedness. A dialogue based on hermeneutic understanding with responsibility and love for the other broadens the fixed horizon. Grumet (1985) asks, "Do you remember how her eyes were glazed, how she didn't really listen, only waited for you to finish so her own turn to tell would come? Do you remember how she asked the wrong question appropriating only those parts of the story that she could use, ignoring the past that really mattered to you?" (p. 3 f.).

A feature of dialogue is to open ourselves to the other. Our opening is an act of listening to the experience of the other between friends, who share in the understanding of a common world (Smith, 1983c, p. 78), "an ethical openness to the other which is a way of giving everything" (Levinas in dialogue with Kearney, 1984, p. 64 f.), and which is the heart of dialogue. Gadamer (1984a) puts it as follows:

> Belong together always also means being able to listen to one another.... Openness to the other, then, includes the acknowledgement that I must accept some things that are against myself, even though there is no one else who asks this of me (p. 324).

Even though there is no one else who asks this of me, it is possible for me to accept that openness can be realized from the responsibility to love and care for the other, and from the mutual respect in an authentic I-Other relationship, without keeping anything for myself. On the contrary, to be open to others in a genuine sense makes us inherently responsible to love and care for others in the deep layers of our mind. Hence dialogue becomes an ethical relation. Dialogue is our endless striving for new prejudices, new horizons in an open hermeneutic circle. On the basis of such a genuine dialogue, we can be a member of a community and a person who has sociality. We can find such humans in a community in Buber's writing (1947):

> 'The individual man for himself, runs his manifesto, 'does not have man's being in himself, either as a moral being or a thinking being. Man's being is contained only in community, in the unity of man with man - a unity which rests, however, only on the reality of the difference between I and Thou (p. 136).

In their anxiety to attain the handed-down goals, the participants in the curriculum development process in Korea have a tendency to be reluctant to ask about the ontological meaning of the intersubjectivity of the process. In an effort to understand the abstracted educational goals which are not directed towards our concrete situation, each of the voices in the dialogue loses ground for its survival which depends "not on shouting down all the others but on granting them a just

hearing" (King, 1981, p. 21). To paraphrase Kant, concrete educational studies without foundation are blind, and foundational studies without the concrete are empty. On the other hand, Gadamer (1984a) argues that knowledge gained through abstract symbols is "blind" (p. 376). For him, the root of injustice is not moral error but blindness.

Nevertheless, Korean educators try to select and organize the curriculum content without questioning the ontological meaning of intersubjectivity, or the essence of various elements which determine the quality of education situated in the concreteness in temporal historicity. In other words, in the Korean situation of curriculum development, there has only been direction-lost-practice, not reflection. Actually, the process includes and needs endless "honest self reflective" (in Nietzsche's sense of the term) decision-making. This decision-making action should be considered in terms of its political and moral aspects and its own situatedness.

Actions, in this sense, are a form of praxis as a unity of action and reflection, because decision-making cannot be a value free process, but one which rests on the interests that will oppose oppression in all its forms. Praxis is a dialectical process of reflection and action in order to transcend the current situation and move towards better education. Praxis starts from the questioning and understanding of taken-for-granted common sense by and through self-reflective prerequisites. That is, praxis is a mode and task of hermeneutic experience. Praxis is an effort to nurture "the dialogical community in which *phronesis* becomes a living reality" (Bernstein, 1985, p. 288).

CHAPTER THREE

THE SEARCH FOR DEEPER UNDERSTANDING

A. Introduction

This study is an unending search for meaning of an intersubjective experience in the curriculum development process in Korea: a movement towards the understanding of intersubjective experience with the purpose of forming new horizons by juxtaposing my prejudices with tradition which is "not an object but the world horizon that embraces us" (Gadamer, 1985, p. 190).

Human understanding is based on self-understanding. The reflection on the ways in which human understanding comes about is the crucial point of understanding. Self-reflection and a self-understanding are the basic spaces towards the realization of potentialities in the interpretive process. "The understanding of a text is conditioned by the self-understanding of the interpretation" (Hoy, 1978, p. viii). To understand is "to understand oneself in front of the text" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 143). The comprehension of the conditions of the appearance of things is related to the structure of human subjectivity which is not the correlate of objectivity. Subjectivity grounded in the participation of being-in-the-world constitutes an objectivity. All understanding flows out of this ontological constitution. Understanding at this primordial level is not epistemological, nor methodological but ontological, i.e., it attests to the fact that we belong to being (van Den Hengel, 1982, p. 124).

My study is to understand myself through the experiencing of intersubjectivity as a text in a circular process within my historicity. Human inquiry is ultimately circular (Spanos, 1976, p. 457). Our belonging to being "is more directed toward the intentional unity of discourse in circular process" in my historicity (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 74). Heidegger (1962) sees hermeneutics as "an interpretation of meaning of being" (p. 424). The experiencing of being-in-the-world can be promoted through hermeneutic rationality to understand communicative and symbolic patterns of interaction (Giroux, 1981, p. 11). For Gadamer(1976), hermeneutics is a way of experiencing which is prior to all

methodical alienation because meaning can be experienced.

By hermeneutic awareness we can hold ourselves open in a conversation "with someone else about our shared world" (Bleicher, 1980, p. 3). In the "corporality of familiarity and strangeness on which hermeneutic work is based" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 262), I can understand ontologically the meaning of experiencing a living relationship of intersubjectivity so that I can move to a further unending determination of new horizons. By understanding the meaning on the basis of these new horizons of mine, I will try to get answers to the questions of how the participants in the curriculum development process work together and what they should do to develop a better curriculum. This is developed in my next chapter.

As a researcher attempting to self-understand and self-reflect with hermeneutic awareness during my encountering with tradition, I will continue to seek to understand my own situatedness in both the Korean and the Canadian educational fabric by the hermeneutic process of participation and distantiation. Hence, it will be possible to begin to interpret the meaningfulness of understanding as being, my being situated in both the Canadian and the Korean tradition. To speak more strictly my understanding of hermeneutic experience initiates from the dialectical encounter, partly with Canadian tradition and partly with Korean tradition, which are integrated into my being and cannot be divided from one another. The lens of linguisticality and historicality of hermeneutic experience in this situatedness is necessary to satisfy the "methodological" expectations of this research in such a way that the ontological significance of research and the understanding of intersubjectivity can be made clearer. But, the lens should be self-reflexive through the hermeneutic process of participation and distanciation. Only in this process can I get transformed answers to the question of how the participants in curriculum development work together for a better curriculum. Hereupon, I can affirm that hermeneutics is my "method."
"Hermeneutics is, we have seen, a universal aspect of philosophy, and not just the

methodological basis of the so-called human sciences" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 433).

Since Romantic hermeneutics, modern hermeneutics has owed its development to a number of prominent philosophical and social thinkers. Even though I admit that there are some differences in some points of detail and approaches among contemporary hermeneutic theories, I will mainly base the study on Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, but also to a lesser degree on Heidegger's ontological hermeneutics and Derrida's deconstructive perspectives. This does not mean that other thinkers are ineligible for the study or are disregarded in the discussion; I will refer to them complementarily from the point of my concern. Much of the insight gained from other thinkers will offer very important clues for the study in terms of method, content, and philosophical background for understanding intersubjectivity.

This chapter consists of three parts. Following the introduction, the second part is a brief review of the hermeneutic tradition and sketches some central figures placing the main focus on the tracing of the developmental trend of repetition to deepen and broaden our understanding. I am also very attentive to the inquiry on the distinctive features of understanding in some phases related to a search for the meaning of intersubjectivity. In the third part, I try, through hermeneutic reflection, to understand the current problems related to the study of intersubjectivity and the contribution of hermeneutics to inter-human communication. These three parts will help to develop an understanding of the philosophical background for the consideration of not only the research approach of this study but also the search for the content of the study.

B. Hermeneutic Tradition

Hermeneutics has its lexical origin from the ancient Greek word, *hermenia, hermeneuein, heremios* which means "interpretation" or "to interpret." Simply put, hermeneutics is "the theory or philosophy of the interpretation of meaning" (Bleicher, 1980). The basic concern of hermeneutics is the interpretation of

meaning, that is, to bring to understanding or to mediate understanding in respect of the various forms in which understanding may be problematic. Hermeneutics is to make the alien, the strange, and the mysterious familiar and understandable. Dilthey argued that "it would be unnecessary if there was nothing alien in them... Hermeneutics is required whenever there is something alien with which the art of understanding has to come to terms" (quoted by Habermas, 1971, p. 164).

Traditionally hermeneutics had to do with the formulation of rules for the interpretation of the Christian text within philology without any special reference to the situation of the interpreter. Since scientific development, it is true that hermeneutics was influenced by the empirical-positivistic presuppositions that human mental and physical activities are subject to fixed laws. These phenomena cannot but conform to fixed laws so that the major concern of hermeneutics became restricted to the development of methodological principles or techniques which would emphasize the correct interpretation of the text.

However, along the development of modern hermeneutics, the concern of hermeneutics has been to inquire into and enrich the dynamic dimensions of interpretive acts in one's situation and historicity as a self-reflective counteraction to the dominant tendency of objectivism, scienticism, and positivism. Hereupon, hermeneutics developed by uncovering the condition of a particular way of viewing the world and knowledge acquisition as a resistance to cultural positivism. Hermeneutics has changed its stance from a methodology of a constantly fixed expression of life to be properly understood, to an effort of transposition into an alien spiritual life. As a result of this tendency, the main focus of hermeneutics is placed on " understanding" as a mode of inquiry of social science, rather than "explanation" as a method of inquiry indigenous to the natural science. In this section, I mainly focus my discussions on our existential openness in repetition as the basis of intersubjective relationships.

Existential Interpretation in Repetition (Søren Kierkegaard)

While Schliermacher and Dilthey attempted to construct the principles or

theories of understanding of texts on the basis of drawing and synthesizing from them, several thoughts emerged in philosophy at that time. Kierkegaard inhabited metaphysics in order to destruct its structure of the univalence of thinking and reality by the concept of repetition of existence. Coming as he did after the consummation of metaphysics in Hegelianism, he was painfully aware that such a concept of thinking completely covers the problem of the "poor existing individual" of human existence, and for this reason located himself in opposition to the philosophy of his day. Kierkegaard withstood the hard pressure of the Western metaphysical tradition, being concerned with a universal easygoing superficiality about existence, and chose "rather to write within the human-temporal-situation of openness and uncertainty" (Spanos, 1976, p. 474). He was compelled to make an effort to assert the ontological priority of temporality in human existence. As a result, in his thinking and writing, Kierkegaard would adopt his own unconventional strategy of hermeneutic violence against an age still innocent about metaphysics.

Through Kierkegaard's proposition, we can find the fundamental origin of the distinction between the hermeneutic circle of phenomenology and the vicious circle of metaphysics in literary creation or literary exegesis as such in Heidegger's Being and Time. Kierkegaard's existential concept of repetition, which is opposed to the Greek concept of recollection, is a major necessary premise for understanding both the hermeneutic circle and vicious circle which have often been referred to in the discourse of modern hermeneutics. Through the pseudonymous author Constantine Constantius, the "constant" and "steady" detached sympathy, and could not undergo repetition. Kierkegaard (1984) says that repetition and recollection are the same movement except in opposite directions, for what is recollected has been and is repeated backwards. Somewhat later in the same book, he amplified the difference, stating recollection as an ethical life view as with the Platonic view of metaphysics, and repetition as the new, existential movement in philosophy (Kierkegaard, 1984, p. 149). In

Kierkegaard's notion of repetition we find the prototype of Heideggar's notion of the hermeneutic circle in repetition. Heidegger (1962) stressed "the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. *Repeating is handed down explicitly* - that is to say, going back into the possibility of Dasein that has-been-there" (p. 437). Repetition is not either a process of recognizing a text in the tradition for its own sake; nor is it a process of recollecting an absolute or privileged origin (logos as presence) as an agency of judging a text in the tradition. Rather, it is a discovering of beginnings by the present interpreter. It makes the present interpreter consider the beginnings in an original, careful explorative relationship with the being of a text. Therefore, the hermeneutic circle as repetition, in short, involves the abandonment of metaphysical understanding in favour of existential understanding of and relationship with being undertaken by the interpreter, in Heideggerian terms, *Gelassenheit*, which lets the being of a text be, and lets it say itself.

Kierkegaard resolutely stressed avoiding turning the world into foreign perfectibility and eternity, stilling its movement, and thereby allaying our fears. He placed his focus of writing open to the wavering, fluctuating, and keeping ready for the fear and trembling by which the existing individual is shaken. By virtue of repetition the individual, throughout one's life, is able to press forward, not toward sheer novelty which is wholly discontinuous with the past, but into the being which oneself is. For Kierkegaard, movement in repetition ought to be movement forward. Moving backward is a kind of antimovement which undoes the progress which has been made. Repetition is a process of existing by which an individual makes his/her way through time in terms of temporality and movement, and exists in the interplay of potentiality and actuality. Repetition begins at the beginning, instead of at the end, with the task instead of the loss in recollection. It is the path from time to eternity, in the Christian sense, which is existence itself. It does not intend to escape from time but to immerse itself in it. In the Christian sense, time means an urgent task, a work to be done, and eternity is the prize

which awaits those who keep the faith. Every movement of time in the Christian sense is charged with the energy and momentousness of eternal possibility in the adventure of life. Hence, repetition, which is recollected forward, makes a person happy whereas recollection, which is repeated backward, makes one unhappy - assuming that one gives oneself time to live and does not promptly at birth find an excuse to sneak back out of life again, for example, that one has forgotten something (ibid., p. 131).

> When the Greeks said that all knowing is recollecting, they said that all existence, which is, has been; when one says that life is a repetition, one says: actually, which has been, now comes into existence. If one does not have the category of recollection or of repetition, all life dissolves into an empty, meaningless noise (ibid., p. 149).

According to Kierkegaard, we have only two ways to address the question of movement: either to affirm it in the category of repetition, or negate it in the category of recollection. Without either repetition or negation there is nothing but the flux, nothing but meaningless noise. Recollection tranquilizes the turmoil; repetition gives a person the ability to keep one's head in the midst of it. In the movement of recollection, everything important has already been. In the movement of repetition, actuality must be continually produced, brought forth anew repetitively. Therefore, repetition means the task for the individual is to forge one's personality out of the chaos of events in time in the midst of the flux, to create an identity in the face of the incessant dispersal of the self through staying with the flux. That is, repetition is the personal task of constituting the self, as a self. For Kierkegaard, the highest expression of repetition is the religious movement in which the individual passes from sin to atonement.

We can more clearly recognize Kierkegaard's notion of repetition by differentiating the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages. Through the breakdown of aesthetical freedom, of ethical wisdom, and sanguine rationality of the judge, human existence can reach the repetition, religious repetition. Repetition occurs only when the individual does not see how he/she can go on, every rational human

resource is exhausted, and the individual gives up everything and awaits the thunderstorm. It is to be purposely visited upon the individual by God so as to accentuate the purely personal God-relationship and to diminish the juridical one. Caputo (1987) puts it in this way, "Here there is not sound reason but as'play' in which the world, that is the hand of God, is playing with man in order to humble his finite understanding and lead him into another and transcendent sphere" (p. 31). Repetition is reached by realizing that everything is lost, there is nowhere to turn, no other end is thinkable, thought is immobilized, language is silent, but the confidence of God dwells again in the tent of the individual as in former days (Kierkegaard, 1984, p. 212). Repetition occurs only if the finite is crucified and the individual surrenders everything in order to enter the divine absence, the thunderstormy night, the fear and trembling. Such a repetition is an inner gain through outer loss. "In the abyss of the God-relationship the individual is able to move ahead....Therefore, the only authentic *Kinesis*, which is repetition, is set in motion by eternity" (Caputo, 1987, p. 32).

Kierkegaard was the proto-destructivist of metaphysical meaning, for he was the one who first placed thinking, with fear and trembling, before the absolute loss of meaning by repetition. Kierkegaard's writings form a milestone on the way to uncovering the complicity of "something else" in the circularity of meaning within repetition within the self-enclosure of text and life. "He commands thinking and understanding to the transgression of the *logos*, to exceeding by a sort of unreserved expenditure just this closure" (Bigelow, 1982, p. 80). Kierkegaard, by opposing existential repetition to Platonic recollection and Heideggerian mediation, set in motion the destruction of the history of ontology and hence cultivated the germ of the central ontological contribution of Being and Time and the whole act of overcoming metaphysics in the later Heidegger. Kierkegaard thought that everything turned on our ability to take our stand in the flux, to press forward in the element of actuality and becoming. Repetition is a matter of interest in placing oneself firmly in and amidst the strife of becoming, that is, it

displaces the disinterested posture of metaphysical thought and sets in motion the foundering of interest in order to make room for the existing spirit which belongs to the sphere of actuality.

Kierkegaard knew clearly the shortcomings of metaphysics of presence: the essential tendency of metaphysics to arrest the flux; nostalgia for a presence lost in a dreamy hope and rational optimism about the story of the loss of presence and how presence lost can be restored. The deconstructive element in Kierkegaard against metaphysics, which always wants to keep a safe distance from and disinterest in the flux by means of objectifying thinking, belongs to a hermeneutic attempt to restore the shape of actuality. It leads us back to the origin differently as a new beginning.

Dionysian Value Creator (Friedrich Nietzsche)

Nietzsche's propositions can be characterized by two themes which are paradoxical to one another: Nihilism and the Dionysian player. The death of God and the loss of the absolute are the major pivots in his life-long process of which the ultimate conclusion is the destruction of the foundation of truth. This announcement is not only his empirical observation related to the decline of Christianity in his day but also his faith, albeit a negative one. Nietzsche is expressing, with this notion, his conviction that the present is in a state of definite dereliction where modern persons cannot find any redeeming features that allow us to reconcile ourselves to things as they are. Nietzsche sees the modern person's "will to power," in whatever form it might take, as the source of a pervasive blindness and sense of suffocation endemic to his world. Thus, he writes, in the Twilight of the Idols (1977), "I mistrust all systemizers and I avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity" (p. 470, §26[1]).

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[1]Nietzsche's works are generally cited by section numbers because the section numbers (that is, the numbers of the aphorisms) are numbered consecutively and standard in all editions, both English and German.

In his statement, "the death of God," Nietzsche implies a condemnation of the personal world as null demarcated by system. The recognition of this nullity is conceived as nihilism. But, we should here differentiate, as Nietzsche points out, between two kinds of nihilism (Megill, 1985, P. 33 f.). On the one hand, there is a nihilism that fails to respond to what Nietzsche sees as the opportunity offered by the world's nullity. This nihilism views the devaluation of all present values as oppressive and burdensome in a passive and anaesthetic attitude. On the other hand, there is an active, aesthetic nihilism. Nietzsche prescribes this nihilism as the appropriate attitude for modern, and post-modern existence, instead of drawing back from the void, we dance upon it. Instead of lamenting the absence of a world suited to our being, we invent one. We become the artist of our own existence, untrammelled by natural constraints and limitations.

Hereby, we can imagine Nietzsche's ultimate task: The Dionysian player as a value creator whose future evolution will justify the human-all-too-human person of the present. He is the awakened and conscious person who symbolizes the contemporary person's goal; the "Systematic Man," a name used by Nietzsche "to signify the Dionysian openness of a consciousness that can tolerate the ambiguities of its own multiplicities" (Kenevan, 1982, p. 389).

We find in Nietzsche another origin of comprehensive conception of hermeneutics which has become a philosophical position beyond an art or technique of understanding texts. Nietzsche is against the absolute-orthodox Christianity, philosophy, the conventional morality and reason. The most serious problem, for Nietzsche, resulted when such absolutism never questions the sovereignty of all values. These absolute values based on reason dwelt without a hitch on a pedestal constructed by reason, since the time of Plato. The most representative result originated from Platonian peaceful reason, which could be destroyed by Nietzsche's hammer through a "great declaration of war" (Nietzsche, 1977, p. 466) against the Eternal Idols or the old truths. This is the "Egypticism" of philosophy.

For Nietzsche, truth is to be the product of convention, the "legislation of language" in which certain words come to designate certain things by agreement (Nietzsche, 1979, p. 81). Nietzsche argues that the use of language is based on metaphor rather than logic. Language is not an adequate expression of all realities, rather, it constructs reality through the metaphors.

> what then is truth? A movable host of metaphors,...Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusion; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins (ibid., p. 84).

The connection asserted between language and the world, for Nietzsche, are dependent upon language rather than a pristine human creation based on conventional language serving as a veil. Truth tells us nothing about reality only about a person's aesthetic apprehension of it.

> But in any case it seems to me that "the correct perception" - which would mean "the adequate expression of an object in the subject" - is a contradictory impossibility. For between two absolutely different spheres, as between subject and object, there is no causality, no concreteness, and no expression; there is, at most, an *aesthetic* relation: I mean, a suggestive transference, a stammering translation into a completely foreign tongue - for which there is required, in any case, a freely inventive intermediate sphere and mediating force (ibid., p. 86).

Nietzsche recognizes that truths expressed according to linguistic conventions are illusory and that they cannot have the degree of certitude they lay claim to. He does not deny the problems caused by the conflict between language and the world, nevertheless he never tries to replace the conflict with something stable and reassuring, something like a program to perfect the weakness of language. For all that, he argues; "there are no facts, everything is in the flux, incomprehensible elusive: what is relatively most enduring is - our opinions...no, fact are precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact'in itself': perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing" (Nietzsche quoted by Megill, 1987, p. 87); "there are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral

interpretation" (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 275, §108). In the preface to his On the Genealogy of Morals, he hints that what is required is an art of interpretation, an art which depends on our ability to chew over the cud of his aphoristic texts (ibid., pp. 452 - 59). Nietzsche's contradictory attitude towards interpretation can be explained by the next paragraph in his relation to the Dionysian value creator. In fact, his main concern is with the way of human life:

> That immense framework and planking of concepts to which the needy man clings his whole life long.... is nothing but a scaffolding and a toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect....that it will now be guided by intuition rather than concepts....He does this so that by shattering and mocking the old conceptual barrier he may at least correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful present intuition (Nietzsche, 1979, pp. 90).

Nietzsche suggests dancing with words and concepts as developed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. For Nietzsche interpretation can no longer be considered just one aspect of a human being, limited to a specific kind of inquiry; an "aesthetic relation," a stammering "translation." It is on the extension of the interweaving of the project of the devaluation/revaluation, transformation of values by reconstruction through deconstruction, with a sounding out of old idols.

Nietzsche's hermeneutics starts from a consequence of his nihilism. Nietzsche denies the truth of the pure world, things-in-itself, because of "something unconditioned" (Nietzsche, 1964a, p. 64, §555). Knowing is putting oneself in the hermeneutic circle. Because, for Nietzsche, the constructing fact is portrayed as an arbitrary and individual matter; fact is entirely the invention of interpretive acts. To put it in another way, there is nothing outside interpretation.

"That things possess a constitution in themselves quite apart from interpretation and subjectivity" is, to Nietzsche, an "idle hypothesis" (Nietzsche quoted by Megill, 1987, p. 86). It is illusion to think that a world can be disclosed through the essence of things by human conscious interpretation. Interpretation is no longer oriented towards the fulfilment of the intentionality of certain discourse; rather it becomes an unmasking of pretended meaning. "What is'appearance' for

me now?" "Certainly not a dead mask that one would place on an unknown x.... Appearance is for me that which lives and is effective" (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 116, §54). Appearance is itself a mask. There is no such thing as appearance as an appearance. Every appearance is only a mask for some other appearance which will be only a new mask in turn. There is a mask because there are multiple interpretations. "Indeed, interpretation itself becomes part of a growing system of concealments, an obfuscation, yet another mask" (Megill, 1987, p. 85). Nietzsche uses the appropriate metaphor, here, text. Interpretation means that the original text is lost, the new text is constructed. "There is *only* a perspective seeing, *only* a perspective'knowing'" (Nietzsche, 1968, p. §12 p. 555). Nietzsche has often been considered as a perspectivist of interpretation.

Nietzsche encourages for us "*to live dangerously*" (Nietzsche, 1974, §283 p. 228) for life is fulfilment and enjoyment. Life can be regarded as an experiment.

> The spiritual haughtiness and nausea of every man who has suffered profoundly...his shuddering certainty, which permeates and colors him through and through, that by virtue of his suffering he knows more than the cleverest and wisest would possibly know,...this spiritual and silent haughtiness of the suffer, this pride of the elect of knowledge, of the "initiated," of the almost sacrificed, finds all kinds of disguises necessary to protect itself against contact with obtrusive and pitying hands and altogether against everything that is not its equal in suffering. Profoundly suffering makes noble; it separates (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 410, §270).

By suffering, one comes to grips with harsh, unconsoling, comfortless, and terrifying reality. One who suffers is one who understands all too well; suffering does not mean the passive beaten person but an ennobled spiritually strong person who looks into the abyss and does not shirk.

> "*Life as a means to knowledge*," - with this principle in one's heart one can live not only boldly but even gaily, and laugh gaily, too. And who knows how to laugh anyway and live well if he does not first know a good deal about war and victory? (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 255, §324).

Without laughter, the capacity of suffering would lead us to strong and ennobled nihilism. "'Where laughter and gaiety are found, thinking does not

amount to anything': that is the prejudice of this serious beast against all'gay science'" (ibid., p. 257, §327). Laughter allows the movement of creation: it is a way in which one can be transformed. Golden laughter is the overcoming of metaphysics; a triumph over nihilism. The affirmation of life is that of existence in the flux. The overcoming of metaphysics is carried in the metaphors of suffering, play, and dance. The affirmation of life must take place in and through a nexus of interpretation. The only way the spirit can live is through the interpretive enactment of life. The act of interpreting is thus the surge of life itself. "Thus, interpretation is, in Nietzsche's concept, the symbol of "*Uberwindung*, overcoming [*depassement*] - of life as fecundity and overcoming. The overman creates because he is not in a world which is but, reads the text of the world and of being by creating it through interpretive metaphor which constituted it and overcomes it" (Blondel, 1990, p. 85).

The embracing of life can only be done in this interpretation. There is a life in the repetition of the affirmation of time. Nietzsche puts the eternal return as an attempt to avoid nihilism by realigning the concept of time. To move through time without negating time, to want to have what was and is repeated to all eternity is Nietzsche's eternal recurrence. "The recurring of the eternal; return is neither identical with the repetition valued by the temporality of the familiar, nor a negation of the public domain. It is instead a new way of temporality which refuses to allow public time to appreciate all value to be reduced to inertia" (Bergoffen, 1989, p. 85). The eternal recurrence is a repetition of the'something,' that is, the life-affirmation of the present, because there is nothing other, and it embraces the historical sense of coming from and going toward. But this'something', however, is always affirmed in continual creative/destructive play.

> The word "Dionysian" expresses...an ecstatic saying of yea to the collective character of existence, as that which remains the same, and equally mighty and blissful throughout all change; the great phanteistic sympathy with pleasure and pain, which declares even the most terrible and most questionable qualities of existence good, and sanctifies them; the eternal will to procreation, to fruitfulness, to

> recurrence; the feeling of unity in regard to the necessity of creating and annihilating (Nietzsche, 1964a, p. 415 f. §1050).

This life of affirming the value of the present is the emergence of value creation; interpretation is value creation; interpretation is the Dionysian value creation of things as repetition. Nietzsche transforms nihilism by the Dionysian value creator's deconstruction through repetition into a realm of meaning creation.

Openness to the Abyss (Martin Heidegger)

The decisive departing point entailed in Heidegger's approach to hermeneutics is that understanding is a mode of being, rather than an epistemological problem. Heidegger considers understanding to be grasped solely as an aspect of being, as an essence of existence, questioning: what, in the human mode of being-in-the-world, determines both the possibility and the actuality of understanding? He painstakingly inquires into the ontological structure and foundation of the understanding which one reaches by the very fact of being-in-the-world. This understanding is a necessity, rather than an exception, which constantly arises from actual existence, as this existence resolutely reveals to one the various possibilities in which one might be being-in-the-world temporarily.

> What does the word *physis* denote? It denotes self-blossoming emergence (e.g. the blossoming of a rose), opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such...in short, the realm of things that emerge and linger on....*Physis* means the power that emerges and the enduring real under its way...*physis* is the process of a-rising, of emerging from the hidden (Heidegger, 1959, p. 145).

For Heidegger, the essence of being-in-the-world is *physis*. It causes to emerge from concealment. It places itself in and stands in unconcealment, *aletheia*. "We know from Heraclitus and Parmenides that the unconcealment of being is not simply given. Unconcealment occurs only when it is achieved by work" (ibid., p. 445). *Aletheia*, the not-being-hidden, is constantly turned out by the work in the world and only there can be found. To Heidegger, facticity cannot be revealed to

a person who steps back from his world. Therefore, Heidegger emphasizes that being-in-the-world is the proper mode of human existence. "In its familiarity with significance, existence is not ontic condition of the possibility that the beings be disclosed, which he meets in the world in their mode of being, circumstanced (*Bewandtnis*), given-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit*)" (Heidegger quoted by Bauman, 1978, p. 158). Our existence being human and our world are in fact two wordings of the same truth: actuality in the familiarity of ready-at-hand, given-to-hand, the mode of Dasein, that is the existence typical of humans, and the possibility of understanding things not used to being understood. Our understanding of things is not just conceived, but inevitable and cannot emerge in the very midst of our ordinary existence. Understanding is our fate.

But how has it come to be so? Existence is at the outset being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world, in its turn, means at the outset being-with-in-the-world, that is, with things and with other people. We meet existence in the state of *Befindlichkeit* (Being situated). "*Befindlichkeit* is, in Heidegger's words, an ontological name for'being tuned',...Our existence has been from the start'tuned' to become a specific existence, this existence here, located in (...'thrown in') the world which contains what it contains" (ibid., p. 162).

Understanding in the state of *Befindlichkeit is*, on the one hand, a closing up of the human being by the very act of'tuning'; and on the other hand, it is exactly'tuning up' which makes the human being a being-in-the-world, therefore a being opened up to things of the world, and being bound to come across disobedience of things and a being pushed into understanding. While remaining just'situated,"tuned up,' one may reach understanding. Distancing myself from oneself is, in a way, much more radical and fateful than distancing oneself from others. It means lifting ourselves from the mode of'being situated' into the possibility to be free, which the state of'being situated' contains and conceals at the same time.

Our life is always, and at the outset, Being-towards-death. For Heidegger, a person is dying already as he/she is born. Resolutely, present as a possibility, death relativizes our existence and discloses it as another possibility. The discovery of death is inevitable, but at the same time the most brilliant and fateful of all human acts. Through this one can pass from *Befindlichkeit* to *Verstehen*, from'being situated' to understanding which can be called the state of an authentic existence. By this understanding of my existence as possibility among many, my existence becomes authentically possible as human. Authenticity, understanding, and disclosing actuality as possibility, are, in fact, different names referring to the same act or state. All of them refer to an opportunity, always avoidable in all existence, which yet has to be transformed from'being situated' into'lifting.' Therefore, understanding is an achievement, a fate which we cannot escape.

Understanding is the disclosure of possibilities which can happen only in the world, in the context of the thrownness of our existence. Therefore, the possibilities must be there, in the world as well. But they would not be disclosed if our existence was not always ahead of it; i.e., illuminating itself from the prospective projections of the present, from the standpoint of the future, which reveals the present as a cluster of possibilities. From the disclosing of things themselves, understanding of them, I open myself up not only to the future but also to the past. At the very moment of my opening myself up, my existence can reach the authenticity, meaningfulness, in which facticity is historicity[2]. Our understanding in this historicity is continually being pursued and the end never finally reached, in an endless process which goes in a circle.

> When one talks of the "circle" in understanding, one expresses a failure to recognize two things: (1) that understanding as such makes up a basic kind of Dasein's Being, and (2) that this Being is constituted as care. To deny the circle, to make a secret of it [as "common sense" or, more philosophically, the metaphysical

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[2]Gadamer, in his book Truth and Method, brilliantly elaborated the historicity. I intensively discuss the historicity in the next section on Gadamer.

> standpoint does ...], or even to want to overcome it, means finally reinforce this failure. We must rather endeavour to leap into the "circle", primordially and wholly, so that even at the start of the analysis of Dasein we make sure that we have a full view of Dasein's circular Being (Heidegger, 1962, p. 363).

Heidegger argues that one intends to rid oneself of Dasein's authentic being by closing off one's temporal existence and this generates a vicious circle. Being "open" generates a hermeneutic circle which is not a vicious circle, despite its presuppositions about being. The whole of the hermeneutic circle, at the end of the temporal process of understanding is not the same whole as the beginning, but "turns out to be endless, that is, historical: not simply full but a more problematic and dynamic experience" (Spanos, 1976, p. 461). The term "*Wiederholen*" used by Heidegger in Being and Time (1962) "does not mean either a mere mechanical repetition or an attempt to reconstitute the physical past; it means rather an attempt to go back to the past and retrieve former possibilities which are thus "explicitly handed down" or "transmitted" (Macquarrie and Robinson's note in Being and Time, p. 437). According to Heidegger, the hermeneutic circle is a process of dis-covering and re-membering the primordial temporality of being and thus the truth as *aletheia*. The hermeneutic circle is a liberating movement, an opening towards being through the repetition or retrieval (*Wieder-holen*).

> To ask "How does it stand with being?" means nothing less than to recapture, to repeat (Wieder-holen), the beginning of our historical-spatial existence, in order to transform it into a new beginning. This is possible...but we do not repeat a beginning by reducing it to something past and now known, which we need merely to be initiated; no, the beginning must be begun again, more radically, with all the strangeness, darkness, insecurity that attend a true beginning. Repetition as we understand it is anything but an improved continuation with the old method of what has been up to now (Heidegger, 1959, p. 32).

Caputo (1987) argues that Heidegger "submitted the notions of'horizon' and'fore-structure' to a searching critique with the result that he no longer described his work as hermeneutic at all" (p. 95). He follows later Heidegger suggesting a hermeneutic relation instead of hermeneutic circle. The later

Heidegger implies that the notion of projective preunderstanding gives way to the hermeneutic relation since the charge of representational thinking could be levied against the notion of a transcendental horizon. Horizon, in the earlier Heidegger, is the'look' or the sight in terms of which we line up or sight objects, thereby making the objectivity of an object possible. The opening in the horizon, by our projecting horizon, has shrunk itself down to our size so that it contains objects which are made to fit our subjective - human limitations. Heidegger adopts *Gegnet* which is a free open expanse, a space of time, lingering for a while in the open. It is a realm in which things can rest for a while, a space in which they find time to emerge, linger, and then drop back out of sight. Here things are "things," not objects. As "things" they rest in-themselves in the free and open expanse, not in a projective framework of our own devising. Here, we are both in the open expanse and outside of it, belonging "originally" to the open. Transcendental preunderstanding has been transformed into a post-transcendental prepossession of thought by Being. We are ourselves encircled and encompassed by the open; we cannot horizonally encircle and encompass it. The thinking (*Gelassenheit*) refers to a kind of thinking, to the way "man" must be in the face of that-which-reasons. And it refers to *Gegnet* itself, which allows not only the horizonal look of objects but also things in the special sense that Heidegger reserves for the word.

Hermeneutics, in the later Heidegger, is not a question of supplying an anticipatory projection of the Being of beings but of hearing a message that is not about supplying anticipatory horizons, but about listening to what is sent our way in the words of the great metaphysicians. In this hermeneutics, a person is to be understood as participating in an hermeneutic relationship to the message which is sent his way. A person is needed and required to pressure the two-fold, which unfolds the distinction between presence and what is present in any given age, and the person who is the being who responds to and hears the unfolding of that message.

The hermeneutic circle does not move between our preunderstanding and what is understood. Rather, the whole turns itself around and now moves between the language and the person who belongs to the language. The mystery is the mystery of language itself, and what threatens it is discourse about language which threatens to turn language into an object. We speak about language instead of speaking from it. The original hermeneutic relation is the intertwining of original saying and human speaking. This is what Heidegger calls a dialogue. The relationship is not between two human speakers.

The hermeneutic circle is transformed into a more radical circulation between Being and Dasein, an intertwining of message of the call issuing from the God of Being, the call of the two-fold, of original language itself. Thus the only appropriate "method" is to surrender that pursuit, to abandon all effort at objectification, in order to reestablish contact with this original circulation between Being and person so that one's words issue out of experience of it and are spoken at its bidding. The task of this hermeneutics is to keep open to the mystery which sustains us and is the uncompassable source of scientific and prescientific life.

Practical Hermeneutics (Hans-Georg Gadamer)

Gadamer, Heidegger's student, works to combine a vital interest in Greek thought and culture along with a strong inclination toward the German idealist tradition. His work in hermeneutics grew out of his historical and philosophical studies and his abiding interest in literature and poetry, both ancient and modern. In Truth and Method (1984a), he demonstrates that hermeneutics, which was the art of understanding in the traditional sense, has universal and ontological signification. Today hermeneutics no longer refers simply to the interpretive techniques employed within special disciplines such as theology and jurisprudence, but to the more basic concern of how understanding in general is possible. With the disintegration of a commonly shared world view, modern age has experienced

a crisis concerning its ability to understand the past, other cultures and tradition, society, and even itself. This consciousness of our finitude has underscored the universality of the hermeneutic problem. The ontological significance of hermeneutics can be seen in the challenge it presents to philosophical perspectives in which a clear subject-object dichotomy is posited - both'idealist perspectives in which a subject constitutes an objective world according to rules or'categories' grounded self-reflexively, and realist perspectives in which an (ideally) neutral subject of discourse in a world of mid-independent facts and objective meanings. Understanding is never subjective toward a given object but belongs to the being of that which is understood; in other words to "the effective historicity" of what is understood, to the history of its influence. For Gadamer, understanding is an event, a happening in which both interpreter and text mutually determine one another. He is concerned not with what we do or we ought to do but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing.

A basic theme of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is the constitutive role of prejudices in understanding. Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence and understanding entails prejudices which constitute the initial directedness of our openness to the world. From his notion of prejudices and historicity of understanding, he further elaborates the "hermeneutic circle," which was one of the major themes of Heidegger, as a basis of all understanding. According to Gadamer's arguments, the hermeneutic circle in understanding is circulating the prejudices, historicity, and effective historical consciousness. The effective historical consciousness, as a major factor of understanding a dialogue between interpreter and text, provides Gadamer with an alternative to objectivism and relativism. A dialogue triggered by the effective historical consciousness always presupposes that no matter how foreign the text is, there always exists some shared historicity or common basis in the understanding of language in tradition, which can provide a point of departure for further understanding.

However, there is nothing external to the dialogue as such by which its success could be judged. The important thing is, as Rorty (1979) has put it, to keep the dialogue going.

In this point, Gadamer introduces again the notion of hermeneutics as practical philosophy and Aristotle's notion of *Phronesis*. In the earlier part of this dissertation, I mentioned that my discussion of intersubjectivity would be reliant mainly on Gadamer's notions to guide the processing of my study. Therefore, in this section I discussed, more concretely Gadamer's propositions under the themes: historicity of our understanding; hermeneutic circle; and philosophical hermeneutics. These influence my study very strongly.

Historicality of Hermeneutics

To Heidegger (1962), the "self" is not merely in the world, but it is "thrownness" within the world, " falling being-in-the-world" (pp. 222 - 225) an existential mode of being. In this case, the self is its possibilities and is there in such a manner that it understands itself and the world in these possibilities, and in terms of them, projects itself upon them. We are thrown into the world as beings who understand something in our historicity and historicality. Since we are thrown into the world, we cannot avoid our being situated in our historicity. We exist here and now, in our own time and within our horizon. We cannot transfer ourselves anywhere else. It is impossible, furthermore, that we can and should place ourselves in another time. It is a certainty for us to live and understand our traditions.

Nevertheless, until the nineteenth century, most thinkers conceived that it was possible to abstract ourselves from our own historical context. "It is even conceivable to think that by some pure act of empathy we can leap out of our situation and'into' the minds of the creators of works of art or historical subjects" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 126). They rejected "the initial pivotal position of our prejudices as the conditions of possibility of whatever understanding we can have"

(Gadamer, 1985, p. vii). The idea that reason could consider prejudices only as remnants of an unenlightened mentality deeply influenced the thinking of some romanticists and shaped the formulation of the doctrine of historicism. In their rejection of prejudices, Enlightenment, natural sciences, and historic human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) of the nineteenth century emphasized the search for objective knowledge by following a system of rules and methodological principles. Thereafter, as the results of Kant's critical inquiry in aesthetics, resulted in the unhappy divorce of the human sciences; the objective and the subjective.

Building on Heidegger's forestructure of understanding and Bultman's pre-understanding, Gadamer (1984a) criticized both the objective and subjective stances and argued that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudices. The very nature of understanding was prejudicial. Gadamer sees that prejudices are the essential elements of tradition[3]. Our understanding is influenced ultimately by our tradition's prejudices. We cannot separate one from the other. The concept of prejudices can be considered in close relation to two other concepts that Gadamer tries to restore and define against Enlightenment: authority and tradition. Gadamer found that Enlightenment thinkers thought of authority as blind obedience to persons so that they denigrated and deformed the concept of authority and tradition. Gadamer (ibid.) argues, "authority has nothing to do with obedience, but rather with knowledge" (p. 248). Gadamer finds the positive role of authority in our understanding. In hermeneutic understanding, reason can be actualized in historical conditions. By an anticipation of moments of tradition, we understand the world in the positive-productive historical moment.

> A person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something...sensitivity to the text's quality of newness. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither'neutrality' in the matter of the object

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[3]Regarding the relationship of prejudices to tradition, Bernstein (1983) sees the tradition as "the source of our prejudices" (p. 130), Weinsheirmer (1958) sees prejudices as tradition itself, and Sullivan (1985) uses the term "traditional prejudices" (p. vii).

> nor the extinction of one's self, but the conscious assimilation of one's own fore-meanings and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one's bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert his own truth against one's own fore-meanings (ibid., p. 238).

Gadamer (ibid.) argues, "understanding is not to be thought of so much as an action of one's subjectivity, but as the placing of oneself within a tradition, in which past and present are constantly fused" (p. 158). So understanding can be a part of the process of the coming into being of meaning. By placing oneself in a context of tradition, which can now be regarded as the sharing of basic and productive prejudices, the interpreter makes one's own prejudices attempt to justify the text's claim to truth and to bridge the past and present. Through the justified productive prejudices which occur in the dialectic between strangeness and familiarity, between past and present, and between object and tradition, a dialogue between interpreter and text, we can reach understanding and achieve new and enlarged horizons. "The prejudices of an individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being" (ibid., p. 245).

In this dialectic and dialogue, Gadamer emphasizes effective historical consciousness to present the productive possibility of understanding. By effective historical consciousness, as an interpreter, we find ourselves in our own situation from where we have to understand tradition by means of the prejudices we derive from within it and arrive "at the truth which is attainable by us despite all the limitations imposed upon us by the finite of our understanding" (Bleicher, 1980, p. 111 f.). In this process, we need the justified prejudices which can be acquired through a dialogical encounter with what is at once alien to us and are the bases of openness to the world, and to break down the two closed horizons of the interpreter and the tradition. The hermeneutic task "Consists not in placing oneself within the latter, but in widening one's own horizon so that it can integrate the other" (ibid., p. 112). Thus our horizon should be in a process of continued reformation through the testing of our prejudices towards the justified new horizon in order to understand parts of our tradition hermeneutically.

Hence, an interpreter can integrate his/her own horizon with the text's horizon for a new, comprehensive, enlarged horizon transcending the initial questions and prejudices by a hermeneutic experience. The hermeneutic experience, as a dialectic, means being open to new experiences which are encouraged by the experiences themselves. Experience is experience of human finitude. Experience is "a new openness to new experiences" (Gadamer, 1983, p. 320) within the limitations whereby the present is still open to the future with possibility and expectation. Even though we are conditioned by the historicity, yet on the basis of it, we can be opened up, through hermeneutic experiences, to new horizons in the historicality in which we become being-in-the-possibility.

Hermeneutic Circle

The main controversial point in the various debates about hermeneutics is the "hermeneutic circle." Expressed in perhaps the simplest terms, the designation "hermeneutic circle" refers to the dilemma that "certain preunderstanding of a subject is necessary or no communication takes place" (Palmer, 1969, p. 25). Gadamer (1984a) raises a question, "how is understanding possible?" (p. xviii). This is a question which precedes any action of understanding on the part of subjectivity, including the methodological activity of the "understanding science" and their norms and rules. This is a question of determining more concretely the structure of understanding found at the basis of hermeneutics. At this point, a traditional hermeneutic rule comes to our aid. It is formulated for the first time by romantic hermeneutics, but its origin dates back to ancient rhetoric. In a general way, before we understand anything in a text, we proceed by a certain preliminary structure which thus constitutes the groundwork for later understanding. It concerns the circular relation between the whole and its parts. The anticipated global meaning of a whole is understood through the parts, but it is in the light of the whole that the parts take on their illuminating function. The criterion for the understanding is the "perfect coherence of the global and final meaning"

(Gadamer, 1979a, p. 146) and "the harmony of all details with the whole" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 259).

In contrast to Gadamer is Hirsch's view of the hermeneutic circle. Following the tradition, Hirsch, a representative of traditional hermeneutics strives to "guarantee the objectivity of interpretation by reviving the notion of the author's intention" (Hoy, 1978, p. 5). Hirsch combines a sympathy for Husserl with the more traditional line running from Schleirmacher and Dilthey to the contemporary Italian theorist, Emilio Betti. According to Hirsch, the hermeneutic circle comes into play solely within the space established between text and one who understands. In this sense, the aim of hermeneutics is always to reconstitute the author's authentic intention and re-establish the concordance, to fill in the lacunas of argumentation. For Gadamer, this sense of unity through the search for the objective author's intention on the basis of the first relationship between parts and whole, and interpreter, cannot help but stay in the closed unproductive vicious circle. In this circle, there are only round trips of the finite meaning within a closed circle, determined as the first stage of circular process, towards the parts and whole without any enlarged fusion of horizons. Actually, traditional hermeneutics rejects breaking down the vicious circle.

> It [hermeneutical circle] is the expression of the existential *fore-structure* of Dasein itself. It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowledge. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme source by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves (Heidegger, 1962, p. 195).

Heidegger broke down the vicious circle by the radical method of defining the nature of understanding itself as circular. His essential point is that "*all* interpretation must arise from a previous understanding - however vague - of the matter under consideration and that its goal is to lead to a new understanding

which can then become the basis for further interpretation" (Maddox, 1983, p. 68). The hermeneutic task is not to escape this preunderstanding but rather to explicate what is present there in an implicit or vague manner. Gadamer (1979a) argues:

> For the very first time the *positive ontological meaning* of the circle that understanding implies is affirmed. Every authentic interpretation must provide itself against the happenstance arbitration of baroque ideas and against the limitations caused by unconscious habits of thought...in order to be authentic the inquiring gaze must be focused on the "thing itself," and in such a manner that it may be grasped, as it were, "in person." ...Now the circular character of understanding is precisely the outcome of the effort which leads the interpreter to strictly abide by this program, despite any errors he might commit in the course of his investigations" (p. 148 f.).

The meaning of the thing itself can be grasped through the circle of understanding which presupposes the prejudices that enable us to understand. Gadamer's main point is the treatment of the hermeneutic circle which develops at the level of an ontology of the understanding rather than merely at the level of methodology as in traditional hermeneutics. The ontological character of the circle means "something basic about very being-in-the-world that we are essentially beings constituted by and engaged in interpretive understanding" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 137).

Prejudices which come from Heidegger's notions of fore-having, fore-sight, fore-conception, and prejudgment have very important positive roles in understanding through a polarity of familiarity and strangeness in the dialectical and dialogical encounters with our tradition. They are the key elements of understanding in which all interpretation is grounded. They are the products of all previous experience and understanding and the horizon of the current experience that is present.

Gadamer clarifies the relation between the interpreter and what we seek to understand. Gadamer did a phenomenological analysis of play as a primordial mode of being. He argues one should learn the art of being responsive to the texts

that we try to understand.

> I would say that the best interpretation should be defined by the fact that one is able to forget it afterwards in the way that one reads the interpreted texts with a certain feeling of the self-evidence so that one can resume their own interests, share their own problem, and ask their own questions in order to find a better situation (Gadamer, 1979b, p. 83).

We must participate, share, listen, and be open to what texts are saying and to the claims of truth that they make upon us. It is possible only through our fore-structure and prejudgment that are constitutive of our beings. Understanding requires the effort and care to make ourselves open to what we seek to understand; to allow it to speak to us as being-in-the-world. Such "sensitivity to the text's quality of newness," (Gadamer, 1984b, 138) which involves neither neutrality nor the extinction of our selves, is possible only through the justified prejudices (ibid., p. 238) that open us to experience and others.

> If we examine the situation more closely, however, we find that meanings cannot be understood in an arbitrary way....So we cannot hold blindly to our own fore-meaning of the thing if we would understand the meaning of another....The hermeneutical task becomes automatically a questioning of the things and is always in part determined by this (ibid., 238).

Following Heidegger's radical transformation of the hermeneutic circle, Gadamer stresses that we must understand things, parts, or texts themselves. We must open ourselves to others, works of art, and texts through our being receptive to the claims to truth so that they can speak to us. But we cannot do this by ignoring all our prejudgments and prejudices. Justified prejudices "constitute the historical reality of our being" (ibid., p. 245).

> In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that ...prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience something - whereby what we encounter says something to us. This formulation certainly does not mean that we are enclosed within a wall of prejudices and only let through the narrow portals those things that can produce a pass saying "nothing new will be said here." Instead we welcome just that guest who promises something new to our curiosity" (Gadamer, 1976, p. 9).

It is only because of these prejudices and prejudgments that we are able to understand the texts themselves. By opening ourselves to the newness handed down to us through the play of our forestructures and things, the texts themselves, we can understand what we are trying to understand; we can integrate the two horizons, the interpreter's and the text's. Gadamer calls this "fusion of horizons."

That our fusion of horizons in the hermeneutic circle is achieved by our dialectical encounter with the prejudices in our historicality, helps us to become aware of ourselves: our self-understanding. The hermeneutic circle is our self-understanding in our historicality. We cannot find the bridges of commonality between ourselves and texts without such forestructure in our situatedness in tradition and language. Thus, the fusion of horizons is "the first, last, and constant task, an infinite process." (Gadamer, 1979a, p. 149). A "text is understood only if it is understood in a different way every time" (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 276). Thus we can break out of our vicious circle towards enlarged new horizons through hermeneutic "spiral" (Maddox, 1983, p. 73).

Criticism and Phronesis in Hermeneutic Practice

> Its [participation] dialectic consists of the fact that participation is not taking parts, but in a way taking the whole....by sharing my own participating in the things in which we are participating, we enrich them; they do not become smaller, but larger. The whole life of tradition consists exactly in this enrichment so that life is our culture and past: the whole inner store of our lives is always extending by participating (Gadamer, 1984b, p. 64).

Accepting Heidegger's phenomenological ontology of "man's" "being-in-the-world" as a significant condition of temporality which influences the possibility of being, Gadamer suggests a very powerful insight for practical philosophy. Hermeneutic theory by itself does not make criticism impossible: the real practical force of hermeneutic reflection of self-understanding and self-reflection makes the hermeneutic theory critical. The hermeneutic task, understanding, which requires an on-going reorganization of our experience of the world, can be

broadened and enriched only by human hermeneutic reflection. According to Gadamer (1976):

> Hermeneutical reflection fulfils the function that is accomplished in bringing of something to a conscious awareness....only through hermeneutical reflection am I no longer unfree over against myself but rather can deem freely what in my preunderstanding may be justified and what unjustifiable. And also in this manner do I learn to gain a new understanding of what I have seen through eyes conditioned by prejudices. But this implies, too, that the prejudgment that leads my preunderstanding are also constantly at stake, right up to the moment of their surrender - which surrender could also be called a transformation. It is the untiring power of *experience*, that is the process of being instructed, man is ceaselessly forming a new preunderstanding (p. 38).

Gadamer considers that hermeneutic reflection is emerging in constant self-reflection attempting to arrive at self-understanding of the interpreter as well as texts. Hermeneutic reflection informs us that all traditions are based on commonly held views which are our prejudices. In this case, understanding in hermeneutic reflection means becoming aware of our prejudices. Understanding looks critically at them. Thus, it can be said that every hermeneutic situation opens up a critical perspective. Gadamer explains it (1979a):

> It is a grave misunderstanding to assume that emphasis on the essential factor of tradition which enters into all understanding implies an uncritical acceptance of tradition and sociopolitical conservatism. Whoever reads the present sketch of my hermeneutic theory will recognize that such an assumption reduces hermeneutics to an idealistic and historical self-conception. In truth the confrontation of our historic tradition is always a critical challenge of this tradition....Every experience is such a confrontation (p. 108).

Gadamer links truth with the thing itself. He says, "I repeat again what I have often insisted upon: every hermeneutical understanding begins and ends with the'thing itself'" (ibid., p. 159). Gadamer adds, "the de-spacialization of'temporal distance' and the de-idealization of the'thing itself' allows us to understand how it is possible to know in the'historical object' *the genuinely'other' despite'my own' convictions and opinions*; that is, how it is possible to know them both" (ibid., p.

159).

Though relation to traditions is itself an essential appropriate condition, it does not function in a dogmatic way. Rather, the appeal to tradition demands the possibility of criticism: "Instead of being yet another method, Gadamer's hermeneutics is a call for methodical self-reflection on the part of all the humanistic enterprises. In that sense, however, hermeneutics is still essentially linked to praxis" (Hoy, 1978, p. 128).

Habermas criticizes Gadamer for not supplying more explicit grounds for criticism. From a Marxist perspective, Habermas argues that Gadamer's insistence on the universality of language in understanding and knowledge overlooks social determinants of knowledge such as power relations and the work structure. Habermas (1971) makes the critical concern for emancipation found in Marxist and psychoanalytic thought his basis; he gives a suggestive adaptation of psychoanalysis to develop an indepth hermeneutics that can analyze distorted communication. In responding to this argument, Gadamer considers this as ideological and affirming prematurely a final point of which the human being is not capable. "Indeed, Gadamer's primarily critical concern appeared to call into question all positions which, like the Enlightenment and Habermas, assumes a final standpoint from which it judges tradition" (Maddox, 1983, p. 72).

In the debate between Gadamer and Habermas, Ricoeur (1981) makes a mediatory effort to arrive at the point that the disagreement between the hermeneutics of tradition and critique of ideology concerns: "the abyss which seems to separate misunderstanding from pathological or ideological distortion" (p. 97). Emphasizing the complementary character of these two orders of science and two modalities of interests, he indicates:

> First, that a hermeneutics of tradition can only fulfill its program if it introduces a critical distance, conceived and practiced as an integral part of the hermeneutic process. And secondly, on the other hand, that a critique of ideologies too can only fulfill its project if it incorporates a certain regeneration of the past (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 159 f.).

Criticism implies distance, and the distance introduced by hermeneutic reflection makes possible new and deeper understanding. "The real power of hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable" (Gadmer, 1976, p. 13). Through this hermeneutic reflection, Gadamer (ibid.) argues, the "real event of understanding goes beyond what we can bring to the understanding of the other people's words through methodical effort and critical self-control" (p. 58). Indeed, it goes far beyond what we ourselves can become aware of:

> The continued validity of the philosophic tradition seems to me to have implications for my own thinking, even with all the modifications I owe primarily to Heidegger....Rather I am concerned with the fact that the displacement of human reality never goes so far that no forms of solidarity exist any longer....The conflict of traditions we have today does not seem to me to be anything exceptional. *Phronésis* is always the process of distinguishing and choosing what one considers to be right (a letter by Gadamer in Bernstein, 1983, p. 264 f.).

In general, since hermeneutic theory is philosophy and not a particular science, it cannot supply appropriate material conditions for interpretive contexts. It cannot be so tied to practice that it can legislate a canon of interpretive norms or doctrine, "school," or "method" of criticism. Nevertheless, it has essential connections with practice, for it is concerned with a special class of appropriate conditions: by *Phronesis*, practical wisdom, or a kind of practical philosophy.

Hermeneutic theory is not concerned with amassing "theoretical" knowledge of what is strange and alien. Rather, it involves the type of appropriateness characteristic of *phronesis*. The type of knowledge and truth that it yields is practical knowledge and truth that shape our praxis. This also allows us to clarify why the "chief task of philosophical hermeneutics is to correct the peculiar falsehood of modern consciousness and defend practical and political reason against the domination of technology based on science. It is in this sense that hermeneutic philosophy is the heir of the older tradition of practical philosophy" (Bernstein, 1985, p. 280).

Gadamer (1979b) refers to *phronesis* as the habit of practical reasoning, the virtue which preserves us against corruption by emotional impacts. Practical reason must give an account of the end itself and of why we prefer something to something else; and so far as we do so, we are not blind to prescription. And we are not all blindly obedient to the prescription of a society. *Phronesis* is "just the application of more or less vague ideals of virtue and attitudes to the concrete demands of the situation" (ibid., p. 82). It fills up the blank of content of critical reflection with further direction and virtue for our praxis in the concrete situation. As opposed to Habermas, because the concept of reflection that lies at the heart of ideological critique implies an abstract concept of coercion-free discourse, one loses sight of the authentic conditions of human praxis. Moreover, this application cannot evolve by mere rules but is something which must be done by the reasoning man himself. "This application, this concretization is the universal aspects of hermeneutics (ibid., p. 82). Thus, Gadamer (ibid.) describes hermeneutics: "to let what is aliened by the character of the written word or by the character of being distantiated by cultural or historical distances speak again....We should never forget that the ultimate justification or end is to bring it near so that it speaks in a new voice" (p. 83).

The object of study of any discipline is just as much a product of the researcher's tradition, no matter to what degree this represents the cultural tradition, as it is of its own historical character. It should be clear that by challenging the social sciences to think not only about the historical character of their object of study but also the historical character of their own discipline, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, especially the concept of *phronesis,* makes a better self-understanding of these disciplines an essential precondition for the legitimacy of their enterprise. This hermeneutic endeavour of researching for a greater understanding of the subject matter can be illuminated by describing our personal experience in the tradition within the conditions of my understanding. But, in this case, as the previous quotation shows us, we should remember again

Gadamer's idea that "the best interpretation should be defined by the fact that one is able to forget it afterwards in the way that one reads the interpreted text with a certain feeling of self-evidence so that one can resume [texts'] own interests, share [texts'] own problems, and ask [texts'] own questions in order to find a better solution" (ibid., p. 83).

Free Play of Signs (Jacques Derrida)

Today, Derrida's name is first associated with *deconstruction*. This word, "deconstruction" has had a remarkable career. Having first appeared in several texts which Derrida wrote in the mid-1960s, it soon became the preferred designator for the distinct approach and concerns that set his thinking apart from Western metaphysical tradition. Although first developed as a philosophy, it has spread not only into literary, art, and film criticism and theory, but also into psychoanalytic, pedagogical, and social theory. To put it roughly, "Deconstruction is the reading of text in terms of their marks, traces, or undecidable features, in terms of their margins, limits, or frameworks, and in terms of their self-circumscriptions or self-delimitations as text" (Silverman, 1989, p. 4). The deconstruction which brings out what the text excludes by showing what it includes, highlights what remains undecidable and what operates as an undecidable in the text itself.

> But if no one escapes this necessity, and if no one is therefore responsible for giving in to it, however little he may do so, this does not mean that all the ways of giving in to it are of equal pertinence. The quality and fecundity of a discourse are perhaps measured by the critical rigor with which this relation to the history of metaphysics and to inherited concepts is thought....It is a question of explicitly and systematically posing the problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the de-construction of that heritage itself (Derrida, 1978, p. 289).

The word "de-construction," partly being resonant with structuralism which was then, in the 1960's, the reigning word, occurs in the above passage, and is concerned with the inevitable, even necessary ethnocentrism of any science formed

in the European scientific tradition. The "de" in deconstruction in the above quote marks a distance from the structuring or construction which has uncritically taken over the legacy of Western metaphysics. The word does not mean that it is a refusal or destruction of the terms of the legacy, rather it occurs, with responsibility for what cannot be avoided, that is, remaking and redevelopment of the concept of philosophy.

> Representation mingles with what it represents to the point where one speaks as one writes, one thinks as if the represented were nothing more than the shadow or reflection of the representor. A dangerous promiscuity and a nefarious complicity between the reflection and the reflected which lets itself be seduced narcissistically. In this play of representation, the point of origin becomes ungraspable. There are things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference from one to the other, but no longer a source, a spring. There is no longer a simple origin. For what is reflected is split *in itself* and not only as an addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles (Derrida, 1976, p. 36).

Representation is like speech for Derrida. Words signify as presence. Their "origins" are not questioned. Derrida argues that if one considers tradition seriously and doggedly works out the premises of the tradition to its bitter end, all so-called signs can never be "fixed" but act as signs to define other signs, like in a dictionary where one definition of a word leads only to other definitions. In structuralism the signifier and the signified are in correspondence to each other, there is no separation between them. Like a piece of paper where on one side we have the sound-image composed of letters (signifier), while on the other side of the paper is the word's meaning (signified). Derrida intends a much more revolutionary approach. According to Derrida, there is not a single signified that escapes (and if so, only to eventually succumb to) the play of signifying'referring' that constitute language. A "detour" exists between the signifier and the signified.

Derrida's rereading of Husserl makes deconstruction go forward, not by rejecting the notion of subjective constitution, but by shifting its focus from subjective consciousness to signs; a certain rewriting of the reduction of Husserl's

transcendental phenomenology. Husserl's philosophy of constitution of the world and meaning by means of the *epoché* - the name of the critical power of philosophy - is taken by Derrida to a grammatological reduction which sees even the self presence of consciousness as a constituted effect. On this he might be influenced by Nietzsche. In Derrida's view, not only the object but also the subject are constituted products of a systematic iterability. Signs must be repeatable before they have public meaning. "The presence of the present is derived from repetition and not the reverse" (Derrida quoted by Caputo, 1987, p. 123). The principle which has determined "being" as presence is subverted by Derrida through the value of nonpresence or absence; that which is suppressed by the next as a "trace." The movement, productive repetition, Derrida argues, originated from the notion of trace and *différance*. Difference is Derrida's way to point to the impossibility of origins. It means that meaning is continually depended and created through the difference in language itself. This difference is not only a kind of *a priori* which inhabits things from the start but also the only way anything ever gets done by means of the repetition (iterability) - which alters in deferring.

> The old opposition between speech and writing no longer has any pertinence as a way of testing a text that deliberately deconstructs that opposition. Such a text is no more *against* 'spoken' than it is 'written', no more against speech than *for* writing, in the metaphysical sense of these words. Nor is it *for* any third voice, particularly any radicalism of the origin or of the centre (Derrida, 1981b, p. 181).

In examining speech and writing in Plato, Derrida acknowledges Plato's persistent and tenacious systemization of the meaning and value of each in terms of their proximity to truth. Derrida deconstructs the hierarchical preference for speech over writing. But, Derrida's major concern is placed on the movement that initiates these oppositions and their reversal. For Derrida, speech is already structured as an articulation as presence, already invaded and differentiated by a system of categorization and syncategorization. The inference of signs is to be tolerated, as if language were a "prison" and not a "house," as if *différance* were

only a limiting condition and not an enabling one. The chain of signifiers makes thought possible in the first place and hence emancipates thoughts.

> The use of language or the employment of any code which implies a play of forms...also presupposes a retention, and protention of differences, a spacing and temporalizing, a play of traces. This must be a sort of inscription prior to writing, a protowriting" (ibid., p. 146).

It is the tracing and pretracing out of the world according to a differential system of signifiers that Derrida calls "writing" in the sense of "*arché-writing.*" *Arché-writing* is just as much at work in speech as in writing in the narrow sense. *Arché-writing* places speech and writing in a new relationship to one another, not as opposition but as instances of an earlier form of writing whose origins remains unfathomable.

Derrida shows the play of reflexivity in which the two concepts of original and image mirror each other in Plato's text. Living logic duplicates nature (Physis) which in turn exists as repetition by repeating itself and coming after itself. Writing doubles this repetition but endangers it by intensifying the gap and slippage between'original' and copy, between thing and its disguise.

> That the sign is detached signifies that it is cut off from its place of emission or natural belonging; but the separation is never perfect. The bleeding detachment is also - repetition - delegation, mandate, delay, rely (Derrida, 1986, p. 167).

Repetition is an irrepressible creativity. In fact, it is impossible to repeat without altering what is made. Even in translation a new text is generated. That is to say, to repeat is to produce and to alter, and to make new. Signs are systems of repeatable traces whose very repeatability makes it possible to re-write. Derrida liberates signifiers from being, truth, and presence. He not only shows that they constitute effects but also affirms the power signifiers create beyond themselves, producing meaning which is not bound by being and presence. Derrida says that which is traced out in signs has entered into a concatenation of signifiers with connecting lines reaching out in every direction and that these links cannot be cut off or excluded.

According to Derrida, there is only free play of difference of signs, no history of Being, no metaphysics. The desire for a history is eschatological, metaphysical, apocalyptic. There is only *différance*, postal agency, which relays, delays, loses letters. The letters only go back by return mail to letters that have themselves gone back by return mail in an endless, hopelessly entangled maze: no letters reach their destination. But we have to stop waiting for the mail as if it contained a private message by special delivery. The postal reduction releases the freed circulation of signs, the free repetition that it will make for free literature, free writing, free thought, free research, free science, freedom for whatever you need (Caputo, 1987, p. 170 f.).

The dissemination of meanings has left us undecidability. This undecidability produces an effect which keeps shifting, is ambiguous, and is impossible to decipher. Regarding application of text, Derrida does not trust all talk of understanding however it may be radicalized : even a hermeneutics of trembling without comfort, an understanding from which one suffers, a hermeneutics not to be helpful but to make things difficult. He fears domesticating his work, removing its critical Socratic sting by understanding itself.

For Derrida, a critical-Socratic praxis is a starting point for a deconstructive strategy whose point is to expose the limitations and delimit the authority of every assertion which does not set itself up as authoritative. Derrida's goal is to make the debate fair by exposing the disseminative and exclusionary gestures that tend to characterize the ruling discourse. In fact, he argues for a kind of cross insemination, in which matters will be settled by a debate without professionalised authorities and authoritarian specialists, by a cross-fertilizing dialogue among many different points of view which is one of the foremost aims of the College (Caputo, 1987, p. 197 f.).

> Deconstruction is not an enclosure in nothingness, but an openness towards other....In short, deconstruction not only teaches us to read literature more thoroughly by attending to it as language, as the production of meaning through *différance* and dissemination, through complex play of signifying traces;...It is not a question of calling for the destruction of such

> instruction, but rather of making us aware of what we are in fact doing when we subscribe to this or that institutional way of reading literature....an interpretation open to several other interpretations,...Without a certain love of the text, no reading would be possible. In every reading there is a *corps-à-corps* between reader and text, an incorporation of the reader's desire into the desire of the text. Here is pleasure... (Derrida in dialogue with Kearney 1984, pp. 124 ff.).

Deconstruction is not destructive criticism but the releasing of another reading of text, a very specific reading of it. According to Derrida, deconstruction always presupposes affirmation. Deconstruction means, in itself, a positive response to an alterity which necessarily calls, summons, or motivates it. Deconstruction is therefore a vocation - a response to a call to the Other. "The other, as the other than self, the other that opposes self-identity, is not something that can be detached and disclosed within a philosophical space and with the aid of a philosophical lamp" (ibid., p. 118). The Other, who precedes any theory or philosophy, necessarily invokes and provokes the subjects before any genuine questioning can start. "It is in this rapport with the other that affirmation expresses itself" (ibid., p. 118).

Derrida gives me a very useful strategy of text interpretation with the notions of intertextuality and intratextuality for hearing oppressed hidden voices as others. Derrida's emphasis on undecidability of meaning through textuality in *différance* is the way to keep questions in question, and emancipation of signs from meanings, which actively joins in the play into which all things are put. His critique of metaphysics of presence makes us be concerned with absence as Others. Through this concern with Others, in chapter four, I hear the voices of the Other's side which are oppressed by male supremacy, Westernized technical perspective, unjustifiable authorities. In the chapter, I use Derrida's propositions as a strategy to hear the voices of others by critical awareness of metaphysics of presence.

Here, in the last part of the hermeneutic tradition, I feel the need to clarify and put into shape some currently debated issues: on the one hand, the

relationship, or the similarity and difference between poststructuralism and hermeneutics, or more appropriately for my study, the possibility of the congruency between the two stances in terms of textuality, openness, language and signs, horizons (and fusion of them), and, at last, meanings; and on the other hand, the relationship or the similarity and difference between later Heidegger's notion of *Gegnet* and Gadamer's notion or earlier Heidegger's notion of "horizon."

Undecidability and Inexhaustibility

Both Derrida and Gadamer criticize metaphysics of presence. Their major motivations are to overcome the age of epistemology. They are thoroughly in postmodern forms of thought. For Derrida, meaning is nothing other than the ephemeral play of language itself by the diacritical opposition of signs. Meaning is a wholly intra-linguistic sort of affair because language does not refer to anything outside of itself but refers only to itself. For Gadamer, at the moment of application as a praxis, understanding is not merely a linguistic affair but also the transformative production of new meanings outside of texts and the order of textuality. For deconstructionists, our interpretation is a form of free-floating play without ground in a context free situation. The inter-play of signs does not allow for the moment of appropriation: undecidability. Phenomenological hermeneutics are inseparable from application in their temporalities and historicities. "Derrida quite simply omits to take into account in his theorizing...the fact that texts have readers" (Madison, 1991, p. 130) as particular individuals existing in particular situations. The fusion of horizons by the individual in his/her time and space means that the discovery of the true meaning of a text or a work of art in the application is never finished (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 265): an infinite process, inexhaustibility. The exhaustibility of fusion of horizons, as the application, allows us to renew our understanding and life.

The proposition of poststructuralism and phenomenological hermeneutics may not be incompatible in the theoretical aspects, but I as a practitioner have

learned tolerance and generosity from poststructuralism in practical aspects. The notion of intertextuality instead of intentionality and tradition, that is free play of signs instead of hermeneutic circle, and standing at the edge instead of participating can be very useful strategies in the search for meanings. I believe that these strategies should be practised before our appropriation in understanding. Irene Harvey (quoted by Madison, 1991) tells us that deconstruction is not a theory, rather a practice, (p. 292), - a "textual strategy" (Harvey quoted by Palmer, 1984, p. 233). As an example of textual strategies, Hoy (1986) explains, "...modern hermeneutics could readily accept this method of reading as a strategy that is useful in preventing us from reading our own expectations into everything. This strategy would make us more aware of our expectation so that we do not become overly enclosed in the circle of our own subjective understanding. Deconstruction may thus be a necessary moment of the hermeneutic circle" (p. 404). I found such powerful ways in which deconstruction could contribute to hermeneutics: deconstruction helps hermeneutics escape from "one-dimensionality" of meanings by the "justifiable possibility of textuality." The demands by Nietzsche's, Heidegger's, and Derrida's "critique of modernity generate the need for the hermeneutical strategy of deconstruction" (Palmer, 1984, p. 233). Palmer says, "In this context, deconstruction appears not as some incommensurable strategy that emerges from the blue but as the latest stage in the development of hermeneutics" (ibid., p. 233). In this sense, Palmer calls deconstruction, "postmodern hermeneutics" (ibid., p. 233).

Postmodern hermeneutics makes us go beyond metaphysics. Metaphysics itself can be seen as a certain attempt to assuage the harshness of things and give itself comfort, to stabilize the flux of our repetition as an "affirmation of life in and through a nexus of interpretation" (Risser, 1985, p. 138). Interpretation based on repetition with postmodern hermeneutic awareness, is creation as repetition. It is, really, an era which is one of great interpretive self-awareness of existence. The embracing of life can only be done by repetition in this critical self-awareness and

as such there is creation.

***Gegnet* and Horizon**

I confess and affirm that I am a practitioner, not a philosopher. In my study which searches for meanings, I cannot help but consider both Heidegger's later notion of *Gegnet* and Gadamer's notion of horizon which is based on Heidegger's earlier proposition. I agree with the Heidegger's *Gegnet* in many aspects. But I am inclined to believe that the notion is too impractical for a practitioner who is seeking the meanings of texts. I, as a practitioner, am very anxious to see the actuality - "now," "here" - near to me, rather than the future with a potential rarely possible. For this study I need both of the notions. In order to hear the voice of being, I need a bridge in an hermeneutic region.

Caputo (1986)[4] criticizes Graem Nicholson's book Seeing and Reading saying that we have to go beyond the horizonal thinking and that the task of thought is not to regionalize the Open into a horizonal frame but to free the open space of what is regioning in the region. The author of the book, Graem Nicholson (1986a) replies that the horizon and the *Gegnet* interpenetrate each other. The horizon is but the face which the Open, the *Gegnet*, shows to us, while the horizon is indeed, a delimitation of the *Gegnet* and comprehension in it, the converse is also true, that the *Gegnet* appears with the horizon. Our representational thinking has to be brought along into our meditation upon the *Gegnet*. We have to seek the *Gegnet* within the horizon (p. 268 f.).

Hereupon, I explain analogies between Zen meditation in Buddhism and *Gegnet*, and between Kyo discipline in Buddhism and horizon. The main sect in Korean Buddhism is a unity of the Zen-Buddhism and the Kyo-Buddism. Even in Korea, quite long ago, there was a debate between the Zen-Buddhism and the Kyo-Buddhism. And even now, there are still independent Zen Buddhism and

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[4]Caputo uses the same argument by the title, Horizonal hermeneutics and its limitation in Man and World, 1986, pp. 241-251.

independent Kyo Buddhism. Most of the monks in Korea, whether priests of high virtue or priests of low virtue, practice Zen meditation every day to get *Vimuki*. At the same time, they hear a Buddhist sermon and learn the Buddhist scriptures and practice self-discipline. The Zen meditation could be equivalent to hearing the voice of being in the openness of *Gegnet* (refer to Heidegger section). Every priest practices the Zen meditation every day in a state free from all ideas and thoughts. But to attain this state free from all ideas and thoughts is very difficult, especially to ordinary monks. Sometimes they practice very harsh self-discipline. But, even though a priest can rarely achieve this state, even more difficult is it to attain *Nirvana* and to get *Vimuki*. Therefore, they learn Buddhist scripture with others or by themselves and hear Buddhist sermons in order to broaden their horizons (refer to Gadamer section). They believe that they can hear the voice to the equivalent extent of their horizons. They believe that Zen meditation and Kyo discipline are interpenetrating and interdependent, and are therefore mutually compensatory. Is this not evidence that ordinary people can hear the voice of being to the extent that their horizons permit?

Why did Jesus Christ scold people that they cannot look at the things they see and they cannot listen to the voice they hear? Does the old saying in Korea not indicate the same phenomenon: there is no text which is unable to be read notwithstanding one hundred readings? The Christ's idiom implies that if we do not have any horizon as willingness, fore-structure, or fore-ground, we cannot understand the meanings of being. The Korean idiom implies that, after we accumulate and broaden our horizon as fore-concept or fore-knowledge through several readings, we can understand the texts. Both cases teach us that we can understand a text equivalent to the degree of our horizons. The *Gegnet* and horizon are mutually compensatory, interpenetrating, and interdependent.

C. Hermeneutic Reflection on the Study of Intersubjectivity

Mutual encountering of human beings emerges from a background of a common temporal life. We live in a temporal community in which the constituents open up toward a common time; past, present and future. The commonality of a community is realized when we bring something which is pointed to "this-there" from our horizons and open it to a common present, future and past. "The'this-there' is an explicit understanding which is pre-given for such a distinction as'mine and yours and allows the mutuality of both" (Pilotta, 1982, p. vii). I and other's experience of one another are not disjunctive but accentuating moments of our experience. This experiencing of one another mainly through dialogue is aimed at mutual self transformation by a mutual changing, acceptance, and transmission based on understanding. In reality, intersubjectivity in human encountering is based on mutual experience which is made possible by dialogue and understanding as a work of life. In dialogue, mutually, human beings not only express utterances which are produced by speech acts but also understand the utterances of others at the same time. Thus acts of speech and understanding closely correspond to each other: "Their correlation consists in that every act of understanding is the reverse of an act of speaking, and one must grasp the
thought that underlies a given utterance" (Schleiermacher quoted by Mueller-Vollmer, 1985, p. 10).

Hermeneutics as a science of understanding and a mode of life establishes a foundation for interpersonal communication. The careful basis in sound philosophical framework of hermeneutics is a key to its ultimate relevance and success. The features of understanding as a core of hermeneutics is of great importance in encountering one another. Hermeneutic thoughts play a role in keeping open the possibilities fundamental to interpersonal human encountering and dialogue.

Hermeneutics can contribute to the study of intersubjective interhuman communication and its practice in ordinary people's lives. In this regard, I firstly

discussed the stances of current studies and the problem related to these stances, and, secondly, I have discussed the possible contribution of hermeneutics to the study in terms of the method and the content of intersubjective interhuman communication studies.

The understanding of understanding as an essence of hermeneutics enables us to improve the study of intersubjectivity in terms of the method which is involved in the study. We think primarily that the content of the study can and should control the method of the study, especially in natural science. But it is also true that it is possible for the content of the study and its result to be influenced by the method itself. The tight and fixed study method can be easily broken.

> The concrete researches of many sociologists and philosophers have aimed at certain forms of social intercourse which necessarily precede all communication....all these are just a few examples of the endeavour to investigate what might be called the "mutual tuning-in relationship" upon which all communication is founded. It is precisely this mutual tuning-in relationship by which the "I" and the "Thou' are experienced by both participants as a "We" in vivid presence (Schutz, 1964, p. 163).

Schutz's explanation of communication grounds the notion of "mutuality." Mutuality is a relation which is not "commonness" emanating from the intersubjectivity, the experience of the Other. The structure of the commonality of mutuality, is fundamental to the interpersonal communication process. The communicative process is an orientation with the task of maintaining intersubjectivity. Self and the Other experience are not disjunctive but accentuating moments of total experience. The Other points to me and I discover the Other in myself. Therefore, the interpersonal communicative experience is a mutually changing acceptance and transmission. In this sense, intersubjectivity and communication should be considered separately. They are different layers of the same identity. Intersubjectivity should be considered through communication, and communication through intersubjectivity. Therefore, in this section, I will inquire into intersubjectivity in the context of interpersonal communication.

Current studies of interpersonal communication theories can be classified into three major categories: conversational analysis; cognitive structure analysis; and interactional process analysis (Deetz, 1982, p. 10).

The most diverse group of the studies can be classified into conversational analysis, or rule analysis. Most advocators of this stance treat conversational rules as normative principles which explain action rather than following the concepts of rules in linguistics. Rules, in this stance, are either formal statements of typified social actions as in turn-taking or socially preferred action such as the use of forms of address. The rules describe surface feature regularity by an appeal to conventional social process. This stance of research tries to avoid speaker meaning, yet documents the need to consider extra-textual taken-for-granted-knowledge and interlocutor interpretation. Many problems stem from an inadequate concept of text and the treatment of the surface features of transcribed discourse as data.

A second stance of the research has developed from George Kelly's personal construct theory (ibid., p. 11). The work discusses the structure and content of cognitive systems. It emphasizes social interaction including social perspective-taking, message adaptation, and relational development. Cognitive structure analysis has provided a better explanation of individual choices in interaction than of the interaction characteristics themselves. But, they have a weak point in that their interpretations were understood psychologically (by virtue of the cognitive categories), rather than hermeneutically, so that their explanations expand more easily to look at all aspects of cognitive interaction.

The third stance is interactional process analysis. This work follows Ruesch, Bateson, Watzlawick, and others (ibid., p. 12). The systems analogue allows the most complete non-linear analysis of interaction patterns available today. This stance tries to specify observational qualities of different relational patterns and relate them to external variables. The problem with this stance is the multiple levels of meaning simultaneously present.

The major problems with these stances stem from their lack of recognition of the need to realize the nature of intersubjectivity and understanding on the basis of transcendental philosophy and hermeneutics.[5] The problems of these studies are: intersubjectivity is, in fact, reduced to objectivity based on the mentality and philosophy of control; they have a tendency to study interpersonal interaction on the basis of humanistic psychology, which is highly subjective; they emphasize advanced hypothesis-testing techniques so that they degrade powerful insight of openness, preparation, and care in hermeneutic sense.

In regard to method we need to choose one which is appropriate for the study. Therefore, we need more flexible study methods which minimize their own influence on the study content and result. Hermeneutics as a method is not a "method." The hermeneutic method by which the researchers open up themselves to the mystery of things can be useful for the intersubjectivity study.[6]

The process of intersubjective relationship of human communication involves participants of dialogue engaging in an understanding of their world so as to interpret this understanding in a meaningful way. The phenomenona of intersubjective human communication appears itself in and through the process of understanding - meaning giving and taking. An exploration of the theory of human understanding in a hermeneutic sense can offer for intersubjective researchers the need to meet the demand for flexibility, fecundity, and relevance. Gadamer's proposition states that the prejudices in human understanding are not bad but, rather, a primordial condition and we can not escape from them. As long as we must construct visions of the world by dialogical encountering from the universality of linguistic possibilities, prejudices can correct and broaden a

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[5]I will discuss the conceptual contribution of hermeneutics to interpersonal communication later.

[6]I already discussed hermeneutic method in the hermeneutics - as a method for the study of the intersubjectivity in curriculum development process in chapter one.

researcher's horizon about intersubjectivity. By returning to the world from which the prejudices originate so as to attempt to observe and clarify its genesis, researchers can get a hermeneutic directive that questions sciences's tendency to assert an epistemological first principle.

The very nature of understanding which opens up oneself to another should be recognized by the researchers. How can we expect to reach others and to be resonant and sympathetic to others, while we ourselves close our eyes, ears, and minds to others?

Caputo criticized even the openness, conditioned and limited by our horizon, in which being may be possessed by Dasein and Being is towards beings. With the openness, researchers can throw away their stubborn dogma which makes their linguistic competence the criterion of the world's truth. The logical validity of arguments cannot be tested without, in principle, positing a community of scholars who are capable of both intersubjective communication and of reaching a consensus. He is able to internalize the dialogue of a potential community of argument in the critical discourse of the soul with itself "This proves that the validity of solitary thought is basically dependent upon the justification of verbal argument in the actual community of argumentation (Apel, 1979, p. 258).

By making the rhetorical practice of argumentation - as such practice is made possible by the intersubjectivity of communication community, Apel argues that the process of understanding - interpretation must now seek directives with which could assure argumentative appeal to logically correct use of intellectual as well as moral norms of the communication community. Derrida and Levinas emphasize the ethical nature of encountering with others as well. Disregarding the characteristics of encountering with others on the basis of ethical commitment would take a risk: dramatizing the very present danger of a technocracy (Apel quoted by Hyde, 1982).

CHAPTER FOUR

INTERPRETING THE TEXT OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN THE CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

A. Introduction

To develop curriculum means to put educational experience for students into an "historical context" (King, 1986, p. 39), that is, it indicates some efforts which may "shape student's personal commitment to learning" (Vallance, 1986, p. 29). Through curriculum development we can actualize "the concrete, existential reality in which the student lives" (Scudder and Mickunas, 1985, p. 45). These actions for curriculum development involve different forms of political action "to make one consistent set of decisions" (Herrick quoted by Short, Winter 1987, p. 5).

We are certainly aware that initiating changes in which curriculum development is understood and conducted will involve a political struggle in and out of the field of curriculum. It seems to me that to develop curriculum is a process in which political struggles converge in the essential tension between multiple views of curriculum reality and a consistent set of decisions which focus on the improvement of the quality of our children's education through continuous decision making. That is to say, curriculum development is an endless process, which involves our whole being-in-our-historicity.

On the other hand, such choices in curriculum development based mainly on the curriculum theories, which were mentioned in chapter two, influence the formation and growth of curriculum itself. These operative curriculum theories are linked to practice in different ways as each perspective brings a set of assumptions and social practices that "defines and qualifies how one reflects on the world" (Giroux, 1981, p. 8). Each of these theories views the world in its own unique way so that curriculum development based on these distinct rationales will lead to varying designs. As a result, many curricularists discuss different aspects of these various curriculum design types: the role and meanings of educational changes in educational administrative hierarchy (Fullan, 1982); the sources for curriculum

content (Stenhouse, 1980); the emphasis on school as the curriculum developer (Eggleston, 1980; Lawton,1983, 1986; Foshay, 1980); the diffusion of innovation in curriculum changes (Macdonald and Walker, 1976); and the value judgments through the interaction of participants of the curriculum development process (Macdonald, 1975a).

In this chapter, I am trying to open up an axiological understanding of the lived relationship of participants in the curriculum development process. The above-mentioned various aspects of curriculum practice can be ultimately realized through mutual human acts. The fundamental fact of penetrating curriculum practice is that curriculum practice must be conducted by collaborative human acts, not individual isolated acts. By collaborative human acts, I mean that the whole process of curriculum development results from the human encountering with Others in which, through interpersonal communication, participants discuss, agree and disagree, make value judgements, develop power struggles, make ethical commitments, and so on.

This human encountering with Others has its roots in intersubjective relationships, sharing the mutual experiences with "good will" for the common goal of improved curriculum and better education. The intersubjectivity of participants in the curriculum development process is the starting point from which they work cooperatively, the foundation on which they rely, and the goal towards which they aim.

This study inquires into the meanings of intersubjectivity of the participants in the curriculum development process. The whole search for meanings is that of hermeneutic application of understanding and practical performance in effective historical consciousness. In philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer emphasizes *phronesis*, in order to make understanding applicable, which is the model of the notion of effective historical consciousness. In hermeneutic understanding, Gadamer's notion of the *phronesis* is realized by effective historical consciousness. Aristotle's concept of *phronesis*, from which Gadamer drew his theory of philosophical hermeneutics, is originally related to practice, not theory. Gadamer's

notion of understanding, which has the dialogical and dialectical structure in one's horizon, is related to the practice of understanding. McIntyre (1981), says that practice is "coherent and complex from socially established cooperative human activity" (p. 175). This passage clearly envisages the nature of the "effective historical consciousness": the effective historical consciousness is established based on one's history which is one's tradition and culture. Therefore, hermeneutics can be defined as a form of human activity through which "good will" is realized in the course of trying to achieve practical performance.

We can see the nature of understanding and interpretation as a practical performance in Peirce's (1960) "interpretant in praxis." Currently hermeneutics has transformed itself from the study of specialized rules of interpretation for the use of theologans or jurists to that of a philosophical discipline and general theory for the practices of the social and human sciences. In this context, hermeneutics is not only the "method" of this study but also the way through which the intersubjective relationship, which this study investigated, is realized in the curriculum development process. If we accept that hermeneutics is the universality of philosophical hermeneutics, the intersubjective practice of curriculum development process in which participants make decisions, face problems, and engage in practice cannot help but rely on hermeneutic practice.

In this chapter, I discuss themes based on three aspects. Firstly, I discuss the practical curriculum development process, which is not aimed at establishing a general theory of intersubjectivity, that is, a discussion based on the consideration of educational practice. Secondly, I discuss the themes on the basis of Korean culture and tradition (even though I am not sure, because I have stayed in Canada quite a long time, of how much I have already been influenced by Canadian culture consciously and unconsciously). Thirdly, I discuss goal orienting human acts which have converged into the development of better curriculum through human encountering with Others: even our unintentional and coincidental touching as we pass one another, are said to be a result of the *kalma* of several billion kalpa in Buddhism; how much more important are our intentional goal

orienting meetings!

This chapter consists of five sections. Following the introductory section, I interpret the meaning that the intersubjectivity of the curriculum development process had for the participants in this study. I interpret the meanings with rather a critical eye, in order to move towards the purpose of improving practice. In the third section, I reflect on intersubjectivity in Korean culture. This reflection was initiated in order to create a basis for understanding the meaning which emerged in the second and third section. In the fourth section, I reflect on my understanding of the meaning of intersubjectivity, which emerged mainly in the second section, with the texts related to those of section two. Curriculum development process is not just an object for my study. As an educator I, too, am engaged in a reflection on practice with the aim of improving practice. I very briefly synthesize, in the fifth section, the meanings which emerged in the fourth section, in terms of openness in temporality.

B. Understanding the Meanings of Intersubjectivity

In this section, I interpret the meanings of intersubjectivity of the curriculum development process for the participants in curriculum development in Korea. The meanings in this section have emerged from several small and large conferences, related to the process of curriculum and curriculum materials development, in the form of a series of dialogues before, in and after the conferences (therefore most of the dialogues were based on the minutes of the conferences). Also examined were written documents which were handed over from the Ministry of Education (MOE) to Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI), the diaries of two female elementary school teachers, and my own narratives based on my memory as the contexts for the texts. In the early part of 1979, KEDI began to carry out a study of curriculum development at the request of MOE. In 1980, Koreans experienced very serious political and social upheavals. President Park was assassinated. The result was the collapse of the fifth Republic and the founding of the sixth Republic of Korea. In the aftermath

of the social turmoil, KEDI was re-entrusted by the MOE to develop school curricula.

Theme B-1: Preparing to meet Others by answering to the *Calling* of Others

[1] It is really an exciting time for me. It is the first time I have been involved in developing school curriculum on a nation wide level. How can I contribute to the calling of the project? To what degree can I contribute to the calling of other people's desire? How much is my experience valuable for curriculum development? I will close my eyes. I will open my ears. I will, with closed eyes and open ears, collect remember my past experience. I will remember my experience for better curriculum. I will recollect my new experience. I will write the whole history of the process so earnestly as to penetrate to the bone. (Diary of teacher B[1], August 1980)

Teacher B describes her feelings before the first meeting for the Korean fourth curriculum revision was held. She had taught at elementary schools for more than fifteen years. In the meantime, she completed her masters degree of education at the Seoul National University. She awaited the very important first day of her involvement in national curriculum development. She was waiting for the first meeting and enthusiastically prepared for the first day. For her, what she should do first for the initial meeting with Others was to fully prepare herself. To prepare is to hear the voice of *calling* of Others. For her, being involved in the curriculum development process was to answer to the *calling* of Others, of nature as divine Spirits (refer to next text). She would close her eyes in order to see things more clearly. She would open her ears in order to hear the voices more articulately. She would describe her experience of the voices so earnestly as to resonate to the bone.

The voice can only produce what the ear hears. We hear the voice "our bones telling us through our ears. It is the ear which is our'royal road' to the

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[1]In this chapter, I did not use participants' real names, because they are still working in several official positions. Also I was allowed to use the teachers' diaries in my dissertation on the condition that I would not reveal their real names.

divine" (Tomatis, in an interview with Tim Wilson, p. 1). The voice from our bones is that of our soul. The teacher is preparing for commitment with her soul. Koreans usually express severe and critical mental states by relating to our bones. One feels sorrow in one's bone; one works so hard that one's bones detach from each other; one is frightened from the tip of one's hair to the marrow of one's bones; one feels chilly even in the heart of one's bones; one does not care if one dies over again and again by more than one hundred times and one's white bones change into the clay so as one's soul ceases to exist. By expressing her mental state through relating to her bones, she showed her willingness to contribute to the development of improved curriculum with her whole body (including her soul). Preparing so earnestly as to resonate her to the bone with her whole flesh can not be reduced to the representation of the Others, but rather to one's invocation. The essence of this preparation is prayer. Through this religious mental state, the preparation of the Infinite has an ethical resonance.

She was afraid of how and to what degree she could contribute to the *calling*, and how much her experience was valued, as she was neither a theorist, nor a specialist. It was the first time she had been involved in curriculum development process. But her preparation for the conference and her willingness to contribute to the *calling* was not less than those of specialists. Berry (1986) says that competent people who are dedicated to the improvement of the human situation do not understand the real consequences of what they are doing, and totally committed people are simply wrong in their judgment (p. 5): competent people are so accustomed to the system and method of what they are doing that they are inclined to be careless in their commitment. Because she was not a competent specialist, she was afraid of her involvement in curriculum development and meeting others for this purpose, and she was forecasting and preparing for what she could do. She did not know how and by what procedure she could be involved in curriculum practice with Others. "When the shoe fits, the foot is forgotten" (Chuang Tzu quoted by Merton, 1969, p. 31). She did not know the method and system well for curriculum development: she might fearfully prepare

herself more fully for curriculum practice. She might be aware of the real purpose, content, and consequences of her involvement in curriculum practice. She did not know how much her past experience was valuable and what the new experience would be like: she tried to abandon her conceptual understanding, which is divorced from our own historical context, of her past experience on the basis of an abstract and theoretical evaluation of it. She wanted to bring it into a careful explorative relationship with the curriculum development in her temporal situation. She tried to open her past and new experience to the wavering, fluctuating, and keeping ready for fear and trembling by writing her experiences in her diary every day through her honest self-reflection in her temporality and historicity: a repetition minding the beginning of her past experience and moving towards new experience in the interplay of potentiality and actuality.

> [2] What will I and Others do? Who will come there? What will the atmosphere of the conference be? At the time point when a *kalpa* meet other *kalpa*. At the place where Jesus Christ gave us money according to our talents. At the point and space, we will make our commitment. I still remember the image of my grandmother who was praying fervently to divine Spirits with well water at its purest under the big tree. Oh, God, Look after me always. (Diary of teacher B, prior to the first meeting [1])

Curriculum development is, for her, from the beginning, to meet others. For her, to be involved in curriculum development is to meet other *Kalpa*, to share her talent with others. It is at the outset, the answering to the calling of others and God. The intersubjectivity had been undergone through putting together her and others' soul and flesh: corporeal intersubjectivity. She was preparing for the meeting with her mind like "preparing fervently for divine Spirits with well water at its purest under the big tree." With the existential understanding through which a *kalpa* meets other *kalpa*, she was preparing with existential understanding the curriculum practice in harmony with nature, divine Spirits, and God and in the total harmony with her talent, that is, herself. The preparing is, for her, spontaneous willingness under the guard of God. For her, there was not any excessive desire either beyond talent. There was spontaneity in harmony with her talent.

[3] Director A:
Let's check our preparation for tomorrow's conference: conference materials; sign post; name card; writing tools; attendance money; seating order; audio equipment; soft drinks; ...Is there anything we missed?

Researcher D:
Director, we missed transportation. And we missed direction sign post which we should put on the corner on the road towards KEDI.

Researcher E[2]:
Isn't that overdoing it? All of them should know the way to KEDI.

Director A:
We should do. There are some people who are coming to KEDI for the first time. That shows our concern for them.

(Pre-meeting of the Curriculum Research and Coordinating Section for the conference on the next day, August 1980.)

The preparation for the conference starts from our resoluteness to care for others and for the meeting without missing any detail. Caring for others is a mode of practical interaction in the world which is always the one which we share with Others. Intersubjectivity is not already laid down from there. It starts from our heartfelt concern and sensibility for others. It results from our spontaneous resoluteness to prepare for the meeting for improved curriculum and better education. Moving back to the teacher, she would describe her old and new experiences, and her former and new knowledge on the basis of this resoluteness and sensibility in her flesh. Describing is more than describing. "To describe is...to change structures, to signify something different from what is shown" (Carvalho, Winter 1991, p. 313). She would stock new experiences and knowledge which signified something different from what is shown and which changed their structures and quality.

[4] I will write my diary as my experiences goes. What will the look of this diary be at the end of this journey? What will the body of this diary be? How much can I contribute to improve the Korean educational situation?

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[2]In this thesis, I am revealed as "Researcher E."

How much shall I be influenced by this experience? (Diary of teacher B, The continuation of the text [2])

To write a diary every day is an irrepressible creative repetition. To write a diary every day is a mode of self-reflection based on one's critical distantiation in hermeneutic understanding. Understanding, appropriation, and repetition are modes of the same actions in one's praxis - as an existential repetition. In fact, it is impossible to repeat without altering what is made. To repeat is to produce and alter, and to make new. To write a diary is to reject domesticating her work and removing its critical Socratic sting by letting the diary speak itself. Therefore, participating in curriculum development is at the beginning not only self-transformation but also a mutual transformation. She could be appropriating the knowledge and experience in her "flesh" which was changed by her involvement and reflective describing. To prepare is to perform in temporal time. To prepare is to forecast the future in temporal time. In the flux of the time and experience she would be different by spontaneously letting her flesh flow.

Theme B-2: "Overstanding" through fragmented, specialized, and professionalised knowledge

[5] Researcher E:
I don't want to mention the MOE's request. I would say that the contents of school curriculum are identified and integrated in such a manner that an integrative approach would be adopted in an elementary school. This allows the learning experiences to be enriched and enlarged at each level with an emphasis on the development of a sound mind and body, the cultivation of intellectual abilities and skills, and the inculcation of moral principles. In addition, in our present social reality students are pressured by a heavy curricular content load. They feel nervous and their health is being adversely affected. We need to reduce students' work load.

Professor A:
I want to warn you against the notion that school should be charged with the mandate for the complete social development of children. School should have the responsibility for developing students' cognitive development as Goodlad mentioned. We have to hand over a part of the responsibility for the development of the affective domain and of the psycho-motor domain to family life, church, social agencies, and so on.

(The first conference of establishing the direction of General Guiding Curriculum Principles in KEDI, August 1980.)

When I heard professor A's statement, especially, "as Goodlad mentioned," I was perplexed.'Why does he particularly refer to Goodlad's name?' I muttered in a low tone. Teacher A who sat in the chair next to me asked whispering, "What does he mean by the name, Goodlad?" In the Korean tradition of discussion, and in this kind of situation, we do not usually mention the scholar's name, because if we say, "Scholar A says, Scholar B says...", we seem to be pedantic. Professors, especially theorists have the tendency to abstract phenomena and use more difficult and complicated jargon. At that time, I felt insulted. (He is five years my senior at my university. He is a famous professor in a so-called first class university in Korea.) He implied, "Do you know Goodlad's excellent educational theory? What are you saying that Goodlad already said in a different way?" He tried to stop my argument with the authority of a famous knowledgeable scholar's name in addition to his own authority. Goodlad's name was, in a sense, his "hiding place" (Charlene Spretnak and Fritjof Capra, 1986, p. 79). He stopped our intersubjective relationship at the hiding place. Intersubjectivity is to keep dialogue going. In this case, there was no intersubjectivity. I and alter-ego (Other) constitute each other as a reciprocal being for one another through listening. He already hid himself in a famous knowledgeable scholar's name. Denying the absolute truthness of Goodlad's proposition, Nietzsche would ask him in the same tone, "Do you know that truth is the product of convention which was made by humans, and truth tells us nothing about reality only about a person's aesthetic apprehension of it? What are you saying? Don't you know that truth expressed according to linguistic conventions is illusory and it cannot have the degree of certitude it lays claim to?" Professor A, by stabilizing the debate using Goodlad's name in a backward movement towards absolute criteria, rejected the happiness in intersubjectivity which would result from the repetition which would move our situation forward. He confined human reason in metaphysical absoluteness which arrests the flux of life and does not consider the repetitious movement of *kinesis*

which makes possible the *phronesis* to be actualized in an historical condition.

> To profess, according to the dictionary, is to confess or declare openly, and therefore publicly, consequently to acknowledge a calling before the work. So the word bears originally a religious connotation, as when we speak, of a profession of faith. But in present society, with its elaborate subdividing of human functions, a profession is the specialized social task - requiring expertness and know-how - that one performs for pay: it is a living, one's livelihood (Barrett, 1962, p. 4).

According to Barrett, through their professional deformation, the professors in our time, have changed into specialists. Relying on their fragmented specialized knowledge, they not only specialize their vision of the world according to their sharpened focus but also have almost a blind spot toward things that lie on the periphery of this focus. In this way, Professor A tried to reduce the responsibility of schools by focusing only on students' cognitive development. He sought to use "the weapons of his knowledge" about Goodlad "through specialization" (ibid., p. 6) "in human community and subordination, therefore with power" (Gadamer, 1992, p. 185). Through unequalization due to his weapon of knowledge, I could not already be the "I" of Thou (professor) as a member of the "us-all." I was not an I as one among many that made up the universal "we" of human association. We belong to different worlds from each other.

Another example of "overstanding" through professionalized knowledge is shown in the following text:

[6] I am very much disappointed with my former professor's manner in today's meeting. Until now, I have been very proud of helping KEDI work which aims at improving Korean educational practice. His reaction to my question in the meeting fell short of my expectation. But, I have to re-think what I am doing now by undergoing this kind of humility. I asked the professor in the meeting, "What is the LTA?" The professor who is my former teacher in university muttered to himself very quietly, "You had better study a little more." (Diary of teacher C, June 1980)

When teacher C attended another small meeting, she experienced a very similar case to mine. Even though the professor did not say anything directly to her, she heard the muttering. In this case, the "study" was theoretical and

specialized, not a practical one, and not even grounded in a concrete situation. If my guess is right, the LTA is the abstract Learning Time Allotment in experimental research. Theoretical knowledge is usually more highly valued than teacher's practical knowledge. A professor's specialized knowledge is considered to be superior to a teacher's practical knowledge. But, in a sense, the teacher's practical knowledge is more integrated than the professor's specialized knowledge. By self-reflecting in her situation, she was theorizing about practical knowledge and truth that shape our praxis in actual educational situations. She was performing the appropriateness characteristic of *phronesis*.

> The fragmented approach to human knowledge is not unproductive, however; it has produced increasing specialization, making us witness to one of the biggest explosions of human knowledge of all times. But because of its fragmented character it is becoming increasingly divorced from the reality it claims to comprehend; the'explosion' has not increased our capacity to deal with the vital problems and crises that confront us (Kothari, 1984, p. 333).

How does knowledge which has been divorced from reality contribute to improving the real educational situation? "Its basic contribution has been to give man a tremendous sense of power and manipulation. Nothing else could have made man so arrogant as this particular role of knowledge" (ibid., p. 333). As a matter of fact, the knowledge, the subject which specialists study may radically change the scholars themselves. It changes intersubjectivity itself. The intersubjective relationships of specialists who stand in the "fiction of an unbiased position" (Ryan, 1982, p. 45) to Other result in the I-It relation. In this I-It relationship, the It is manipulated and dominated by the "I" of the Other (professor) without any protection of "in-between" sphere. "I" (It) do not need to feel any responsibility for the It. As a result, the relationship denies something deep inside us that is "a product of the practice and discussions in which we literally and figuratively find our'selves'" (Flax, 1990, p. 206). It may damage not only the intersubjectivity itself but also educational improvement.

> "The explanatory power of science is tremendous. Facing the continuing increase in knowledge resulting from research and,

> corresponding to this, the higher recognition of science and research, one cannot do otherwise than to also acknowledge the expert" (Gadamer, 1992, p. 182).

Gadamer argues that we need to ask ourselves about the balance between the responsibility which properly belongs to science and the responsibility of the scientist as a citizen (ibid., p. 191). Scientists as specialists have responsibilities for the common good and caring for Others. Those scientists who realize the meaning of responsibility act according to human nature which gives up the will to power. The Person who gives up the will to power is a "natural man/woman" who rejects to be the center of Others and objects so that keeps the distance from Others and objects, and is not arrogant. We should be natural men/women, decentered subjects, who live in harmony with nature before we should be technical persons, working persons, or specialists. Therefore, the human characteristic is that we act spontaneously according to natural order. If we think, judge, and act according to this human nature, there might be no problem with intersubjectivity. But when we cling only to our technique, our knowledge, we make a mistake by considering only the branches without thinking of the root. The Reverend Bub-Jung, a famous Buddhist priest in Korea teaches us, "We have to reflect on our life not only in our own position but also in the opposite position. Because while we are living our own lives, we are living altogether in a community where we are dwelling together" (Yi, January, 1989).

Theme B-3: Keeping territory

[7] Researcher A:
Researcher E, would you explain in more detail the reason why we should reduce and integrate curriculum content? Do you even consider the student's development of logical thinking?

Researcher E:
Do you think of students' thinking ability and teaching and learning process in the context of the school situation? I don't think students' learning takes place in separated categories, that is in cognitive, affective, psycho-motor domains. Human brain functions are not separate from each other. Students' logical thinking cannot be defined only by the cognitive domain

or by your definition of reasonable thinking. I hope to promote student's thinking ability. This attempt has the aim to promote students' thinking ability.

Professor B:
Researcher E, did you have any plan to adjust the sequence and scope of each integrated subject?

(The first conference for establishing the direction of General Guiding Curriculum Principles in KEDI, August 1980)

NOTE: In addition to these arguments, there were lots of objections from subject-matter researchers and professors indicating the difficulty of teaching the integrated fields, and the lack of teachers' readiness to teach the fields, and the issues related to in-service education, and so on.

The conference was divided into two groups between the subject matter researchers and professors who were against the integrated curriculum, and the general curriculum theory researchers and professors who were in favour of the integrated curriculum. Therefore, the conference held heated debates and finally bogged down without any conclusion about the integrated curriculum. The matter was deferred to the next conference. It was very strange and a bitter disappointment to those of us who belonged to the Curriculum Research and Coordinating Section that the opinions of the conference were divided by opposing opinions held by the subject matter specialists and the general curriculum theory specialists. Usually, I think, general curriculum theorists are more concerned and familiar with the sequence and scope of curriculum content. But the result of the conference on at that day was totally different from, and the reverse of my expectations. I realized that we could not synthesize one conclusion. But, after the meeting, as I did not know the reasons for the conflict, I made up my mind to individually meet people who were against the integrated curriculum. In the given situation, I could not expect to work together with other participants as a team. I met researcher A who was one of my friends. I asked him a barrage of questions. I asked him to speak more frankly. I didn't know the reason that he objected to the bill so critically. What was the reason? Did he really think that

the scope and sequence were distorted in the integrated curriculum? Did he think that they are so important to the lower grade students in elementary school? Did he intend to make them subject matter specialists? Didn't he think that we could adjust the integrated curriculum? Why did he only see the negative aspects of the affair instead of the positive? Why wasn't he willing to develop the integrated curriculum cooperatively for an improved curriculum and better education? Did he really think that the integrated curriculum will damage students' education in lower elementary grades?

I believed that he already knew that the subject matter division of school curriculum could be categorized according to students' experience and life. At least in elementary school, the division is different from that of a scholar's major and is an arbitrary structure which is convenient for teaching students?"

He answered me that sequence and scope are a kind of network depending upon the structure of the subject matter. He confessed that he had to consider not only educational progress but also the state of his subject matter time allotment in the organization of curriculum. He was afraid of weakening his subject matter in the time allotment in the organization of curriculum content. In fact, he had to consider the education students' pre-service teacher education and colleagues. He even had to pretend to object to the integrated curriculum in order to keep curriculum content, even though he might agree to that in his mind.

In this matter, most researchers and professors of subject matter are in the same position. It is most difficult to readjust the time units of subject matter in the curriculum development process, especially to cut time units. If one tries to change the organizational structure of curriculum content, he/she should be prepared for the subject matter specialists' pressure. They succeeded in keeping their fields, but they failed to consider educational progress. Facticity cannot be revealed to a person who steps back from his/her world. In fact, they rejected the *calling* from the Others and educational progress.

Without nonrelatedness he was an everyday being-with-(towards)-the-one-others. He hid his innermost possibilities. Consequently, he was also incapable of

respecting those possibilities of the Other that are accessible to him within the world. He rejected the releasing of another reading of text. He was not concerned with a cross-fertilizing dialogue among many different points of view by his adherence to keeping his subject matter from being weakened. By rejecting opening his mind to Others, he shrunk the possibility of hearing the voices of Others so that he was limited to the voices which fit his subjectivity. By rejecting the repetition which is a personal task of constituting his self as a self, he lost the self-transformation, free open expanses, where things and voices could rest and linger for a while.

> ...carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world for himself as a way of being. We are taking the word "responsibility" in its ordinary sense as "conscious (of) being the incontestable author of an event of object." In this sense the responsibility of the for-itself is overwhelming since he is the only one whom it happens that *there* is a world... (Sartre, 1956, p. 553).

By rejecting opening himself to Others, he indulged himself in the illusion of his faith in the systematic practice of the subject. He disregarded the fact that not only the object but also the subject are constituted products of human consciousness. According to Sartre, since without human consciousness there would be no'world' but only a differentiated plenitude of being-in-itself, human consciousness is individually as well as collectively responsible for the state of the world. Human consciousness as being-for-itself is responsible for the world because it causes the world to be as it is.

For the subject matter specialists to keep their territory and to be content with the maintenance of the status quo required them lying to themselves in a'bad' faith. In 'bad' faith, they refuse to judge value, take responsibility, perform action, and choose freedom. "Briefly, bad faith is an attempt to hide both from the responsibility of choosing and sustaining our present lifestyle and from the ever present possibility of our lifestyle" (Catalano, 1990, p. 677). The specialist was not concerned with his being's-in-the-world resoluteness toward itself and authentic care to the existence of the other as well as with his helping the Other to become

free. Nietzsche encouraged us to live dangerously because life is oriented toward fulfilment and enjoyment. One who lives dangerously by suffering, understands all too well. Suffering means an ennobled spiritually strong person who looks in the abyss and does not shirk. Researcher A rejected to live in suffering.

> [8] If they know that I did not object positively to the integrated curriculum and assume an indifferent attitude toward the weakening of our subject matter, they will try to maul me. I have to consider the people behind me. (Researcher A, August 1980)

In the dialogue with me after the conference, he told this to me. By objecting to the integrated curriculum he hid from himself and Others. In his case, lying to himself is related to his attempt to hide from his responsibility for his life as a researcher, specialist, and at the least, educator. In reality, the specific manifestation of this self-deception is determined by the social situation and individual circumstances which limit his choice and condition the real possibilities he confronts. In self-deception, the temporality of consciousness is different from one who acts in good faith. In good faith, we recognize the past to be sustained in existence by us; in bad faith, we attempt to discard responsibility for the past of our present. In self-deception, we deceive ourselves into believing that the past we sustain is in-itself, that is, something given by nature or accident.

> now the meaning of past is strictly dependent on my present project. This certainty does not mean that I can make the meaning of my previous acts vary in any way I please; quite the contrary, it means that the fundamental project which I am decides absolutely the meaning which the past can be here for me and for others (Sartre, 1956, p. 498).

For Sartre, the self is always vulnerable. I know my self as the other knows me. I am not in a privileged position when I attempt to understand myself; but nor is it an objective view, in the sense of an unbiased view. As a result, I can fudge evidence about myself through my I's being interiorized in the way I see myself in the world before others. The ideal liar not only denies what he believes to be true in words, but also he denies that his words are lies. "Bad faith does not hold the norms and criteria of truth as they are accepted by the critical thought of good faith" (ibid., p. 68). In bad faith, his reflection works within his bad faith

project, so that when he reflects upon himself he sees the value of his intimate understanding as automatically providing him with a view of the way he appears before others. He lies to others and himself that he objects to the integrated curriculum because of the irrationality of its scope and sequence, and suggests that the pressure from colleagues to keep territory makes it seem like a natural event. Bad faith aims at a stability of belief that evidence cannot provide. What makes it bad faith and self deception is that it sees itself as the type of belief that arises from evidence. In bad faith, and self-deception, we have no real interest in altering our understanding about ourselves, since our beliefs are aimed at sustaining a certain attitude at any cost. It keeps from itself any other possibility. In bad faith, it is impossible for us to have an intersubjective relationship with others because it rejects the action of change and fulfilment of freedom which are the foundation of intersubjective relationships in which we aim at mutual-self-transformation repetitiously.

Intersubjective relationships with others are possible only in good faith, which is based on critical evidence which can be changed whenever it needs to. According to Anderson (1989), in good faith, we are able to will, in the sense of actively promote, the freedom of others so that they will do the same for me. For Sartre, human consciousness is responsible for everything which happens in the world. Therefore, we must consider the fact that there is something which we must do more than be conscious of: one must take steps toward ensuring this occurrence. Nevertheless, it must be said that good faith is the starting point of intersubjectivity. It is certain that good faith triggers the leaping-ahead and the freeing which first make it possible to let the "I" and Other be in their own most potentiality for my and other's beings. But, in fact, researcher A had still stayed at the mental state of pre-reflective consciousness. He did not try to understand his situation and Others. Critical reflection in hermeneutic understanding needs critical distance. He was engulfed in lying to himself and Others in bad faith.

Theme B-4: Authoritative vertical intersubjective relationship

[9] Teacher A:
Oh! I am ten minutes late. Why don't you start the conference?

Researcher E:
We are waiting for you.

Teacher A:
Oh, you are waiting for your president!

Researcher A:
Yes, you are right. Take a seat here.

Teacher A:
No, I will sit down at that other table.

(Before the third small conference for developing the integrated curriculum in KEDI, September 1980)

Teacher A is my teacher colleague with whom I had taught in the same elementary school in Seoul. He is five years older than I. (This statement implicitly expresses the importance of age in Korean society.) He refused my suggestion to take a seat near me and sat down in an empty chair which was near the entrance door. At that time we did not put name cards on the table because the conference was small and the participants were acquainted with each other. It is very common that, in the arrangement of tables for a conference, we place the table for high-ranked or aged persons at the opposite side from the entrance, and the table for low-ranked or younger persons, near the entrance. The teacher tried to sit down on the chair suited to his position. It is very natural, in a conference or meeting, for the high-ranked persons to arrive at the conference later and for the low-ranked persons to arrive earlier and wait for them.

Even in KEDI, which consists of educators who are highly educated and relatively liberal, there still remains the rank consciousness, a legacy from the orthodox Confucian tradition and patriarchal culture. The members of KEDI are treated differently according to rank and/or age, rather than treated equally as independent subjects. At the Bongchun-dong area in Seoul, there is KEDI

employee housing where many employees have moved out. One of my friends who had stayed at the housing area told me, "In this area, the wives of directors are directors and the sons of directors are directors as well."

The Korean way of thinking vertically and hierarchically was, in ancient society, the driving force which kept social order and progress. Even in a modern democratic society there is a need for intersubjective human relationships which are based on respect and love for parents and elders, and the duties of high-ranked persons and low-ranked persons. In a modern democratic society, we need, to some degree, a hierarchical relationship based on experience, ability, and knowledge. The hierarchy of modern Western societies are based on the contract between members of the society in order to work cooperatively and effectively. Korean society has the problem that the hierarchy is based on the classification of life styles according to the degree of high or low rank in the work place. In Western society, high-ranked persons are accredited according to their professional and/or managerial function. In Korean society, the high-ranked persons are accredited to a master/servant relationship, in addition to their professional and/or managerial function. Due to this tendency, in Korea, a high-ranked person might expect and be satisfied with the welcome of his/her subordinates' when he/she comes to his/her office. The subordinates, at the duty end of the day, would finish and sit reading their superior's "face" and wait until he/she left his/her office. Such a person that has been wedded to the authority of rank and age - high-ranked or subordinate - has come to reject dialogue with and responsibility for Others. He/she does not respond to Others, that is, he/she never hears unreduced claims in all their crudeness and disharmony, nor answers to them out of depth of one's being as a "Single One." What he/she says and hears is reduced in the rank-consciousness.

In this situation, reduced to rank-consciousness, we cannot expect intersubjectivity based on mutual understanding in an hermeneutic circle. According to Heidegger, understanding in the hermeneutic circle is a process of dis-covering and remembering the primordial temporality of being and thus the

truth as *a-letheia*. The movement of understanding is a liberating movement, an opening towards being through repetition or retrieval. The people who are engulfed in rank-consciousness, are staying back from this world. They cannot lift themselves from the mode of'being situated' into the possibility of being free. Through open dialogue, we can achieve understanding. Understanding is an achievement. Being confined in the rank-consciousness, people forget to understand their existence as one possibility among many, and to become as authentically human as possible by their existence.

[10] Researcher G:
I am very uncomfortable with director C's manner of conducting the meeting. He interrupted the researchers and disregarded researchers' opinions.

Researcher E:
Why didn't you make a complaint to him directly?

Researcher G:
What did you say? I cannot but be tolerant about it.

(After section meeting, September 1980)

This is a dialogue between me and researcher G after a small meeting preparing for the moral education curriculum. Researcher G didn't complain to director C about his arrogant manner of chairing the meeting. There is a tendency for a subordinate to restrain him/herself from expressing frank opinions in an official meeting due to his position and, sometimes, age. When one of my colleagues who worked with me in the same section but was in charge of a different project conducted a small meeting for his project, he opened the meeting with the statement:

[11] Researcher F:
Firstly, I express my feeling of inferiority about chairing this meeting to elders. (May 1980)

He was holding the meeting about his project, "mentally challenged children's education." He is younger than I by about seven years. It was his first address to the meeting. This mentality rarely appears on the surface during official

meetings as it is repressed. This mentality is so deeply ingrained that people anticipate and implicitly claim the authority of age.

One day in 1988 when Seoul was filled with Summer Olympic excitement, one foreign interpreter embarrassed a staff member of the Organizing Committee of the Seoul Olympics by complaining. He tried to get on an elevator which stopped at the entry hall of the office of the Organizing Committee of the Seoul Olympics. At that time, an elevator girl prevented him from getting on the elevator. He was pushed out of the elevator and he waited for another elevator. Because he did not know the reason, he asked the girl the reason in English, but he couldn't communicate with her. After the event, he was informed that the elevator was reserved for the chairperson of the committee. When he left Seoul, he said, "It is a very strange circumstance which I cannot find in any other Olympic City in the world, that many people should be inconvenienced due to the need to provide honourable treatment for the chairperson who is only one man."

At one time, among the salaried men in Korea, there was a pervasive phenomenon: they flattered others saying, "You are absolutely right." Others said: "Clings to superiority." These events resulted from a belief in authoritarianism (i.e., misunderstood authority). In this case, authority "is identified too quickly with domination and violence" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 76). Authority is easily connected with blind obedience.

> It is true that it is primarily persons that have authority; but the authority of persons is based ...on acceptance and recognition....that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight. ...his judgement has priority over one's own.... Authority in this sense, properly understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience to a command. ... it rests on recognition. ...That which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has authority....the authority of what has been transmitted.... what we call tradition; the ground of their validity (Gadamer, 1984a, p. 249 f.).

For Gadamer, the person who has superior judgment and insight is the one who has the authority. Authority is related to recognition, not obedience. Because authority is a result of recognition, authority is accepted through a process of

examination with set criteria. Authority is acquired through a value process. As a criteria for giving value to authority, Gadamer considers the tradition which is authority itself. In this case, there is no absolute authority. We always have to be suspicious of authority. Therefore, there is, in a broad sense, authority which we should keep and authoritative authority which is related to arrogance, dogmatism, and obedience and which we should destroy. If all kinds of authority, that is, even justifiable authority is destroyed, we will be in a bind of mental anarchism. Authoritative authority is bestowed socially and culturally. Habermas (1984a) would recognize this phenomena as a result of "systematically distorted" and "pathological communication." I am afraid that recently we are destroying authority which we should keep while keeping the authority which we should destroy. While the unjustifiable authority can be accepted in a traditional or patriarchical society, it cannot be accepted in a democratic society when it causes conflict between the superior and the subordinate. The unjustifiable authority makes the superior arrogant and superior, and the subordinate inferior, flattering, and servile. It causes the subordinate to become treacherously obedient. The person who is consumed with unjustifiable authority has a tendency to put down his/her subordinates and disregard them and to grovel before his/her superiors.

In the intersubjective relationship where unjustifiable authority has been destroyed and where we are concerned about our responsibility and the calling from Others, we try to find alternatives and sacrifice ourselves in order to practice them. In doing so we can create our own voices. We can live our own meaningful lives with our own colour and scent. We can actualize the nobility and weight of our lives by Buddha's idiom, "I am my own Lord throughout heaven and earth." Being fully aware of Lordship, we can get two necessary conditions for intersubjectivity: on the one hand, the distance from Other which means entering into a relationship and, on the other hand, mutual confirmation of their personal qualities and capabilities in a practical way. This means that he/she confirms his/her partner as the existing being, even while his/her partner is opposed to the Others. At the same time we have always to be concerned with Lao-Tzu's

teaching: "Order is a distinguishment, the distinguishment causes superiority or inferiority, and at last, the superiority/inferiority establishes the dominance."

Theme B-5: Embarrassment with gender discrimination

[12] Researcher E:
Supervisor, I think we have to emphasize health education for this programme. We have to be more concerned with students' health when they first come here from their free family home lives. In addition, traffic. ...

Supervisor:
I would like to emphasize education for rule following. They should be kept in order from the very first day of school life. Public order education is very important.

Researcher E:
Teacher B, what is your opinion?

Teacher B:
Let me see. According to my teaching experience, they have difficulty learning in the time periods in school which are quite longer than those of free family lives.

Supervisor:
What's the difference? Do you say that they pay less attention to health education than public order education?

Teacher B:
If we consider the positions of their mothers, they may always be worried about traffic accident on the road.

Supervisor:
Let's talk in the macro rather than micro view point.

Teacher B:
Does a sniveller in the first month of grade one have anything to do with micro or macro?

Supervisor:
In education, we should consider both "ought to" and "be."

Teacher B:
What are you saying now? I would admit the "ought to." But let's consider the actuality of a sniveller.

Supervisor:
According to my grand mother, a female has as a narrow view of things as the hole of a turtle's nose. Ha! Ha! I only say it just for fun.

Teacher B:
Its beyond a joke. I spoke to you as a school teacher, not a woman.

(A meeting in a small hotel room down town and quite far from KEDI, December 1980)

We were writing the curriculum materials: a textbook - orientation programme which was called "We are first grade" and the teachers' guide for the first month of grade one students. I rented a small hotel room for about two months in order to write the materials together with two male and two female elementary school teachers who had experiences in teaching lower grade pupils. Because they had to come after school hours, I rented a hotel room near downtown for their convenience. In the hotel room I arranged basic materials and looked closely at the manuscripts which teachers wrote before they came in the evening. And we worked together on the materials which I prepared during the day time.

During the discussion, the supervisor slipped in the speech when he was at a loss for an answer. He changed it into a joke. Even though he said it was just for fun, it was a good example of the Korean male's way of thinking. It shows implicitly the reality of the present oppression of women in a society, culture, and religion which are man-made. In Korea, until now, it is true that the intersubjectivity between male and female has been subject to the ideology of male supremacy. This intersubjective relationship is based on the general conception about Korean women who were regarded as inferior to men, and held in low social and legal status in society. These phenomena result from the false assumption that sex roles are universally true and biologically natural.

O'Brien (1981) argues that the division of sexual difference has been accredited to social and cultural factors. Shan and Tittle (1985) argue, "since sex roles do differ depending upon the culture in which they are found, it is clear that many of the characteristics contained in them are transmitted primarily by the culture involved, not by biology" (p. 80).

[13] Director B:
There is no vase with flowers, even though there are two female researchers in this office.

Teacher C:
If a male researcher brings a vase in the office, are his hands blistered?

Director B:
Look, your researcher G is wearing blue jeans.

Researcher G:
...

Teacher C:
Why not? Should she not wear blue jeans?

Director B:
A female is a "flower of the office."

Researcher G:
Flower?

Director B:
In addition, especially because this office might see many visitors, we have to dress properly in order to get good ideas for our research.

Teacher C:
In order to get good ideas we have to wear casual clothes.

(In the Curriculum Research and Coordination Section, November 1980)

According to director B, a female researcher was a "flower of the office." A flower is a thing, a decoration, not a human. Researcher G would have to be a thing or an object which is confined in full dress. According to Buber, the relation of I with object, the "I-It" relationship, is primary in *experience*. The "I-It"

relationship is entirely a subject relationship and is not mutual. It is a typical subject-object relationship. It is comprehensible, orderable, and significant only in connection as a ready-to-hand, not itself. Therefore, "I" does not need to take any responsibility for the object. The "I" has a meaning for the will to power. According to Nietzsche, the will to power, in whatever form it might take, can be easily changed into the source of a blindness and into the sense of suffocation endemic to one's world.

Being guided by Buber, at the end of this mentality, we find that the primary word of "I-It" can never be spoken with the whole being. "What a shame to work together with the director who does not see women as women." (Refer to next text.) The director did not see a woman as a woman as the whole being. He saw a woman fragmented according to his various uses. At the end of this way of thinking, he sees a woman's body only as a sexual object. He sees a woman's soul only as maternal.

[14] What a shame to work together with a director who does not see women as women! I was surprised at directors B's argumentation. How can the way of thinking in such a way continue until now like an unavoidable ghost! I absent-mindedly have looked at the fact that female researchers serve the tea in the office[3]. (Diary of teacher C, in the same day as the text [13])

[15] I have been returning home late at night.
I cannot care for my family well.
I feel guilty for my family.
Who am I? What am I doing?
Am I a wise mother for my children?
Am I a good wife for my husband? (Diary of teacher C, January 1981)

If we put the two phrases "Wise mother" and "Good wife" together into one phrase, we can get a slogan; "Wise mother and Good wife" which might be considered an instrumental and terminal value for Korean women and a typical example of the way Korean women dwell with others in intersubjective relationships. We can see this slogan throughout Korea: in rural and urban areas,

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[3]Currently KEDI female researchers do not necessarily serve tea. After the birth of the sixth Republic, these customs were radically changed.

in school buildings, at intramural oratorical contests, and even beauty contests. We might find the origin of this slogan in the three fundamental principles and the five moral disciplines in the human relation writings of Confucianism. This fundamental aim for women is created by enormous social pressure on women and is an expression of an ideology of male supremacy. When a woman is asked about her future hopes, she has to answer, "Being a wise mother and good wife," lest her character and chastity be under suspicion.

> Whatever may be the private opinion of anyone concerning the women's sphere and proper occupation, we must, for the present at least, act under the supposition that in Korea domestic life is her sphere and destiny. Whatever we may want our girls to do or be, it must all be secondary to this first call (Rothweiler, 1964, p. 90).

For Rothweiler, what ever else may or may not be taught to women, we ought to fit them thoroughly for this calling. They must learn to prepare food; cut, make and repair their clothing; keep themselves and their room neat; and all this in purely Korean style, except where we can improve on that without weaning them from their people, on making them discontented with their surroundings or creating demands in them that cannot be supplied when they leave us.

> Three years in deafness
> Three years in blindness
> Three years in dumb,
> These three years of each.
> The way to train the life of husband's house (Yoo, 1982, p. 155).

> Sister, sister, cousin,
> How is the life of family-in-law?
> Sister, sister, don't talk about that.
> Though hot peppers are hot,
> The life of the family is hotter (ibid., p. 155).

This is the reality of a women's life with her-in-laws in the Yi dynasty. The leadership of the Yi dynasty decided to further limit women's public affairs and to encourage their seclusion in the home in order to escape from a moraly low point during the latter part of the Koryo dynasty, which was offensive to public decency and threatened the basis of social morality, according to Confucian standards.

> The adoption of Confucianism by political leaders in the Yi dynasty (AD 1392-1910) brought about decisive change. Propagating the duality of female (Yin) and male (Yang) - with male ascendent - as the natural order and as the normative force for the social order, Confucianism subordinated to men, aligned them to stereotypic social categories - chaste women, devoted wife, dedicated mother - and confined them spatially in the rooms of their house (Deuchler, 1983, p. 2).

In fact, the inner room became the women's domain: in a sense the women's prison. Men held the public realm, and made and wrote official history. Women were considered as a good man's virtue or as an evil man's devious consent. Confucianism provided ethical and moral codes which regulated the social and personal relationships among people including women. Korean women's letters, in Korean women's history, commenced from the adoption of Confucianism by the Yi dynasty. A Korean Man's view of womankind is based on the dualistic philosophy which dominates his mind and is constituted by Yang and Yin. Based on the distorted interpretation of Confucianism, women were required to be blindly submissive to men. Their daily activities were limited within the private realm: when going outside, women were carried in closed carriages.

A woman was taught to always humble herself before her husband as much as she possibly could, instead of insisting upon her rights. The husband was compared to a master or heaven, given all priority and privilege. The same obedient attitude was emphasized in the relationship to her parents-in-law. Once a girl married, she was assumed to be born again in the "family-in-law." The philosophy of women's intersubjective relationships with others in the Yi dynasty fitted women into the existing Confucian order of society. Therefore, obedience, chastity, and selfless service were stressed for women. Under the social pressure on women, they experienced a haunting sense of regret or of unfulfilled wishes, which seem to be inherited generation by generation in a sense, a condition Koreans call ***han***.

The dominant ideological slogan of the traditional ruling class according to the Confucian value of "wise mother and good wife" might be a normative model

for Korean women: that women should provide the moral foundation of family, educating their children and acting as the faithful supporter to their husbands.

> Traditionally, a Korean woman is born as a mother rather than a woman. When a baby girl was born, her mother and grandmother would squeeze her nipple in the first week after her birth. This was because of their desire that when she grows up and becomes a mother, she could breastfeed her children easily (Yoo, 1982, p. 187).

At this point, we should also consider the degree of Confucian influence upon the common people. Confucianism could not put all women behind walls, however. Although it was pervasive as the model of perfect social order for all of the Yi dynasty, not all classes adhered to Confucian practice to the same degree. A comparatively small upper class could afford to approximate ideological purity in daily life. "Korean women, whether ideologically confined to the inner rooms or cast out to the periphery of society, created for themselves positions of influence radiating across the narrow ideological and social confines of the confucian family" (Kendall and Peterson, 1983, p. 3). According to several studies, Korean daughters "lost their inheritance right only in the seventeenth century. Previously, Korean kinship was structurally more bilateral than patriarchy" (ibid., p. 11). In the book, Kendall and Peterson report the Korean housewife's managerial dominion and authority (ibid., p. 13)

> Having caroused far into the night,
> In the moonlight capered,
> I returned home and in my bed.
> Behold, four legs.
> Two have been mine;
> Whose are the other two?
> Two have been mine;
> No, no, they are taken (Kim, 1982, p. 66).

This *hyangga*, which is probably the most famous of all Silla poems, is *cheoyongga*, written during the Silla dynasty (BC. 57 - AD 935). Cheoyong was believed to be a son of the Dragon King. He married a beautiful woman from a good family. While he was away, an evil Spirit transformed itself into a man and attacked her. *Cheoyong* returns home to find his wife in bed with another man. He

refrained from violence. Instead he sang this song with a calm that so impressed the evil Spirit that it went away. It is worth noting that the magical power of the song was used in shamanistic rituals to help expel Spirits[4]. On the other hand, we can glimpse phases of married life in the Silla dynasty in which Shamanism and Buddhism were dominant religions.

It is very interesting to compare the *Cheoyong*'s reaction to the faithlessness of his wife to that of husbands who were living in the Yi dynasty which was based on Confucianism. If Cheoyong were living in the Yi dynasty, he might expel his wife with a charge of violation of an item of the "seven offenses." There were *Chilgeochiak*, "seven offenses" for which a woman had to leave her husband's house. The matter of divorce was entirely controlled by the husband. He could cast out his wife for any one of the following seven offenses: (1) incompatibility with his parents; (2) adultery; (3) jealousy; (4) barrenness; (5) incurable disease; (6) a quarrelsome disposition; and (7) and theft.

> Korean people feel a sense of affection toward and focus their attention upon a ray of warmheartedness rather than on money, politics, and military matters. The making of a connection between nation and nation, and the approaching of human beings, one to another, are not science but art. That does not result from politics but from religion, not from knowing but loving ... Korean art seems to be full of affection. It has been proven by history that Korean people have been excellent in their sense of art (Yoon, 1970, p. 341 f.).

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[4]Shamanistic cult constituted the core of the Korean religious mind. Throughout the country's history, many organized religions such as Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism were introduced, but Shamanism invariably assimilated and transformed the imported religions. Shamanism was the religion of common people. The mass culture of Korea since the earliest times has been Shamanistic in its basic character and tone. Shamanistic village rituals were functions in social integration. They were practised by the whole village, rich or poor, male or female, old or young. Women enjoyed relatively equal opportunity with men in Buddhist practices from the time of Buddhism's introduction to Korea.

These attributes of warmth, kindness, nurture in the Korean personality can be attributed the Korean women. Yoon (1970) quoted a Japanese scholar, Yoo in his proposition about Korean people which is expressed in his book, Korean Art (quoted by Yoon, 1970). If Yoo's outlook about the Korean people was correct, it would be the result of Korean women's effort, based on the ideology of "wise mother and good wife" to which Korean women have been accustomed, in education and intersubjectivity. Our Korean ancestors, for example, used to sleep in the same room with a strange visitor who was travelling somewhere and dropped into their house at night. Such caring for visitors could be said to be the Korean people's unique personality which was developed during the period of lactation with a wise mother so that several strange travellers could even sleep comfortably back to back, with one another in the small village inn.

Yi (1977) describes the infrequency of nervousness and melancholy among Korean people. They have a harmony with their external world to the extent that the sound of tinkling wind chimes or striplings crackling in the wind does not disrupt their sleep as it would that of others, but is rather heard as music to their ears. This generosity of spirit and acceptance of that which is, can be traced back to the all-embracing, all-accepting love of the mother for her babies.

In fact, in the last one hundred years, there were significant emancipatory movements for women. The earliest of these, the *Tonghak* (Eastern Learning) Movement was begun in the 1860s by a scholar, Choi Cheu. In the *Tonghak* ideology, he specially demanded equality of the sexes in a four point petition for human rights. In 1889, the *Tonghak* Movement announced six articles as guides to daily living for their followers, including: revere your wife as a god; love your daughter-in-law; love slaves as your own children. In 1909, the leaders began *Tonghak* Girls' School, contributing importantly to the development of formal education for women. Another movement, initiated as a part of protestant Missionary work, achieved its goal mainly through education. It established schools and instituted church educational programmes for women.

Thereafter, circumstances necessitated the state of the women's movement in Korea and it carried on as a patriotic movement, especially as an anti-Japanese movement. The women, after the independence demonstration, organized patriotic organizations in ten different cities and collected funds in secret to finance independence activities outside of Korea. Through this organized effort, women helped support the remaining family members of leaders who were abroad. This was one of the first strong and well-organized women's organizations. As early as 1899, there was an organization of fifty members. When Korea had a hard time paying an international loan from Japan, these women took out their treasures which they had kept wrapped in silk and gave them to the government to repay the loan. These women, who had been obedient to the men's role, came out in the open and accused men of living under a double standard. This donation of their treasures to the nation certainly showed that they were not satisfied to be only somebody's wife and someone's mother. This activity was the very beginning of Korean women's participation in social and national affairs after adoption of Confucianism into the nation's political philosophy. It was the starting point of the re-interpretation of the meaning of intersubjectivity of the wise mother and good wife.

It is certainly true that, after the liberation from Japanese colonialism and by the adoption of Western political, cultural, and family life style, which changed from a large family system to a small one, the meaning of the slogan has undergone dramatic change. Even though the ideological slogan has still been pervasive throughout Korea, its conceptual boundary has been reduced. Traditionally the concept of the slogan has been considered in terms of wise mother, good wife, filial daughter-in-law, and filial daughter. But at present, the latter two concepts are gradually being forgotten. Women in Korea are no longer dedicated supporters of their husbands, but are equal partners. They at present, do not want to sacrifice their total selves for their family members. They want to have their own lives. Consequently, women have transformed the meaning of the intersubjectivity of wise mother and good wife. Korean men's mentality has not

caught up to those of women. Korean men still live in a dream of patriarchical male domination over women. Korean women want to be treated "as a whole integral being" in partnership with men (Getz, 1982, p. 411). But, in Korea, the sense of patriarchy still has remained "as the archetypal pattern of oppressive governance by men with little regard for the well-being or personal fulfilment of women", (Berry, 1988, p. 143) for the more seemingly urgent political, social, and economic values.

Scott argues (Spring 1988) that equality-versus-difference cannot construct choice for feminist theory; the opposition pairing misrepresents the relationship of both terms (p. 44). Equality, in the feminist theory that lies behind the claims of excluded groups for justice, means ignoring the difference between individuals for a particular purpose or in a particular context. The notion of equality thus includes an acknowledgement of the existence of difference: if individuals were identical or the same there would be no need for equality. The opposition of men/women in a binary system asserted the incomparability of the sexes, so that it "serves to obscure the differences among women in behaviour, character, desire, subjectivity, gender identification, and historical experience" (ibid., p. 45). The duality of this opposition invests it with biological explanation, and then treats each side of the opposition as a unitary phenomenon. Therefore, Scott (ibid.) argues: "The only alternative ... is to refuse to oppose equality to difference and insist continually on differences - differences as the condition of individual and collective identities, difference as the constant challenge to the fixing of those identities, history as the repeated illustration of the play of differences, differences as the very meaning of equality itself" (p. 46).

When reality is ideologically coded, the essential humanity of human beings is reduced to a code and it reduces us, in the end, to signs which bear the only traces of racism and sexism. Denzin (1991) explains, "This is the dilemma of postmodern self: to find an essential humanity in a forest of signs" which deal only in the surface reflections which are shaped by race and gender (p. 18). Our true estate and identity: marriage, family, household, friendship, neighbourhood, and

community in which our intersubjectivity is rooted have an effective existence. They are not only organized institutions in a public sense but are also private conditions in which a human is a complete body and mind through intersubjective relationship. They are completely necessary and needed. Flax (1990) suggests that "unless we see gender as a social relation, rather than a set of opposite and inherently different beings, we will not be able to identify women's or men's full part in..." (p. 182). If we accept that Berry's "conditions" and Flax's "social relationships" are right, we also can get an excellent clue to intersubjectivity between both sexes from Nandy (1987). Since they are our conditions and social relationships in which we carry our lives based on our language, we might "seek to subvert the rules of the game and the language in which the rules are framed..." (1987, p. 121). With new rules and language, Korean women might start their new lives (new intersubjectivity) with men as partners based on difference in equality.

We should consider the social relationship in terms of both equality and difference. The new rules and language would start from rethinking the meaning of difference in feminism. Scott (1988) argues that when equality and difference are paired dichotomously, they structure an impossible choice (p. 43). Equality includes an acknowledgment of the existence of difference. If females were identical with or the same as males there would be no need to claim equality. If equality were rejected while acknowledging difference, the difference would not make any sense. The oppositional pairing of equality and difference mispresents the relationship of both terms. In this context, the difference does not mean the categorical difference but the difference among a group. The categorical difference, generalized categorization, obscures the difference among women. Gender categorization of male/female serves us to lose the individual historicity and specificity. Consequently, it leads to oppressive governance by men over women. Again,

> The only alternative...is to refuse to oppose equality to difference and insist continually on differences - differences as the condition of individual and collective identities, differences as the constant

challenge to the fixing of those identities, history as the repeated illustration of the play of differences, differences as the very meaning of equality itself (ibid., p. 46).

Theme B-6: Losing ownership-consciousness

[16] Supervisor:
We have to revise our work a little and put some elements of national identity education into this programme.

Researcher E:
What did you say? How can we teach the national identity to the very young children at the age of six?

Teacher A:
I am not quite sure if we can find a way. For the first month of grade one, the students have a lot of things to learn urgently. We can teach them later.

Supervisor:
We should consider the social reality that we are faced by the danger of North Korea. In order to win over North Korea, we have to teach them earlier. The earlier the better.

Researcher E:
Yes, we want to win over North Korea as well. But, we don't need to follow North Korea's method. We cannot win them over by the same method as indoctrinating and oppressing students. Their method is more systematic and complete than ours for the purpose of indoctrination and oppression. If we follow their method, we also may have the same autocratic government.

Supervisor:
Why don't you think that we can teach national identity education to our children? I think we can. I don't mean that I hope for an autocratic state. I just want to educate reasonable citizens.

Researcher E:
I don't say that we can't. I just spoke about the necessity of national identity education.

Supervisor:
This is a strong directive from the director of Supervising and Compliment of Curriculum Bureau. This is the intention of higher offices in the Ministry

of Education as well. Therefore, please find a way to put these elements into this programme.

Researcher E:
Please do it by yourself.

Supervisor:
I do not say I hope. You should do.

Teacher C:
Please don't argue any more. Let's think about the potential.

(Working Committee in a small hotel room downtown, December 1980)

NOTE: I and four teachers were writing specific curriculum materials, in which we integrated three curriculums for the first grade students in elementary school, into one programme. The working committee which consisted of myself and four school teachers was to be developing curriculum for the first month of the students beginning their first grade. The supervisor of the Ministry of Education who advises and guides the fundamental direction for the programme came to the working place.

[17] After the supervisor left, we continued to discuss the issue.

Teacher A:
Let's trust teachers. As you have experienced, our teachers are able to handle the issue quite well.

Researcher E:
How can we properly educate students if we start at the wrong place? How can we justify this? However, I think that we have to accept the intention of the MOE. Do you have any good ideas about this?

We agreed that we should make partial changes to the illustrations, the written words, and children's songs in the orientation programme according to the requirements of national identity education. For example, we inserted more images related to national identity materials such as the national flag and our national flower.

After the debate with the supervisor, I was severely frustrated since I had been charged with the project. What does it mean to work together, especially with a civil servant? The above-shown dialogue shows how intersubjectivity,

understanding, and repetition can stop. The supervisor depended on the authority - higher officials in MOE. In the end, I (including the teachers) depended on the supervisor and other teachers. To depend on another authority, not oneself, means to give up acting according to our free will. To give up my free will means to deny to be an individual "I", the owner of the "I." This non-I is only a slave, not an owner of oneself. The slave's acts are not based on the existential values of judgment, openness, differentiation, and experience for the new experience: no meanings, no understanding, no repetition. The acts result in only the end-products based on recollection. In slaves' acts based on recollection, we do not need to be concerned with caring for others, free choice, and responsibility. There is only blind obedience by rejecting to be the owner of one's self. To reject our responsibility for Others is to reject being the owner of the "I"s.

I lost my ownership because I gave up my responsibility for better education. The supervisor lost his ownership-consciousness as well. He had to take responsibility for adding the tint of indoctrination into the programme. But, in fact, his main task was to adhere to a request to include national identity education; how he did this and to what degree this affected the content depended on him. He lost his ownership because he just followed exactly the interests of the director of Supervisory and Compliment of Curriculum Bureau without any questioning of the rightness of the intention of his director, without any of his own value judgment, ("it was the director's strong intention"), and without more reflexive thinking of the way to realize the intention. In a sense, teacher A lost his ownership consciousness too. I tried to object to the intention in a superficial way but I did not make any effort to persuade him and I did not try to find any other alternatives. We failed to invent other ways instead of complaining about the absence of a world suited to our situation. We failed to become the artist of our existence, untrammelled by historical constraints and limitations.

Losing ownership means to give up decision-making. It means we did not act according to our faith and just followed the other's will. By losing ownership consciousness we lost the insight of *living dangerously* in repetition which is an

inner gain through outer loss. We gave up our obligation and transferred our responsibility to others: the supervisor, to his higher officer in the MOE; I, to the supervisor; the teacher, to his colleagues. Emphasizing a teacher's critical reflection, Aoki (April 1983) emphasizes the need for a teacher's critical reflection.

> Critical reflection and action as action full of thought and thought full of action, leads to an understanding of what is beyond, allowing disclosure of tacitly held assumptions and intentions of the authors of curriculum X, which likely are hidden from view. Or such reflectivity can allow disclosure of the teacher's own unconsciously held interpretation of curriculum X. ... Reflection, however, is not only oriented towards making conscious the unconscious by disclosing underlying assumptions and intentions, but it is also guided by the newly gained critical knowing (p. 15).

Teacher A was right in believing that his colleagues as teachers might be able to move beyond the author's assumptions and intentions for curriculum X guided by critical reflection and action. The curriculum intentions and the implementation are not so linearly linked as the author's original expectation. But this hermeneutic understanding of curriculum x by teachers needs some premise: teacher's resoluteness to achieve a new interpretation or critical understanding.

Carson (1983) sees curriculum implementation as a creative process which may develop the potentiality of curriculum. When "we say that this curriculum is not implemented as it was intended, how do we take this? We say that this curriculum has grown; it's a lot better than it used to be. The teachers are growing, the kids are growing, we're moving forward" (p. 37). But, it is quite difficult for us to expect the critical reflection and moving forwards from teachers who until now have been used to doing things in the way to which they have become accustomed, without any concern for improvement and who want the MOE to give them more detailed directions and guidelines.

Let's put aside the supervisor's mentality from our discussion: his perspective of teachers as implementers and last users, of curriculum directives, is the same as those whose "task is to get individuals and groups of individuals to implement it faithfully in practice ... that is, to use it as it is'supposed to be used'

as intended by the developer" (Fullan, 1982, p. 31). Even though the result is much the same, the ethical source and issue of responsibility is the more fundamental issue.

Three stonemasons were carving big stones in order to build a church. When they were asked what they were doing, one of them replied, "I am carving stones." The second stonemason replied, "I am carving an artistic sculpture." The third, " I am building my Lord's house." It is obvious that the result would be very different. In the Korean language, the subject of a sentence is not I (individual), but we (collectivity): our home; our brother; our mother; even our wife and husband. "You and I are originally one body,...we cause disunion to find conflict worthlessly...we are full brothers and sisters in the same" (Yi, 1989). In the we-consciousness of the chief Buddhist of Chogue Sect, we can take responsibility for Other. The owner cares for things and others. The ownership is not an occupation, but means to care for and manage with responsibility. "Within the Western context we are always inclined to see land as a commodity and think first of its ownership; in contrast, the traditional Indians understanding of land focuses on its uses, and the duties people assume when they come to occupy it" (Deloria, 1989, p. 261).

The awareness of a Korean landlord is the same as that of this passage. Being aware that "agriculture is the foundation of a nation," they farm regardless of little profit, even financial loss, due to the decrease of the rice price in Korea. In our tradition, ownership preserves a harmony with nature and the situation in which things have been placed: ownership should encourage situations to develop in their own way. It does not mean to keep something out of the others' hands, to transform, change, and manipulate according to harmony with one's whim.

The Supervisor was very concerned with the way to order and control people involved in the curriculum development process rather than being concerned with the curriculum itself. During the Japanese colonization of Korea, Korean landlords were easily dispossessed of their farm lands by the Japanese because the landlords were concerned with the use of their land without any legal

registration, not with occupying their land.

Slaves give up their responsibility and ownership to others. They are only operating mechanically. They are "refugees of one or another, homeless victims of an authority that knows little, and has no real desire to know anything..." (Smith, 1992, p. 10). We were all slaves. We did not have any desire to improve education and just followed the authority; we were the victims of authority. We did not try to find alternatives in the situation; we were like children without a sense of responsibility for Others. We just practised and adjusted ourselves to the intention of authority. We had adopted unconsciously the "habits of subalternity and obedience which have become internalized as a kind of second nature" in our alienation in our being-for-other-people (Jamieson, 1988, p. 88). According to Levinas, our responsibility for Others should be inseparable from our invocation. Derrida would say that the whole point of deconstruction is to assume responsibility not, in the manner of metaphysics, by responding to but by assuming responsibility for. For him, "the readier and more rapid the response, the more dangerous it is.... The height of responsibility is to wonder the origin of what calls for a response" (Caputo, 1988, p. 64). All of us rejected the consciousness of response. We gave up our responsibility by our unwillingness to think our invocation. We were engulfed in the everydayness, in publicity without any sensible self-awakening.

If we were living in the Yi dynasty, we would be *Sunbi*[5] who were willing to risk our lives for our *Myungboon*, morally self-justifiable bases or principles. I asked myself if Sunbi in the Yi dynasty treated this issue in this way. What is the reason for people to change like this? We can easily imagine that this mentality is culturalized and inherited. If only I gave up the ownership mentality, I could imagine that the phenomena would come from my own personality, whatever the reason. But all of us gave up this way of thinking: "The cultural trap in which we are caught is a strong one, overlain by much protection shrubbery which hides its

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[5]I will discuss about "Sunbi" and "Myungboon" in the next section.

outline and ferocity from us" (Wallerstein, 1990, p. 53). Explaining this outcome through the colonization of the mother country with the example of India, Nandy (1989) suggests, "Colonialism may have vanished from the world scene but a smile lingers in the air" (p. 276). I am sure by giving up our responsibilities we give up a better education. When we are involved in curriculum practice with a sense of responsibility as an independent and respected owner for Others and for education, we can help the children gain a sense of responsibility through a better curriculum.

Theme B-7: Difficulties in working cooperatively with institutionalized thinking

[18] Researcher E:
In order to hold an official meeting, we have to take time to prepare the meeting. It is very difficult to meet the time deadline for the delivery of the materials to students, if we spend too much time in preparing for the meeting. Let's try to find a simpler way instead of the meeting to save time.

Supervisor:
I think we have to follow our plan. I think it is more desirable to go through the whole procedure designed in advance. In order to meet the time deadline, let's work harder and more intensively.

(In a small hotel room in downtown, December 1981)

The supervisor was speaking very correctly. He stopped speaking after that. But, if he had continued to speak, I imagine that he would have said that we must work hard late into the night. In fact, if he wanted to have the meeting, there was no alternative. Everything he thought and said was very stereotyped and institutionalized. He just wanted to go exactly through the previously fixed procedure. He did not intend to think about the participants who were involved in the project. He lost the ability to be a flexible thinking being accustomed to bureaucraticism. In his mind, he thought that civil servants (school teachers) should endure some difficulties for public education. His mind was full of the basic ideas of loyalty, filial piety based on bureaucracy. He anticipated that others also acted in the same way as he did. This was the pattern, a way of his

intersubjectivity with Other. In the conversation, he was very concerned with the delivery of the materials by March first. He could only think of the fixed plan and about his job. He was not concerned with actuality. He wanted to keep a safe distance from and dis-interest in, the flux by means of objectifying thinking. In this sense, Nietzsche condemned the personal world as a much demarcated system. In order to hold the official meeting, we would have to spend more than three extra days. In his mind, he had the idea that only the exact procedure would guarantee the correct result.

The intersubjectivity of the curriculum development process is praxis in practical reasoning. Praxis based on practical reason needs methodical reflection on the part of all the humanistic enterprises. Without methodical reflection, we cannot reach understanding, which is in a process of continued reformation through the testing of our prejudices towards the justified new horizon. Understanding is an event, a happening in which both speaker and listener mutually determine one another. Through this mutual determination, we can share experiences with each other, which is a new openness to experiences whereby the present is still open to the future with possibility and expectation. A rigid way of thinking cannot afford creativity based on the repetitious understanding in one's own historicity and temporality.

[19] Teacher A:
Well done. We've almost finished our job. Researcher E and you three teachers have made a good effort to develop this curriculum material. It was a very hard time.

Teacher C:
I really think so. Especially we four people (three teacher including me) who worked sometimes till one o'clock in the morning. Please imagine our (two female teachers) situation. It was a very tough job. But, the most difficult thing was to persuade our family, especially our husbands. As housekeepers, we worked till late at night in this small hotel room. If you were my husband in a normal sense, do you think you would understand me?

Supervisor:
You completed great a job. All you have done is for better public education. In a sense, it's your fate. Ha, ha. Your effort will be awarded in some way. Thank you.

(In a small hotel room downtown, January, 1981)

In Korea, there are some idioms: *Ah* and *Eo* which are quite different even in a sentence. By a courtesy language we can write off a great amount of debt. The first idiom means that even if we say the same thing in a sentence, the meanings for the hearer can be totally different according to the dialoguer's situation and the speaker's tone, intonation, and attitude. Even though some one says his/her thanks, according to his/her attitude, the hearer might never feel his/her thankfulness. Comparing the Korean language with English, the adjectives and adverbs of Korean language are more variable than those of English. Verbs and nouns are less variable than those of English. English is a very technically-oriented language while Korean is a very affectively-oriented language. These comments come from my own superficial observation. Unlike English, we have so many ways to express our thankfulness. The second idiom has a literal meaning. He just said, "Thank you." At that time, I as a third person, felt that he was not really of a thankful mind. He did not mention the two school teachers' difficult situation. He was not concerned with their living situation. He was not concerned with their sacrifice. For the supervisor, it might not be seen as a sacrifice, because their endeavour was very natural for public education. They were to be rewarded by MOE. In the process, we omitted the official meeting to examine materials. Normally we would meet and discuss the materials. Because of the insufficient time, we had an errand person from my office deliver them to each examiner's office and collect them.

[20] General manager:
From now on, I hope you will carry out interdepartment affairs by official documents.

Researcher E:
Why do we have to spend so much time and effort that way.

General manager:
Because it is the natural and right way for official affairs.

Researcher E:
Okay, I will do so. I will receive all replies from other departments by official documents.

(At one general manager's office room in KEDI, May 1991)

This text is not directly related to the fourth curriculum revision in Korea. But, when we consider KEDI's position as a curriculum development centre, most of KEDI's work may be indirectly related to the curriculum development process (in a more positive sense). When I was working as the director of the Research Coordinating Section, I planned an interim evaluation of the results of all the research projects of KEDI in 1991. A researcher helped me telephone all six departments to submit their materials for evaluation to our section. It was very difficult for the researcher to make contact with one of the six general managers because he was too busy to stay very long in his office. So the researcher asked his secretary to inform him about the evaluation. Because his department had not submitted the materials several days after the time deadline, I visited his office in order to courteously ask him to submit the materials. When he was requested to do, he answered that he had not received the notice. (Thereafter, I confirmed with his secretary that he had already been informed.) He suggested that I communicate between departments by official document. (Even though I use the verb, suggest, at that time, he ordered me implicitly because he was a higher ranked person than I. I was, however, not a subordinate under his direct control.) We had not had any problems with interdepartment communication by telephone before that affair. When we use official documents, we have to spend much time and effort to write, type, get signatures for the documents, deliver, and receive them. When I indicated the inconvenience of the procedure, his answer was as the response to text [20], not for the convenience or confirmation of communication.

He was instituting an official procedure. He thought that interdepartmental communication by official documentation was the natural and right way to proceed. For him, form had priority over content. Language is descriptive and one of the things described is the repository and source of experience. It is word and deed - it is itself a form of life (Stern, 1981). "When a limited and conditioned new "good" is erected to the level of an absolute, it immediately becomes an evil, because it excludes certain complementary elements which are required if it is fully good" (Merton, 1969, p. 30).

We have an idiom, "We burn the three roomed thatched house to exterminate bedbugs." This means that we burn the barn to get rid of the mice. The instituted form-oriented way of thinking overrules cooperation. Heidegger (1977) warns against the growing consolidation of the instituted character of a science which "attains to the respect due a science only when it has become capable of being institutionalized" (p. 124). An institutionalized way of thinking based on "the precedence of methodology over whatever is" (ibid., p. 125) not only guarantees the authority to research and researcher but also "forms men of a different stamp" (ibid., p. 125). In this instituted way of thinking, we cannot *belong* together but are only *together* in the same place. In the belonging *together*, we lose our suitable place and our ownness. "No account of reason can prescind from the institutionalization of reason ... (Caputo, 1987, p. 229).

> We have draped [it] with institutional authority. We have made it a *princeps*, an *arché*/king, not only by turning it into a rigorous technique and fixed method but by giving it political authority, by creating a rationality - caste, a guide of specialists and professional practitioners of reason. The original Enlightenment idea of reason ...has so withered away that what nowadays calls itself reason is the latest and most dangerous authority of all (ibid., p. 234).

Therefore, Caputo argues, the emancipation of reason from institutional authority: "to keep reason in play and to keep the play in reason" (ibid., p. 235).

According to Johnson (1987), our experience, which experiences itself, results from our positive thinking acts based on reason and includes all aspects of human beings: physical; social; linguistic; cognitive, which make human beings

human-like (p. xvi). Therefore reason, which makes our experience as it is, is not necessarily confined in the cognitive domain but moves out of the cognitive process into imagination, intuition, feeling, and meditation, that is, the total human body and soul. His arguments are very similar to Merleau-Ponty's proposition (1964): Corporeal intersubjectivity. Therefore, it is possible to say that intersubjectivity consists not in the institutionalized way of thinking but in the greatest possible free flexibility for corporeality.

Theme B-8: Totalitarian determination in the process of centralization

[21] Document No. Pyungyo 1016

To: The President of KEDI

Title: A request for the study of a reduction and an adaptation of elementary, and junior and senior high school curricula.

The Ministry of Education is trying to study the reduction and adaptation of curriculum content for elementary, and junior and senior high schools according to the plan for normalization and alleviation of the overheated tendency of informal tutoring. In order to ensure research and development of school curricula by a specialized institute, the Ministry of Education entrusts the study for reduction and adaptation of curriculum content for elementary, and junior and senior high schools to your institute in accordance with our several practical agreements with your institute. We wish your institute to carry out the study as follows:

1. The matters entrusted to research and development:
   A. Curricula development
      1. Kindergarten curricula
      2. Elementary school curricula
      3. Junior high school curricula
      4. Academic senior high school curricula
      5. Vocational senior high school curricula
      ....

2. Content and period entrusted to research and development:
   A. Basic orientation and aims
      This Ministry of Education emphasizes the research for and development of curricula and textbooks appropriate for educating students to constructively contribute to a

democratic welfare state, and to especially the normalization of education, especially:

1. The re-organization, integration, and reduction of subject matter
2. The careful collection and structuring of the amount and difficulty of curriculum content
3. The adaptation of the amount and difficulty of curriculum content

B. Objectives of the study

By careful collection of the curriculum content, with due consideration given to the quality and difficulty of the materials, we wish to educate students to contribute to the development of a democratic welfare state. We wish to realize the attempt to establish an education for the holistic man, and to normalize education.

C. Basic principles

1. To emphasize the education for national identity
2. To resolve the problem of current school curriculum
3. To re-organize, integrate, reduce subject matter, and revise elementary school textbooks ...

The vice-Minister of
Education for the
Minister of Education

Many people in Korea believe that KEDI independently develops school curricula. But, this document shows how much freedom KEDI has to develop school curricula. Before MOE requested KEDI to develop the school curricula, they had already fixed the basic orientation and aims, objectives, and basic guidelines of the research and development of the school curricula. With regard to curriculum development, what is left except the principles manifested in this document? What can KEDI make decisions about? What kind of alternatives does KEDI have? What kind of choices can KEDI make? What can KEDI add and subtract? So far as I was concerned with this fourth curriculum development, KEDI was only a machine to develop curriculum following the rules and orders previously put in place. In an old Korean saying, "No matter how far away Oh-

Kong Son[6] runs from *Avalokitésvara*, the Goddess of Mercy, he is still left confined in her palm. No matter how KEDI researchers discuss, think, concentrate, make decisions, make choices, and decide on values, that is, do their best, their acts were confined in the very concrete pre-established general rules which were handed over to KEDI by MOE. This is the reality of intersubjectivity between KEDI people and the MOE. I tried to break this one-sided relationship at least in my work when I wrote the integrated curriculum, especially the orientation programme for the grade one students, but it was impossible as far as I had to work for KEDI.

Based on the information in the above-mentioned document, MOE people controlled KEDI people. Intentionally or unintentionally they stamped their ideas on the process of curriculum development. This reflects Buber's I-It relationship which appears to be related to a person's attitudes towards one's empirical world, and which involves categorizing objects, events, behaviours, and other experiences. He/she attempts to predict, control, and understand his/her world as it comes to him/her via his/her senses. At times, the I-It relationship dictates that people be manipulated and otherwise treated as though they were objects to use or control. KEDI people were just objects which were only moving their arms and legs almost without thinking. Another mode of relationship of'I-Thou' involves authentic communication through dialogue between one person'I' and another person'Thou.' The dialogue involves a loss of self-consciousness for the Other who steps out to I. In the discussions with MOE people, KEDI researchers were persuaded, or ordered under the name of dialogue. In the dialogue, the absolute Other was reduced to one of relative others.

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[6]Oh-Kong Son was a character in a famous ancient novel of China. He could use magic, for example, to divide his body. He could be several places at the same time. With this powerful magic, he challenged the Mercy Goddess. But, after with only one challenge, he came to realize the limitation of his power to prevent himself from being prisoned by the Mercy Goddess.

> Individuals are reduced to being bearers of forces that command them unbeknownst to themselves. The meaning of individuals (invisible outside of this totality) is derived from the totality (Levinas, 1969, p. 20 f.).

In the dialogue or encounter of KEDI people with MOE people, there was only totality in which the Other was one of the plural others as "an object": the totality of reducing of the Other to the same. The power which has been possessed by MOE people deprived individuals of their uniqueness in favour of a system of totality. An individual borrows his/her meaning from the totality. Individuals are reduced to bearers of forces which command them without their knowledge. The significance of any particular is its place in a network of significations existing independently of it: "a situation where totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the totality itself" (ibid., p. 24). MOE people mention the situations, but the situations are highly abstracted, conceptualized ones: national situation; national identity; economic situation, and so on. Therefore, the other in the dialogue is robbed of his/her individuality and particularity by being understood or approached only on the self's (MOE people's) own terms. They forget that the ultimate justification or end of understanding and dialogue is to bring it near so that it speaks in a new voice. He/she is not merely an aspect of the self. He/she exists beyond the self's conceptual system. "Conversation, from the very fact that it maintains the distance between me and the Other, the radical separation asserted in transcendence which prevents the reconstitution of totality, cannot renounce the egoism of its existence; but the very fact of being in a conversation consists in recognizing in the Other a *right* over this egoism, and hence in justifying oneself" (ibid., p. 40). In the KEDI people's dialogue with MOE people, they as the Other could not be recognized as a *right*, showing they were involved in only a quasi-dialogue with MOE people. In this situation, the experiencing of Others is not a new openness to new experience whereby the present is still open to the future with possibility and expectation. At the very beginning, there could not be a sharing of experience and opening to the future, because, at the beginning, there was no encountering, or dialogue, understanding.

New and deeper understanding is premised on criticism which implies distance. But in this relationship between KEDI and MOE people, as Buber says, there was no distance; there was only using, manipulating. Therefore the meetings between KEDI people and MOE people were not based on mutual understanding, and consequently, there was no intersubjectivity resulting from a cross-fertilizing dialogue among many different points of view. This dialogue was a "happening to meet" others, and was not an encountering because the "happening to meet" cannot "share the jubilation of life through dwelling living souls together at the same time and space" (Bub-Jung, 1991). In the "happening to meet," there was no room for the existing spirit to belong to the sphere of actuality. There was only a universal easy going superficiality about existence.

[22] Director A:
I cannot see teacher C. What happened?

Teacher A:
I received her call this afternoon at my school. She's so overworked she is sick in bed.

Director A:
Mercy on me! I am very sorry about that. It means the project might be delayed. How is she getting on? (When the director visited the small hotel room where we were working together, December 1980).

At that time teacher C had been very busy. She took on five roles as a mother, as a wife, as a teacher, as a KEDI volunteer, and as a daughter-in-law. Her parents-in-law, who lived in a small village, were visiting her. Two days before she could not work because of her sickness, she told me, "I wish I have five bodies, I wish I could divide my body into five women as Oh-Kong Son did."

The director worried about the delay of the project. He worried about her health too. But, he mentioned her health a little awkwardly a few seconds after he mentioned the project. I was near him at that time and was struck by the fact that he was first concerned with the project, and then he expressed his concern about her health. In reality, he might be considering her as a writing machine. She was only a part of the system to develop curriculum materials. He was concerned with

her use-value first, and ends-value second. One might be tempted to say he was concerned with her health only for the project's sake. She was a "standing-reserve" in a technical mentality.

> Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve [Bestend]. ...Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object (Heidegger, 1977, p. 17).

In this technical mentality of encountering with others, the world is seen as fully available for use, ready to be appropriated whenever it is needed. The way in which the world reveals itself in a modern technological perspective is in "standing-reserve," ready-to-hand, ordered; set upon; challenged. "The object of such challenging demands can exhibit no autonomy, no personal rhythm, or claims. The technician thus experiences no sense of responsibility toward the object, but does with it whatever he desires" (Leder, 1985, p. 246).

The technical mentality to see everything in the perspective of "standing-reserve" results in, according to Heidegger, "supreme danger": totalization. The man who is absorbed in the way of thinking of technical-scienticism, "exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 27). As a result, the man "becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth. Man becomes the relational centre of that which is as such" (ibid., p. 128). For the man in the relational centre, on the one hand, "where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing" (ibid., p. 27). On the other hand, in this way, whatever stands by in the same standing-reserve, ready-to-hand, no longer stands over against us as object. That is, the reality is a pre-structured image produced by man and at his disposal. "That the world becomes picture is one and the same event with the event of man's becoming *subiectum* in the midst of that which is" (ibid., p. 132). In this process, the totality of knowledge, science guides the way towards total prediction, total control, total use. Persons become the relational centre and see the world as a

picture. On the one hand, one restrictive totalized mode of disclosing is taken as totally representative of reality, and on the other hand, even though "the unconcealment itself within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork" (ibid., p. 18), "the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct" (ibid., p. 27). In fact, the domination of one person over another person is merely a compound of both the disclosing which leads to seeking totalized domination over all things, and a person's appropriative attitude toward all things. In this case, we cannot expect the real event of understanding which goes beyond what we can bring to the understanding of other people's words through methodical effort and critical self-control. There were only silent obediences. This phenomenon might be our unavoidable fate because "in practically all areas of human endeavour, the attempt is to extend the modern West's technological vision" (Nandy, 1988, p. 92). However, despite this situation, Merleau-Ponty provides a dim ray of hope: what we seek what he claims, "is beyond our goals and our means, and commands all our useful activities ..." (Merleau-Ponty quoted by Barry Jr. 1991, p. 398).

Theme B-9: Beginning working cooperatively despite first time disappointment and frustration

While working together, we were in a series of disappointments and frustrations in the situation which was created. Most of the previously discussed texts, [5], [6], [7], [8], [10], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22] showed that we felt very frustrated at that time. Even though we were using the same Korean language and working together with the same goal, we could not understand and communicate with others fully because of different concepts, interests, jargon, intentions or attitude. Even the same word had different meanings according to speakers and/or listener, or the existing situation. Although we were working together, it seemed as if we were working individually and separately with different aims.

[23] Researcher A:
Before we hear the reason, I would like to ask about the nature of this conference. Is this conference only for discussion or do we hope to reach an actual productive conclusion?

Director A:
I am very worried about your misunderstanding. As researcher E already mentioned, the reason that we are having this meeting is to discuss the way and manner in which the integrated curriculum will be developed. Therefore, I think we have to provide opportunities to figure out the character of the integrated curriculum before we can reach a conclusion. Please don't hesitate to express your frank opinions, I think we have to have several more meetings like this. Please don't hurry trying to reach a conclusion.

Researcher B:
You mentioned the means and manners. But when do we reach a conclusion about the need for an integrated curriculum?

From the start of the conference, researchers and subject-matter specialists implicitly expressed their negative feelings about an integrated curriculum. There were very serious and long discussions about the integrated curriculum. The researchers in favour of an integrated curriculum seemed to get the worst of it from those opposed. This may be because each subject matter had already thoroughly researched the theoretical background about knowledge, education, teaching, and curriculum, while those in favour of an integrated curriculum were still developing theory.

Professor C:
Well I am very tired and hungry. Does KEDI offer lunch? Any way how about we continue this meeting after lunch?

(The first small conference for developing integrated curriculum in KEDI, August 1980)

Professor C has influential authority with other participants of the meeting. He was very conscientious and supportive of the integrated curriculum, and to the task of our section, the Curriculum Research and Coordinating Section. Following his suggestion, the morning meeting was closed at 11: 40. (Usually lunch time started at 12: 00.) The afternoon meeting was reconvened at 2: 00 p.m. (Usually afternoon meetings were held at 1:30.) When the afternoon meeting reconvened, even though the same topic as that of the morning meeting continued to be

discussed, there were no sharp conflicts or objections as in the morning meeting. Professor C had succeeded with his cooling-down-of-ardor-strategy. Even though what he said was an illocutionary speech act, the content of what was said and the manner in which he said it was a perlocutionary speech act by his authoritarian authority. I had a feeling that the curriculum development process was being viewed as a management or political process. After the conference finished, one of the researchers came to me and complained about the early starting lunch time. I could not apologize to him in any words. I asked myself: "How do researchers and professors differ from merchants and politicians?" Here is a diary of teacher B:

[24] I am not sure if I want to continue being involved in this project. I am very busy with the tasks of teacher and housekeeper. Why do I have to be patient with that kind of manner? What meaning can I gain from this situation? My acquaintance with KEDI staff? For better education? My being sorry for researcher E's great effort? In order to stay friends with many people? Because of money? I cannot find the reason that I have to continue. I used to respect professor C. But, today I was very disappointed with his action. It was the act of a merchant who seeks only profit at any cost. I have to consider whether I should attend that kind of meeting if such an event happens again. And what do the researchers in the afternoon meeting say? (August 1980)

The participants, especially non-KEDI people, sacrificed themselves to education. They spent much time and effort on this project. They were paid about fifteen Canadian dollars a day by KEDI for attending the conference. The money was not enough to pay the taxi fare for a participant who came from quite far away. There were many people, especially among professors, who would not attend that kind of meeting and gave the excuse of being busy. Only real volunteers would attend. The reward of their sacrifices was only frustration.

There was a similar case with the meeting one month later. This meeting was held with the aim of developing a teacher's guide book for moral education. At this meeting when we were discussing the general principles for the book, the participants divided into two groups: on the one hand, one group of teachers argued to develop a more detailed teacher's guide; and on the other hand, the other group of KEDI researchers and professors argued to develop a broader

teacher's guide in order for teachers to re-interpret and re-create the book for more creative teaching. When the two groups' contradictory opinions were sharply divided against each other, the chairperson stopped the meeting in the middle saying, "Let's talk about it next time."

These examples show that we can do anything for our own purpose without considering others at all. The others in these cases are supposed to be objects and follow someone else's opinion. Others are no longer co-operative partners but just the'It' of the'I-It' relationship, as reluctant obstacles in a necessary formal procedure. Teachers especially were glared at, sometimes by professors, other times by researchers, for their way of thinking in opposite pole contradictions. They were disregarded as being the last users of curriculum materials. They were not treated as real partners. They were treated as a last source to which the professors or researchers could refer. The professors and researchers argued that the guidelines for teaching subject matter, explanatory materials, teaching methods, and basic philosophical assumptions, etc. should be placed in the first part of the book. Teachers were supposed to plan every classroom hour and teach students following the directions which were suggested in the first part. Teachers argued that, since they needed to follow the directions and guidelines, they would teach students more easily following the suggestions. Researchers and professors consider the teacher's role in the teacher-user perspective as one in which teachers are perceived to be at the end of the curriculum practice process. Teachers are only experienced, skilled practitioners who "play a mere supporting role in the process and are unable to act as critics at the level of ideas" (Connelly and Elbaz, 1980, p. 108). The teacher's task is to follow the ideas of the written curriculum with fidelity.

> The task is to get individuals and groups of individuals to implement it faithfully in practice - that is, to use it as it is supposed to be used, as intended by the developer (Fullan, 1982, p. 31).

This linear way of thinking, namely that implementation is theory applied in actual situations, was the backbone of the fourth curriculum revision in Korea

as long as teachers were involved in the process. Even in the curriculum development process in which teachers were involved directly, there was no exception. There were many examples of this phenomenon, some typical examples are texts [9], [12], [15] and [19]. MOE people (including researchers and sometimes professors) make decisions and then teachers write the curriculum materials following the decision-making. In the process of curriculum development, teachers sometimes make suggestions, only to find them disregarded.

[25] Supervisor:
Yes, I understand your intention and effort. In some sense, I agree with you. But what is good is good. Let's follow my boss's opinion. Please understand my situation.

Teacher A:
Of course. Since I have been involved in several MOE projects after 1966 when I moved to Seoul, I did not experience a case where MOE people, especially higher-rankers, changed their decision and followed school teachers' opinions. Do we have any other alternatives?

Teacher B:
I don't have anything to say. But this is my first experience being involved in MOE and KEDI projects. At the very first, when I became involved in this project, I expected that there would be a lot of chance for me to improve Korean education. Now what is this? I am just a writing machine following your orders. I expected I could do something for better education, better curriculum. Today, I am wondering if I am really contributing to Korean educational progress or if I am one in ten thousand, making Korean education worse. Is this the real face of the curriculum development process? What is the authentic one?

Supervisor:
This place has changed me. You have changed me into a rascal indeed! When I changed my job from school teacher to MOE official, I had the same feeling as you. At the time we discussed national identity education, and when I spoke words about something, the words themselves went far beyond what I meant to say. I didn't mean what I said. In short, let's consider our international political situation. I feel refreshed by the frank confession of the things on my mind.

Researcher E:
Yes, let's admit our actual situation. Isn't there any other way? Under the admission of our actual situation, let's make our best effort to find another

> possibility which satisfies both MOE to the maximum and fulfills actual classroom needs. Anyway, I am very happy with our mutual understanding. I expect our project will be carried out perfectly with our mutual understanding.
>
> (In a small hotel room in Seoul, December, 1980)

This dialogue was on the third day after'theme six.' In fact, the supervisor called me at the hotel room the next day of'theme six.' Partly apologizing, he explained to me that he was afraid he had said too much directly, that he was worried about the progress of our project, and he asked me to express his apology to the teachers involved in the project. When I relayed his apology and explanation, the teachers accepted his apology and understood his position.

We express our own voices. The supervisor began to reflect on his action. We began to reflect on our own actions as well after his apology and the dialogue. The moment of our self-reflection was the very moment for us to be frustrated, the frustration arising from the conflict between our actual curriculum development process and the expectations of a curriculum developer. Even though the self-reflection was only frustration, it gave us the occasion to come to an understanding based on humility. This was the starting point for us to work in an intersubjective relationship, a very happy starting point. We began to understand each other; we became attuned to each other. Before this, even though we worked together, especially in the relationship between supervisor and others, we were separate things. The actual honest self-reflective moment brought us the momentum we needed. From this, we dimly felt others as Husserl's alter-ego. I, as the director of integrated curriculum materials, had to be satisfied with even this very small progress. After the discussion, we each made efforts to do our best, even in the confined boundaries which were established by MOE, to find the "middle distanced possibilities" embracing all in our dialogue and discussions. We tried to extend the boundaries within which we could find a place where we could work for a better curriculum. Teacher B's diary:

[26] I feel I have had a very long journey or gone through a long tunnel. I feel I can contribute to the KEDI project now. During the process of this work, I started to feel reluctance to the KEDI project. I was so frustrated that I did my work unwillingly. Sometimes I imagined the supervisor would be fired. The persons who make the Korean educational process worse should be fired. But now I can understand the supervisor's situation. If I have to find a target to attack, that should be our international political situation. The confrontation with North Korea, the most warlike nation in the world. Oh Lord, help us! Bless us! Oh God, I pray for our working committee, for our country. (Diary of teacher B, December, 1980)

The four people, two of whom were my good friends before our work, have all become my very good friends now. While working on this tough project, in a very difficult situation, we have made our friendship more deep and cohesive. From the supervisor's opening himself to Others, we began to understand each other. Opening himself in his temporality and historicity triggered our mutual understanding. Due to this mutual understanding we can share our intentions, our problems, and ask our questions in order to find a better solution. We can keep the dialogue going in commonality.

C. Hermeneutic Reflection on Intersubjectivity In Korean Culture

In this section, I will discuss Korean cultural background as a foundation for the discussion of section B and as the starting point for section D.

Korean people have traditionally lived on the basis of vertical interhuman relationships, giving priority to the idea of loyalty and filial piety in a patriarchical system. In this patriarchical society it is typical and natural that elders or people of higher rank have the authority in dialogue, especially in the debate over crucial issues.

Older people and those of higher rank traditionally conducted dialogues in which they had absolute authority and made decisions for those who were younger or of lower rank. Consequently the latter did not have an opportunity to express their emotions or opinions. Until now, the cultural background for intersubjective relationships based on authority in dialogue has been transmitted to us consciously

and unconsciously. To make matters worse, the authoritative political atmosphere has further enforced these social phenomena. In an authoritative society which gives priority to economic development, the politico-economic elites plan and make decisions about all sorts of social-economic-political affairs, and ordinary people follow their intentions without any opportunities to express their suspicions, or objections.

Another characteristic of the Korean cultural and societal background for dialogue can be traced to the traditional culture of an agriculture-centered society in which people belong to the community in a tight social bond. In an agriculture-centered society, intersubjective relationships are based on paternalism which underlies solidarity through cooperation and unification. Even in dialogue based on the relationship of people of equal status, the characteristics of an agriculture-centered society in which people are linked by sympathetic sentiments results in a search for peace, interdependence, and cooperation rather than for a dispassionate, critical reasonableness as based on knowledge and information.

Therefore, even in a discussion aimed at problem solving, they tried to reach agreement by the attunement of their sentiment through compromise and concession before scrutinizing the reason, analysing the situation, and examining the way to it. This attitude was enforced by the idea of Confucianism which stresses traditional harmony and the middle way. Participants made an effort to reach agreement not by expressing differences but by smoothing over different opinions as much as possible rather than clearly acknowledging differences.

In Korea, when confronting problematic issues, we prefer to resolve them sentimentally through little dialogue rather than by dialectical dialogue which recognizes and criticizes different opinions. If we cannot resolve contradictory opinions by genial harmony and a "happy medium," we tend to resolve issues through highly emotional contradictions or authoritative oppressive relationships. This cultural heritage of a traditional life with little dialogue is still with us.

Our political ancestors, in their political lives, tried to approach and reasonably resolve contradictory issues through dialogue based on reason in terms of multi-dimensions, not just emotion. They based their political life on the *sunbi* consciousness[7] (or the way of life or thought). The *sunbi* consciousness with its merits and faults, can be connected and based on the *Myungbun*[8]." This *myungbun* tends not to permit compromise or adjustment of itself so it remains in contradiction to those who challenge or question. Adhering to this *myungbun*, one is likely to fall into a dogmatic argument that only his/her idea is absolute truth. Based on this rigid dogmatism, one might think that, because of one's firm faith in the truth, only one's own *myungbun* can be the *myungbun* and one's own idea cannot be false. This monism, where pluralism cannot find any room to survive, has remained as another characteristic of our traditional lives.

Even in the current post-modern age, we have had very little chance to live in a democratic society. As a result, our intersubjectivity in encountering with others has been dominated by authoritative-sentimental or the *sunbi* consciousness tradition which contradicts the former. We have, until now, depended upon this way to solve problems by emotional attunement according to a moral sense (or

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[7]*Sunbi* means scholar. The meaning of *sunbi* was different from that of modern times. They were, at the same time, scholars, philosophers, writers, poets, and lastly politicians. They believed strongly in truth. They intentionally lived very poorly but honestly in harmony with nature. Because they believed that wealth was their major enemy or the element which led the mind into evil, they lived and practised their idea. They exemplified the way of life by their lives directly and bodily. They were the educational mirror and the master for ordinary people to reflect themselves. They were the mentors for ordinary people. But they were very stubborn in their faith. Sometimes, they would sacrifice even their lives for their faith or principles. This *sunbi* consciousness (or the way of thought or attitude) was the criteria, or basis for their valuing, decision-making, judging, arguing, or living.

[8]*Myung bun* means the morally self-justifiable bases or principles for sunbi. Sunbi consciousness could practice, study, be involved in, and live based on this *myung bun: myung bun* was their basis, foundation, attitude for philosophy and heir lives. *Myung bun* were very practical guidelines or principles.

loyalty to someone) and a "face" which curtailed authentic dialogue and understanding. This phenomenon can be overcome by our recognition of a democratic life. These social phenomena of the lack of dialogue and understanding might originate from the poor quality of school education. In the Korean educational situation, because of insufficient educational opportunity, we could not offer sufficient educational chances for students to be involved in open dialogue, expressing their own voices and letting others speak different opinions. In Korea, we have little concern in education with the basic attitudes of openness and care towards others with love and responsibility in dialogue. As a result, in our society, social encounters have been carried out in a mechanical way or in a power struggle aiming at controlling, using, manipulating others. Individuals encountering others have come to easily contradict each other, to complicate the issues concerned, to be antagonistic; emotional treatment of issues without dialogue and understanding based on corporeal intersubjectivity without problem solving results in leaving unpleasant feelings and forgetting the essential issues.

D. Reflection on the Meaning of Involvement in These Themes

In the previous section, I reflected upon the Korean tradition of intersubjectivity. This was to show the textuality of tradition. I showed, in section B, how intersubjectivity had been changed and distorted into frustration and disappointment in spite of the participants' initial great hope and willingness to answer to the calling of Others. This section shows my efforts to go beyond the negative phenomena by reflecting on the present situation in Korea. I discuss my reflection on the meanings of texts by intertextualizing both the section B texts and section D texts on the basis of section C texts, our tradition. If not based on tradition, our understanding may be confined to a language game. If we do not go through intertextuality or intratextuality for understanding, our understanding may be shallow, narrow, or arbitrary. Flax's meaning of meanings can provide the answer to the debate between postmodernists and hermeneuticists to the practitioners who seek meanings.

> The search for intelligibility and meaning is not necessarily the same as the imposition of reason. It need not enmesh us within the "metaphysics of presence." One can seek meanings without assuming they are rational, context-free, or fixed forever." ...The [postmodernists'] claim that a commitment to intelligibility or meaning necessarily traps us once again in the metaphysics of presence is not warranted. Meaning can be unconsciously and intersubjectively constructed without the constructor assuming they are "found" bits of the Real or True (Flax, 1990, p. 225 f.).

Theme D-1: Intersubjectivity is based on understanding activated by loving our commitment and each other

[27] I am happy today. Recently I have been doubting what I am doing for KEDI. The day before yesterday I felt some conflict in myself. My husband was reluctant for me to do what I am doing. He wants me to be just a mother and a teacher. He has been worried that if I become too distracted by the KEDI project I will not look after my affairs at home. Recently I have regretted my neglectful attitude toward affairs at home. Furthermore, the current problems in KEDI have made me disappointed with what I am doing. But today they listened to me. They expressed to me their appreciation after the conference. Now I am very proud of my contribution and glad of my commitment to the KEDI project. I re-think and acknowledge my commitment to the KEDI project. I love what I am doing. I have to do as much for my family. (Diary of teacher C after the second small meeting for developing integrated curriculum in KEDI, September, 1980)

By being proud of being appreciated by Others, teacher C came to acknowledge and love what she was doing. She thought about the importance of the project, her responsibility to it, and her commitment to it with Others. Our group began to realize the meaning of the obligation with which I and Others in different fields were charged. From then on, the atmosphere changed gradually. We began to care for Others and our commitment. (Even though, as we can see texts which were in section B, conflicts between participants, especially with the supervisors, had continued for quite long time.)

We had lots of chances to have formal and informal discussions. Through continuous discussion, we began to acknowledge Others and Others' works. As we

continued, our love for each other and our commitment to the project deepened as we acknowledged each other's work. In fact, human beings can think more deeply and richly about things with a sense of love and commitment. Heidegger says in this regard: "Perhaps...what we call feeling or mood...is more rational, that is, more intelligently perceptive, because it is more open to Being than all reasons which, having meanwhile become rational, were misinterpreted as rational (Heidegger quoted by Kenevan, 1982, p. 391).

Love is all-embracing and allows one to open oneself wholly to Others. "Love is a spiritual bond grounded in a unique spiritual affinity governed by the *ineffable* of God-given spiritual identities (and tied thereby to the categories of necessity)" (Dillon, Winter, 1989, p. 349). We can observe more deeply and richly when love is present; we cannot really see an object unless we have some emotional involvement with it. "It may well be that our reason works best in the state of ecstasy" (May quoted by Kenevan, 1982, p. 391). "All things are subject to eternal love" (Shelley quoted by Dillon, 1989, p. 349).

[28] I am not the person you think I am. I have trusted you [who work in the Curriculum Research and Coordination Section]. I trust your true feelings as far as this project is concerned. After the first small meeting for developing the integrated curriculum, I reflected at home. I took serious view of my work for KEDI and, at last, I realized that I loved my work for KEDI. As I loved my work for KEDI, I could not help but reflect on my previous attitude and work: "What am I doing? Where am I?" When I thought about what I am doing and the results of what I am doing, I could not help but be honest with myself. ...I have come to understand more deeply my work, the work of KEDI, and, at last, your work. (from informal dialogue with Researcher B in the Curriculum Research and Coordination Section, September, 1980)

Researcher B confessed his feelings to us after the second small meeting in my section. Usually my colleagues and I disliked him because he was eccentric and often rude. Even though he had also felt the same pressure as that of the text [8] in'theme three' by the people behind him, he had to be honest about his commitment, when he was thinking of his duty to KEDI and KEDI's duty to Korean educational progress. After this confession, we came to like him. The

opening of our minds following the opening of his mind to us allowed us intersubjectivity. The opening of our mind to Others made us be honest to our work and to re-think our duty. The more we were honest to and thought about our work, the more we understood and loved our work. According to Buber, in intersubjectivity, "I-Thou" is the primary word of *relation*. It is characterized by mutuality, directness, presentness, intensity and ineffability. Meanwhile I-It is a primary word of experiencing and using the Other as an object. The relation is love, not emotion or feeling which remains within the I. Feeling dwells in man, but man dwells in his love. Love is not clinging to the I in such a way as to have the Thou only for its content, its object, and is not the enjoyment of a wonderful emotion; love is the responsibility of an I for a Thou. Because of this responsibility, researcher B was honest to himself. Teacher C as well, due to her responsibility, was thinking of what she was doing. They opened themselves up to their work and to Others. The essence of dialogue is responsibility. This means responding by hearing the unreduced claims in all their crudeness and disharmony and by answering them out of the depth of one's being as a "single person." Teacher C, as a single person, through responding by hearing the call of Others, could participate more positively in the project at a considerable sacrifice. Researcher B, through his response, could change the atmosphere of the second conference. The responsibility, indeed, consists in thinking in the absolute passivity of the self, in other words, a form of vigilant passivity to the call of the Other and the Beings.

For Buber, the active form of encounter between man/woman and man/woman is simple immediacy and togetherness. Researcher B and teacher C presented themselves without any mediation; with love alone they encountered Others and other things. In this case, they never had any desire to manipulate Others but only, prompted by love, to understand them. They wanted to open themselves to the world and the company of Others. They shared the absolute meanings of their work with Others. In fact, understanding is more than itself; achievement, performing, transforming. Understanding is an event, a happening in

which participants mutually determine each other. It was possible by the love for each other. By love for each other and our commitment, we can hold the things which rest in the open for awhile and then drop back out of sight.

Theme D-2: Saying as disclosure based on *belonging* together.

Working together in a intersubjective relationship with the participants in a curriculum development process is based on the group relationship of the participants who communicate with others. Group work is not merely a multiplicity of subjects, but rather a unitary subtrait in which the subject's desires, ideas, activities, and voices are woven together in the harmonious overlapping of their individual streams of consciousness. When this group relation based on harmony was broken, the group members could not work together within intersubjective relationships (texts [5], [7], [10], [12] [16], [23]). In these cases, the participants, as Husserl says, are not yet the other human beings to me, still not only my fellow human beings, namely, "pure alter ego" without any worldliness situated in space and time. We were not mediated, not co-present. We did not have sympathy or love for Others, even egological empathy. We were only others in general. Husserl, with the notion of "communal spirit," envisages that the society of a group is "indeed not a plurality, but rather a unity in plurality" (Husserl quoted by Allen, 1978, p. 80).

> We are brothers and sisters as a member of one family...so that you and I were originally one united body, and there had never been any distinguishment. But people distinguish you and I (Yi, 1989).

Yi's argument goes further than Husserl's. He continues, "If we respect only ourselves and not Others, then there would be continuous fighting with each other. And if we realize that I and Others are originally one united body and respect Others like ourselves, then this world would be *Sukahvati* where lotuses blossom all over. He emphasizes unity in difference and mutual respect for Others. Intersubjectivity can be possible from these mental states. There is a Korean proverb, "communication mind to mind (without spoken language)." In

this mental state, we do not need spoken language in order to communicate with each other. We are in some kind of telepathic communication with each other. But when we distinguish you and I, we have come to need language. Language is a kind of bridge to recover this mental connectedness.

[29] Teacher A:
How can we handle the three domains together? I think it is very difficult.

Teacher C:
I would suggest thinking about this project in two aspects: on the one hand, about curriculum development; on the other hand, about teaching students with this curriculum. Developing curriculum, I think, is very difficult. But, in the actual classroom, to teach with this curriculum and its materials is not so difficult. Some teachers have already integrated curriculum materials by themselves and have taught in this way. If we are not concerned so much with the particular structure of each subject matter, it is not so difficult for us to develop integrated curriculum as we anticipated. The first thing what we have to do is, I think, to consider how much desirable this curriculum is to students.

Teacher A:
If we ask school teachers about the desirability of the curriculum, I am sure that the majority of teachers will agree that the integrated curriculum is desirable to students.

Researcher E:
According to statistics of the survey of teachers' and parents' opinions, most of them agree with the curriculum. And there is a great deal of theoretical evidence to support the rationality of the curriculum.
Researcher A:
I still worry whether the unique structure, sequence, and content of each subject matter will be damaged.

Researcher B:
You are partly right. But is the categorization between each subject matter not for our teaching convenience, at least, in elementary school? I think we need, in a sense, to make up our minds to sacrifice ourselves for better education. Let's not forget KEDI's responsibility and *raison d'être* to help school teachers in the educational field.

(An informal discussion in Curriculum Research and Coordinating Section before the second small meeting for developing integrated curriculum in KEDI, September 1980)

The atmosphere of the informal discussion was very different from that of the previous ones: teachers began not only to talk but also to express their opinion. And the attitude of Researcher B was changed (texts [23]). Until now, teachers were very hesitant to express their opinions. They were mainly hearing researchers' and professors' opinions. Buber (1947) emphasizes the importance of sharing with Others. Everyone must be ready to share with and contribute to Others. One must not contribute one's spirit only to be diminished and distorted. Experiencing the other side through willingly sharing is to feel an event or thing from the side of a person in the dialogue, as well as from one's own side; this inclusiveness acknowledges the other person in the actuality of his being. A dialogue without sharing is not dialogue. Habermas (quoted by Young 1990) warns against this attitude of standing outside the community of contribution: "the price is a lack of understanding of the multiple and interrelated layers of meaning" (p. 473). Even though it was informal talking, it was the first time that teachers were able to express their opinion. After this occasion teachers gradually began to express their opinions.

In the second conference, we came to a conclusion that we should find a way to reduce the scope and the grading of the curricula which were to be integrated in order to eradicate the concerns of subject-matter specialists. The atmosphere of the small meeting could be said to be the exact extension of text [29]. Researcher B took an important part in the meeting. After the second small meeting, the opinions of KEDI researchers and professors were gradually changed into agreeing with and supporting the integrated curriculum. The changed situation after the second small meeting was the result of a kind of "indirect communication" (Kierkegaard quoted by Ramsland, 1987, p. 331). According to Kierkegaard, indirect communication means that the communicative exchange takes place through a conceptually unmediated experiential context. Every subject is an existing subject, which should receive an essential expression in all his knowledge. In indirect communication, I have a sense of the Other, not just from what she tells me, but from how she projects herself to me. I am attuned to the

Other. We should express this through the prevention of an illusory finality. The change in the atmosphere and aftermath of the KEDI meeting began with Researcher B and the teachers disclosing their selves. The atmosphere changed through communication of mind with mind. As a result, the participants were attuned to others. We could work together. On this occasion, by saying as showing and gathering, the participants were at the starting point of *belonging* together. That is, not an antithetical pole of contradicting theses or unified synthesized place.

> The essential unfolding of language is saying as showing...self-showing appearance is the mark of the presence and absence of everything that comes into presence, of every kind and rank (Heidegger, 1971, p. 123).

Saying is the mode in which *Ereignis* speaks. Saying is gathering letting-lie-before what is present in its presence. Letting-lie-before means that it does not force into disclosure but lets what is lying there disclose itself. The essential character of human beings "is brought into its own through language, by remaining given over to the essential unfolding of language, to the ringing of stillness" (Heidegger quoted by Stenstad and Maly, 1986, p. 131). Therefore, saying something is already always a responding which results from listening. The participants in the curriculum development process began to say and listen. This listening is possible not by ears but by our attuning to our *belonging* together with the saying.

> The recovery of the original could never restore the original in the way it had been known in the beginning. Where loss precedes recovery, the recovery will transform the original even as it recovers it....for the real root of it lies in the historicity of our understanding, and indeed in the temporality of our being, the involvement of our present and our future in our past (Nicholson, 1986b, p. 62).

The *belonging* together on this occasion was started from saying in the existential movement as repetition. Our being-with-one-another, through language, not only is constituted in its meaning and its possibility, but also in a concrete form through communication in language. This being-with-one-another finds the

ecstatic unity of the future in its projections. Saying as gathering and disclosure is more than speaking and talking. Language is not only what allows us to open up our minds but also what allows us access to the openness. "Language is what allows access to the open-ended" (Chambers, 1990, p. 108). Through this openness to the disclosing of meaning, we understand and have an intersubjective relationship, *belonging* together. Through openness to the transformation of meaning in our historicity and temporality, we can experience not only present but also past and future. Even nowadays in a postmodern age, we can do so by the language which makes meanings *belong* together. In fact, if the differences of meanings, voices, and traces may not *belong* together, the differences will lose their identities as difference within sameness. The differences no longer are differences. They are already non-differences in separate belonging. The more we differentiate the voices, meanings, and traces, the more they have to *belong* together in language. Professors, researchers, and teachers came to *belong* together in their different voices.

This mode of intersubjectivity is dependent upon our experience in human existence. Our experience is dependent upon communication as the existential movement in repetition. The communication is dependent upon the quality of understanding meaning *belonging* together. That is to say, intersubjectivity is based on the language as saying and disclosing our experience through our understanding which allows meanings to *belong* together.

Theme D-3: The difference within sameness as presence within absence.

Kierkegaard says that our self representation is formed from others. We seek from others integration and a sense of worth. Saying is already action. Words are deeds. Intersubjectivity is to attune oneself to Others through experiencing the action. Intersubjectivity as attuning, becoming, is a fundamental structure of our being-in-the-world. Language creates objects. We deploy signs to structure our world, even in a broader sense. Merleau-Ponty says, "We do not represent the words of the interlocutor or our own words that call up what follows" (1973, p.

30). It makes sense thus at the perceptual level of our flesh from which discourse starts. In fact, discourse is human existential relations. Insofar as discourse is aimed at sharing meaning, it has to bear much meaning to be meaningful. According to Heidegger (1969a) identity is subsequent to the ontological difference in the event of appropriation of being (thinking) and Being. This identity, which is an existential issue, refers to a sameness which is not identical. Sameness is mutable, subject to difference and ultimately an expression of non-identity. Sameness is non-identity, in fact, a trace of identity. Consequently, discourse which speaks of identity as sameness, reduces the identity to non-identity through making the identity present. Therefore, it may be possible to be meaningful by presenting something as "difference within sameness" as "non-identical."

[30] Director A:
Don't be disappointed at today's event. Sincerity can move even heaven [Korean idiom]. Let's forget today. Let's think of tomorrow. The sun rising in every morning is always new.

Researcher D:
Yes, the next conference won't be like the one today or the one yesterday. Do not anticipate another conference like today's.

Director A:
Forget it. Some of our past conferences satisfied us very much. There may be this kind of conference or that kind among many conferences. We can only do our best.

(After the first conference which was very unsatisfactory to researchers of Curriculum Research and Coordinating Section, August 1980).

The thing as an identity presents itself in difference. Conferences are different according to the time they are held. Conferences which consist of the same people and have the same goals are still different, mainly because the discourses of participants in the conferences are different. According to Husserl's subjective time consciousness (Husserl quoted by Blum, December, 1985, p. 298), we ourselves are different in temporality. The first conference, according to Husserl, is a "primary impression" which one might describe as a "now impression."

Each "now impression" gives the previous "now" the status of a "retained now." The succession of retained "nows" creates a nonexplicit, non-objectifying "horizon" of retention. But the primal impression (the first conference) implies a "protentional" aspect: it anticipates the succeeding primal impressions which are "not yet" (the second conference). The unity of the entire process is assured by the inner-relationships of protention and retention which bind the constant generation of new primal impressions into *one* time flow. Thus, because of retention and protention, every moment, past or present, points beyond itself in two directions, but the way in which these directions modify the moment constantly changes with the onward flow of time. The relationships among moments within the subjective time flow mean that even at this basic "nonobjectifying" level, mental life can be called "intentional" for which a moment can "point beyond" itself. Like this, the first conference and the second conference are different by the intentionality. The two conferences as the same conferences are different.

[31] Supervisor:
At that time, when we discussed national identity education, and when I said some words about that, the words themselves went so far beyond what I wanted to say. I did not mean what I said. (refer to text [16] and [25])

The supervisor apologized to the school teachers for his intemperate words. He was possessed by language. For the supervisor, language grants a considerable degree of autonomy from the speaking person.

> Linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, first as "I" is nothing other than "I." Language knows "subject" not a person, and this subject, empty outside the very enunciation which defines it, suffices to make language'hold together,' suffices, that is to say to exhaust it (Barthes, 1977, p. 145).

By the same token Pierce says, "Man is a sign...my language is the sum total of myself" (quoted by Eco, 1976, p. 316). Language forms the speaking subject. Language forms the human subject rather than the other way. In actuality, language becomes the field through and in which the subject is constituted *qua* human subject. "I" is supposedly nothing but an ongoing narration. I's experience

evolves as part of an ongoing life in the narrative, not as one indiscrete instance.

Now an ongoing life, for Merleau-Ponty, is not atomistic but variable, depending on one's perspective - this moment, this day, this year. Therefore, experience has an ever-unfolding richness before our reflective grasp. In time flow in temporality, one shares experiences by intrasubjectivity which comes to be *belonging* together in difference.

After the supervisor went home, we chatted for a time, while continuing to work (refer to text [25]).

[32] Teacher C:
How can he be changed so much? How he is different! Until now, I cannot quite believe it.

Teacher B:
But his face was serious enough for me to trust him.

Teacher A:
You had better trust him. Even though he is sometimes stubborn, basically he is so honest as to be trusted. He cannot hide his feelings from his face.

Researcher E:
Currently he has changed and become flexible. Let's trust his speech today is heartfelt. It is no good to doubt others' sincerity. It is certain that he will, at least, perform his duty faithfully.

(In a small hotel room in Seoul, December 1980.)

Supervisor of text [25] and supervisor of text [16] are different despite being the very same supervisor. To teacher C, the two supervisors are different persons within sameness in temporality, and the retention and protention - intentionality. To teacher C, the supervisor in humility is already the supervisor in coercion who is seemingly not the supervisor. Hegel would say, in order to affirm that "A is A" is already to distinguish A from A. In order to be itself, A must be distinguished within its own reality. In self-consciousness there is no longer any presence of self to self, but aging. Time is diachrony and concerns me as the process of aging. This diachrony of time is the disjunction of identity where the same does not meet up again with the same. Therefore, the self will be identified

or elected or chosen by the Other which it is not. The "otherness" contained within the heart of the diachronic self will give reflexibility to this self its elective identity. As a result, the self of the supervisor, in this diachronic time, is identified by the Other - teacher A and C.

Heidegger rejected equality as an expression of identity. He contended that the movement of difference is essential, inherent to the equality relation, and irreducible. *Equality is difference hidden by the promise of sameness reiterated through repetition and replication of an element.*

Heidegger thinks of identity as the *belonging* together of two kinds of mediation. One appropriates Being and Being appropriates one: ontological difference. One's appropriation of Being reflects one as a being; Being's appropriation of one reflects the Being of one. Identity can reflect both Being and one only if determined in the appropriation of Being and thinking together - mutual appropriation, that is, the *event of appropriation*. Thinking appropriates Being: "It is man open toward Being who alone lets Being arrive at presence" (Heidegger, 1969a, p. 31). Man's *appropriation* of Being means that one is distinguished in one's Being from all other beings. The closer thinking comes to its object, the more urgently the difference appears. Both difference and ontological difference indicate the impossibility of full presence. What is present is endlessly changed and absent, and what is absent is present by the trace in the movement of *différance.*

The supervisor is not only different from himself as he ages but also is different from other participants. The texts have until now shown the differences among participants in terms of their attitude, voice, thinking, but the texts showed how much participants disregard, as well, these differences and want Others to be the same as themselves. To disregard the differences is to accept that Others should follow me in dogmatism, that they reject the progress, and that they reject the mutual transformation by sharing experiences. Being dominated by Others, participants are merged in Others and are absorbed in inner-worldly beings. Participants in I-It relations wants to use Others. An I-It relation is entirely

subjective and has no mutuality. The primary work of I-It relationship can never be spoken with the whole being. For Levinas, one who is elected by and subject to Others is in fact the Other's hostage - responsible for the Other's being to the point of substituting oneself for the Other. In the notion of absolute passivity, one can take asymmetrical responsibility for Others. By accepting the difference[9] among participants, we can see the absence (reserved presence) and hear the unsaid voice: we hear all participants' contributions to better curriculum by centering decentered participants into the edge through full equalization and vibrating oppressed voices of participants through technically Westernized consciousness.

Theme D-4: Responding to the face of Others.

[33] Korean's *eolgool* [Korean word which means a person's face] gradually seems to have been disappearing. The typical Korean's *eolgool* might be benign, naive and unsophisticated, eminently virtuous, and a little fatuous. Nowadays, I cannot find, in the city (even in the country), these *eolgool* which I could easily meet in my hometown in my girlhood.
When I meet youngsters with fair and well-nourished *eolgool*, I feel, somehow, egoism and lack of rigorous willingness from their *eolgool*. They seem to be lacking the will to endure and overcome hardships in their lives. Comparing their *eolgool* to those of people now in their forties or fifties we may find big difference between them.

It is very natural that people's *eolgool* change due to their living conditions and environment. There is nothing ever fixed so firmly as to never-evolve itself. It is very worthwhile to continue to be reborn and transform themselves newly so as to discharge their duties wholeheartedly.

What may the *eolgool* be? I guess that *eolgool* phenologically consists of *eol* from which originated *eol* which means soul, and *gool* from which

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[9]The difference in this case, means differences among each group, not categorical, for example, male, female, professors, researchers, or teachers. These differences can make sense with a necessary condition - equality. The equality also can make sense with a necessary condition - difference. I have already discussed this in theme B-5.

> originated *ggol* which means figure. The *eolgool* is the presence which expresses one's thought, language, living habit, and demeanour - one's figure of soul which embraces all characteristics of one's identity. The idiom that we may imagine one's personality and character by one's appearance, seems to originate in this fact. We can deceive ourselves and Others by words, not by *eolgool*. First time I heard the supervisor's apology, I could not trust his words. How can a person change his mind so easily in a few days? I still remembered his aggressive face when he said what you should do [refer to text 15]. I could read his firm willingness from his face which was different from both the typical Korean *eolgool* and youngsters' *eolgool* at present. But, his face today was very different from the face of a few days ago. His face was so heartily and sincerely appealing to us. I cannot help but trust him by his face. He was very anxious to do his duty and keep friendship with us. His face of today was, in a sense, the typical Korean *eolgool*. He was speaking his deep mind in more humility and sincerity by his *eolgool* than by his words. I cannot help but do my best due to his *eolgool*. (A diary of teacher B at the same day as the text [31], December 1980.)

An intersubjective relationship is a face-to-face encountering with Others both of whom are speaking. We comprehend the meaning from the revelation of the face which is language. Teacher B was speaking of the supervisor through his facial expression. This facial expression, discourse, is a relationship with the other that maintains the distance of infinite separation "yet without this distance destroying this relation and without this relation destroying this distance (Levinas, 1969, p. 41). She made up her mind to rely on his face rather than his words. Face is the "window" through which the Other comes towards me. He comes from out of the height which typifies the Other as height and highness at the same time. Teacher B could not help but be passive to supervisor's aggressive and appealing face. "To face someone is both to perceive him and to answer to him" (Lingis Quoted by Robbins, 1991, p. 138). The face faced by me "is not reducible to my vision of it, it looks back. It talks back. To see a face means that the face looks at me and talks to me" (ibid., p. 138). The face is given as a unity of glance and speech which is "what makes the difference between consensus and disagreement" (ibid., p. 138). Teacher B not only heard the supervisor's face but also saw his face. Intersubjectivity starts from a sensitivity to the Other's face. In the actual

situation, Teacher C did not hear the voice of supervisor's face which was not an equal confrontation of presence. The inequality is irreducible. So she was doubtful about his true heart. She said, "Until now, I cannot quite believe." Teacher B said, "His face was serious enough for me to trust him" (refer to text [32]). The notion of sensibility is thus somewhat rehabilitated. Sensibility "recovers a reality" (Levinas, 1969, p. 188). "If the transcendental cuts across sensibility, if it is openness preeminently, if its vision is the vision of the very openness of being, it cuts across the vision of forms and can be stated neither in terms of contemplation nor in terms of practice. It is the face; its revelation is speech" (ibid., p. 193). Teacher B heard the voice of the supervisor's facial expression. "The face is both utterly defenceless -'naked,' that is'without covering, clothing, or mask,' naked because of its eyes, its look which breaks through form, and causes it to be'divested of its form' - and also that which challenges my powers,'inviolable,' saying opposing me, offering resistance" (Robbins, 1991, p. 142 f.).

For Levinas, the face of the Other is beyond being and comprehension. Beyond Husserlian expressive meaning and Heideggerian ontological meaning of being in general, and presupposed by it, is the expression introduced into the world by the Other's face. The face is not the countenance but the vibration of sounds that is the discourse of saying and is presupposed by what is said.

I am defined as a subjectivity, as a person, precisely because I am exposed to the Other. The Other breaks into the self's sovereign existence and puts its own being into question. It is my inescapable answerability to the Other that makes me an individual "I." So that I become responsible or an ethical "I." The ethical I asks if I have a right to be and excuse myself to the Other for my own existence. The most I's which we discussed in the section B of this chapter were demanding I's, positive I's, technique-oriented is (refer to themes [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8],).

"I cannot help but do my best due to his face." Speaking delineates an original relation and understanding the voice's face is inseparable from teacher B's invocation. She cannot help but do her best. His visage speaks to me and forces me to think. In front of the face I make demands of myself - the more I respond

to it, the more the demands grow. Teacher B perceives the supervisor in the nexus of cultural and visible forms - a typical Korean face which almost disappeared and an appealing face through which she could recover the typical Korean face when the supervisor's face appeared in a conjuncture alongside his duty in the cultural context. The face was discrete, an epiphany, a visitation. The appearance of the face was primordial speech. The face appeared as naked, as destitute and strange. "Because it cannot be incorporated by the self, it challenges egoity and opens the dimension of responsibility for the Other" (Wyschogrod, 1989, p. 189). For her, to be a self in the light of the presence of the Other, was unable to get rid of being answerable to the Other: she is absolute passivity.

Theme D-5: Become responsible to Others.

[34] People's encounter with Others during a lifetime are like trees which increase the number of their branches while growing. Often we are hurt by encountering Others as there is not a day when the wind calms down at the end of the branches of the trees. But we are dwelling with Others in the accumulation of emotion of both love and hatred at the same time as we share the deep taste of mellow *kimchi* and of both bean paste pot stew and pork meat stew with *kimchi*. Koreans would love one's lover again even out of hatred. Koreans express their contradictory feeling of relief and sorrow at the same time at Other's departure by one combined word: *Siwon subsub*. On this evening on the afterdeck of this small passenger ship, why am I reminded of the face, face, faces? Why am I,even here, thinking of my unavoidable responsibility for KEDI project from the beginning of my involvement in it five months ago?

Learning from the wisdom of nature in which soil germinates new buds with the rotten-leaves-manure and embraces life and death at the same time, Koreans who have survived by farming, embrace all things within one fence: warm hands to put together without dividing - raising rabbits beside a henhouse; building a kennel in a corner of a cow shed; leaving some persimmons at the branches of persimmon tree for Korean magpies in the autumn harvest. If Koreans are so generous to and embracing of animals, how much more so we Koreans are to humans! The faces with which I was at the same time angry and sorry about, and to which I was responsible out of the starlight, in this evening, have approached me and made me long for them. What are they doing now, those who were created by God and have been charged with calling of Others who are created by the same God?

> How this ocean, in which little islands appear and are entangled with each other, is more elegant than the vast open ocean! When I see a lonely, ripe persimmon-sized outdoor lamp in the island village, I feel as if I am walking on a quiet trail in a village even though I am standing on this passenger ship. Are there any others more appreciative, beautiful, welcomed, and beloved than humans for humans? The more I have lived a worldly life, the more I have appreciated the endless love for humans, which is implied in the passage that we would like to live in this mundane life although we "roll over the cow dung."
>
> What are the faces doing now? Are they healthy? I am very sorry for leaving them alone; even now they are working hard in a small corner of an educational field in Korea. They are standing "there." Firstly, humans are concerned with humans, long for humans, and love humans. The consciousness of humans for humans means that there is distance between them. Humans mediate the distance with longing and loving. (A diary of teacher B who had a winter vacation with her family at southern seaport of Korea, while other participants were still working at the small hotel room, January 1981.)

Even though she was enjoying her winter vacation with her loving family, she was concerned with Others and thinking about her responsibility for Others. Human subjectivity has been determined by a past which never was and will never be a present. Her unique past of writing curriculum materials had become her fate of being responsible for Others.

Texts [5], [7], [8], [10], [13], [16], and [23], showed how much we can deny responsible for Others. In the distorted intersubjectivity in which participants are treated as the presence-at-hand, as a anonymous, faceless being in general, the entire life of consciousness is centered on my ego, the Other is phenomenologically constituted as a modification of my self, and self becomes responsible for only my self. The otherness in this intersubjectivity is the otherness of something there, innocent, accessible and essentially capable of being taken up, mastered and possessed. This possession and mastery are the denial of otherness of Others, they are dependent on me, are what makes something mine, and are reducible to the Same, "the way of the same" (Levinas, 1969, p. 38).

If there is no experience of any distance at all, the feelings are not given distinct elements. Teacher B conceived the distance between herself and Other's

faces. According to Buber (1947), entering into a relation with Other is based on the primal setting at a distance. Non-distant Other is a technical body and an I-It relation. The otherness of Others is based on the irreducible, absolute quality of exteriority. It resists any attempt at interiorization.

Teacher B is longing for the faces. She is sensible to the faces. To be sensible to something, pure sensation, is different from being conscious of something. To be conscious of something is to look at something as something in one's intentionality. In the previous themes, teachers were treated as writing machines, flowers of offices, and final users. Even professors and researchers were treated as gatekeepers. According to Levinas, "the return to the things themselves does not take place first in consciousness of...but in sensation which is immediate contact:'the sensible must be interpreted primordially as a touching. The touching of this immediate contact Levinas calls'pure approach and proximity' ...proximity is pure sensation and irreducible to conscious of ...or to knowledge" (Levinas quoted by Vasey, 1981, p. 185 f.). Proximity par excellence is the proximity of the Other, the approach, the one-for-the-Other of saying. Proximity is saying, contact, the sincerity of being exposed; a saying preceding all language but through language. The signifying of meaning is the relation with Another and characterizes the event Levinas calls *obsession*. "I" is obsessed by the Other and caught up in the relation of the one-for-the-Other of proximity. In saying something to you, I not only present what is said but also I expose and offer myself to you. Being-in-relation-to-Another initiates from saying. Saying delineates an original relation. The understanding in saying is inseparable from his/her invocation. The speaker is the source of responsibility. Respondents make responsibility conceivable. Identity is established and maintained through relationship with the Other. Vulnerability is a condition of responsibility. One does not choose fundamental responsibility. My responsibility does not stem from any decision or contact or convention originating in my or our will. "My responsibility for the Others has begun before I became aware of my own body" (Peperzak, 1989, p. 17). The human body with its sensibility is not an exclusively altruistic possibility. The proximity is channelled

through enjoyment. Sensibility is enjoyable. Teacher B, in fact, in spite of her occasional disappointment and anger, had generally been enjoying the project. Teacher B had been responsible for Others while at the southern seaport.

Theme D-6: Co-attuning to Others in praxis.

There is an old saying in Korea: "All creatures are Buddha and all grass-roots-ordinary people are sage." This old saying includes a very important clue for intersubjectivity. We can infer the meaning of this old saying from the ideology of *Tonghak* movement: Three reverences - reverence for heaven, humans, and things which have mysterious lives in themselves. Intersubjectivity in Korea is basically based on humility and cooporation-orientation. But recently, the way to have interhuman relationships with Others has been dramatically changed and Westernized into the self-centered egologism. Heidegger identifies an egocentrism which operates at the origin of Western philosophical thinking and has been notified by Cartesian, "*Cogito ergo sum*."

The motive of this primary orientation toward the subject in modern philosophy is the opinion that this being which we ourselves are is given to the knower first and as the only certain thing, that the subject is accessible immediately and with absolute certainty (Heidegger, 1982, p. 123). This egoity already appears in the form of the... certainty which is nothing other than the guaranteeing of what is represented for presentational thinking (Heidegger, 1973, p. 127).

The I is the original ground of unity which was then attributed to everything. The independent origin of the self provided the possibility for worldly entities to be likewise independent and self-originating situated in the dualism that lies at the basis of representational thinking. In this fundamental certainty, a person is the representor of all representing, the realm of all representations, of all certainty and truth, and therewith has been made safe and secure.

[35] Teacher A:
I was disappointed with being treated as a implementer and a writing machine. In several meetings, I felt myself pushed to the edge to listening to the professors' and researchers' selves. I don't know the reason that we [teachers] have to follow and adjust to professors' one-sided opinions.

Teacher C:
Sometimes, they [professors and researchers] used low forms of speech.

(In a dialogue of a working committee while having supper at a small restaurant at the time the writing was nearly finished, January 1981.)

Texts [6], [9], [12], [15], [19], [22], have shown the way for the participants, especially teachers, to be treated in the intersubjective relationship as they develop the integrated curriculum "co-operatively." Teachers should only listen. According to Husserl, my human I is constituted, mundanized, become worldly through the Other. I become a human being as a member of community in the spatiotemporal world and can be situated among other beings through Others. Teachers can be worldly humans through Others' allotting roles for them in the self-centered mentality. What is worse, the teachers were not allotted their roles as equal partners. They were treated as a being-inner-worldly ready-to-hand and spoken of in connection with equipment. The whole situation of other teachers' being were changed into professors' or researchers' objects in an I-It relation in which the distance between participants was thickened. Buber does not see these dialogues as a dialogue. It is just a process to move toward a fixed goal. In this relationship, the self does not have any concern, caring for, love, and responsibility for Others. The self is completely fascinated by the world and the Dasein - with others in them in everydayness. The self-centered ego looks at its object not as humans but as equipment. The self lives in a tragic form of liberty: a liberty of self-reliance and rugged individualism in which self is isolated from one's fellow.

In the Korean language, there are two kinds of vocabulary for one object: mundane words and humiliating-oneself and honouring-Others words. The Korean language has very well developed honouring suffixes and honouring words. Koreans express their reverencing and humiliating intentions by various language

usage. For example, *Hada* is equivalent to "do" in English. *Hasimnida* is a word which expresses humiliating oneself and honouring Others. They change the ending of the word, *Hada*, leaving the stem of the word, *Ha* as it is. *Na* is the equivalent to "I" in English. In order to humble oneself, Koreans use *Cheo* instead of *Na* (English does not have any equivalent to this word). In order to honour Others, Koreans use *Dangshin* which is an equivalent to "Thou" in English. In dialogue, Koreans are very concerned with these honoring-humble word usages. In order to keep a dialogue smooth and on-going, it is very important for Koreans to use these words appropriately. In the dialogical situations, when a person uses wrong honoring-humble words, it means that the person insults the Other. It means that the person steps on the Other's *face*. To Koreans, *face* means one's being oneself. Koreans emphasize the *face* much more than Levinas. There are many usages related to the *face*. "I don't have any *face* to see you." "I lost my *face*." "My face is disgraced." "I erect my *face*." The diary of teacher C:

[36] I have undergone a loss of face several times after being involved in the KEDI project. Even though I did not tell my family about that, I am very ashamed with my family about losing face in my secret mind. If I tell my family about that, especially, my husband will be very angry. Whom shall I plead that? What am I doing now by disregarding my face? (November 1980)

The person who is not concerned with honorific and humble word usage is one who is not considering the Other's subjectivity. She only sees the signs in front of the face. Basically, a sign is a thing, not human. We do not need to have any responsibility for the sign. We only have to manipulate it. The Other's self has been decentered while my self has been overemphasized.

With this decentered self, Levinas seeks the springboard from an ethico-religious aspect. According to Schrag (1986), "subject as speaker, author, and actor is restored, not as a foundation for communicative praxis but as an implicate of it" (p. 138). He found the source of subjectivity at the implication of communicative praxis.

[37] Teacher C:
Since you invited us to the conference, I would ask you that you be more concerned with increasing the channels for teachers to express our opinions and encourage professors and researchers to listen to us more seriously. Anyway, generally speaking, I enjoyed this project. Especially, I had an exciting experience and thought of myself in dialogue with others, and I reflected on my teaching experience and what I have been doing, while writing.

(The continuation of text [35], January 1981)

Teacher C expressed her complaints with her suggestions. Her suggestions implied teachers have been restricted in their chances to express their opinions and when they tried to suggest some opinion, others rarely listen to them carefully. In fact, as teacher C mentioned, my self as a speaker (professors and researchers) is firmly reified, and Other's self as a speaker (teacher) is already dead. And yet she experienced so much at the conferences in the discourses. As I mentioned in theme twelve, intersubjectivity is strongly related to discourse. This discourse cannot be understood without reference to an I and you. When discourse was separated from the I and you, the intersubjectivity was reduced to a distorted one due to the frivolous signs. When discourse was not situated in you and I in historicity and temporality, the intersubjectivity cannot be a unique individual relationship with the Other as a Singular person. By sharing experience, it has come to be confined in a totalized relationship with each other as a ready-to-hand tool.

> In regard to the question of subjectivity, the phenomenological hermeneuticist...does not say that the I is nothing but a linguistic construct. Rather, he or she says that the I...is essentially a process of becoming and thus - never fully is - constructs or...constitutes itself in and by means of language, by...narrating itself (Madison, 1988, p. 164).

According to Madison, self constitutes itself by language. The self is a process of becoming. Therefore, the self is the way we relate, account for, speak out actions through language. The self is the story we tell ourselves and others. It is the autobiography we are constantly writing and rewriting. Thus, the self is not

something given, but something acquired, achieved by language. Therefore, our selves can experience something in dialogue and get self-transformation, mutual transformation through discourse - a mutual "transformation of the narrating self" (ibid., p. 169). In reality, the discourse, the "expressed experience is experience which has settled down and become something of'substance'" (ibid., p. 165). Thereafter, we not only express experience in dialogue, but also express our experience in the expressed experience. We are "the co-authors of our own narrative" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 213). Our selves are co-authors who want to self-transform through story telling. Our selves are co-listeners of our narrative. Our selves are attuning selves which co-write and co-listen.

> The speech of the book comes from a certain silence, a matter which it endows with form, a ground on which it traces a figure. Thus the book is not self-sufficient; it is necessary accompanied by a *certain absence*, without which it would not exist. A knowledge of the book must include a consideration of this absence (Macherey quoted by Cormack, 1992, p. 31).

Cormack (1992) explains *structuring absence* which is crucial to the work's ideological structure in terms of absences, which might have been expected to be in the text but are missing from it, rather than *avoidances*. The certain problem in our discourse is that an evaluative judgment, which is itself ideological, creeps into the argument. In our discourse, we make these absences, by avoiding them our discourse speaks about and constructs another ideological view. Therefore, this should make clear the ideological importance of absences in the experience in expressed experience. It is not simply a matter of avoiding some issues but, rather of enabling the ideological argument of the discourse to be worked out unproblematically.

With the "more chance to express and the willingness to listen to," I am reminded of the *Hwaback* conference in the early days of *Silla* dynasty. The *Hwaback* conference was a system or a method by which six chiefs of six tribes, who consisted of the ancient *Silla* dynasty, held a conference to make decisions for important state issues. In order to make decisions, they went to the high mountain

far from town after bathing their body and purifying themselves. On the isolated mountain, they made decisions about important state issues by unanimous consensus in a mental state of openness and emptiness. Going to a high mountain has two points. Firstly, to them, making a decision was no less than hearing the voice of the divine Spirit, the voice of nature. In order to hear the voice of nature, they had to go to a high place as near to the heavens as possible. Secondly, they intended to be isolated from the mundane world in order to be free from their various desires. They had to go to a distant place far from town as possible. At the place, they discussed the issues until they had unanimous consensus without regard for the number of days passing by. In a sense, their discussion means that they confirmed the voices of nature which they heard in a different way. They believed that, since they had the same ideas, objects, beliefs, they could reach unanimous consensus. The consensus was not the result of negotiation but the result of confirmation of nature's voice which builds upon itself. The chiefs were, even though they represented several tribes, acting not on behalf of their own tribe but on behalf of all; they were representatives of the whole country. The subjectivity of unanimous consensus in this conference is very vital in the sense of *unanimous* consensus, but it is dead in the sense of unanimous *consensus*. That is to say, self should not only be vigilant in order to be responsible, supportive and contributive but also sacrifice itself in order to get consensus. It means that self should attune to Others in order to hear the voice of disclosedness of Others in a mental state of resoluteness and openness.

Theme D-7: An endless process of dialogue to share *Chung Do, juste milieu* voices.

[38] Supervisor:
I will buy supper for you today.

Teacher A:
It's nice, *bulgogi*.

Teacher B:
Let me see. *Bibim bap*.

Researcher E:
Thank you. *Bulgalbi*.

Teacher C:
Naengmyeon.

Supervisor:
What time is it now? Oh, time has passed so quickly. How about ordering same menus to save time?

(In a restaurant near the hotel. January 1981)

The supervisor suggested we eat the same dishes. It is true that if we ordered the same menu, we could save time. But, I am not sure if he was really worried about time. In the evening, we ordered *bulgogi*. *Bulgogi* is more expensive than other menus. Therefore, it is obvious that at that time, he was not worried about money to pay for the dishes. In fact, it was an example of a way of bureaucratic thinking. Especially in the bureaucratic society, there is a tendency to see uniformity as cooperation or solidarity. This way of uniformed thinking results from thinking in an either/or binary system in which the *medium* can not be accepted so that the two extremely opposite roles stand against one another.

In this way of thinking, pro and con cannot co-exist and conclusion and choosing without full and frank discussion are enforced so as to be made quickly. In this mentality, a person does not accept the other, who has a different opinion from him, and even sees him as an enemy. In fact, the various ways of acting and thinking between the two opposite poles are considered as fence-sitters. In Korea, people have difficulty with standing at the "between" so that they are forced to stand at one of the opposite poles. Texts [8], [13], [16], [18] are examples of this mentality.

[39] Today it was implied by my mother-in-law that the supper was not salty enough. It is Saturday today, so, in my thought, I tried to make a delicious supper for my family despite being tired. It is very difficult for me to have a good relationship with her. (Diary of Teacher C, December 1980).

In Korea, we say being just salty enough: as "*Gan i matda*." *Gan* means the degree of salty. *i* is a nominative case suffix. *Matda* means well-adjustment. *Gan i matda* means that some food is just salty, appropriately delicious. In fact *gan* originated from a Chinese character which means "between" or "distance." Therefore, *Gan i matda* means the distance between some things is reasonable, that is some things are in harmony with themselves. Therefore, in *Gan i matda*, the others can have a good relationship with each other in harmony. In Buddhism this is called a "middle road" *Chung Do, juste milieu*.

Buddha taught his followers this *juste milieu* as an important principle of intersubjectivity. He said, "you have to eat a proper quantity of food after careful consideration of the quality by yourself." "The string of *geomungo* should be in proper tension as to make good sound." He taught his followers the harmony and praxis with the example of *food and geomungo*. Intersubjectivity would be based on the acceptance and encouragement of multiplicity, ambiguity, conflict, and tensions in harmony.

Thinking something in a dialectical way presupposes the idea of totality. In the dialectal thinking system, "Otherness thus seems to be both saluted and domesticated within a larger, overarching totality" (Desmund, 1987, p. 1). In the same book, Desmund criticized the general tendency of Hegel's dialectical thinking to reduce the richness of the real to something thin and logical, and to place totalitarian thinking within the overreaching development of dialectical thinking itself, while dialectical thinking is often far richer than its autogonists are willing to grant. He suggests a "metaxological" relationship as a better mode of intersubjectivity. This metaxological relationship - the discourse of the middle - like dialectics, asserts that self and other are neither absolutely the same nor absolutely different, but, unlike dialectics, allows for an *inter*mediation of self and other, not just a mediation from the side of the self. He argues that metaxological relation does not circumscribe the difference within an overarching monism. But it still has the dangerous tendency of reducing difference to one side of an antagonistic thesis, by the very nature of dialectical change which mediates

function from the side of the other as well as from that of the self. As I mentioned above, in Korean intersubjective relationships, it could be possible to be so. We need a thinking system based on "physical change" in which other voices could still be vital through unending continuing dialogue and endless deferred understanding.

> *Herménia* is the *theia moisa* of *logos*. It is neither the understanding nor the pre-understanding of a meaning - and it is participation in meaning, it is, in this sense, only where the meaning does not pre-exist, and does not come to pass away any more in the end, but where the meaning *is* this sharing, this multiplication of logos. (We are meaning, in the sharing, in the distribution, in the multiplication of our voices). That is to say that meaning "is" the gift itself in the sharing - this gift which is neither a pre-donation nor a pre-position, because it is the sharing which makes the gift. (Nancy, 1990, p. 244).

Nancy emphasizes sharing voices, not sharing meanings. Sharing voices means multiplying voices in which ambiguity, difference, and multiplicity can be maximized. Sharing meanings means the end of dialogue and, especially, in the Korean situation, one pole of either/or binary poles reduced to another pole. Therefore, we need to share voices in order to multiply the meanings as a gift from itself without understanding, that is, with infinitely deferred understanding. "The sharing (the dialogue) is understood here as a provisional necessity - to the community of interlocations." (ibid., p. 247).

The more we share the voices through dialogue, including, of course, questions, as the provisional necessity, the more we get the rich meaning as a gift from the voices. The time period of provisional necessity should be prolonged as long as possible. To share voices pours the meanings into our openness through its disclosedness as a gift. As I mentioned above, in the Korean intersubjective situation, thinking in an either/or binary system is pervasive. We need to multiply the binary opposite poles by differentiated multiple voices, through deferring the reduction of one side to another pole easily, and to create harmony between the antagonistic stances. As a necessary condition to multiply, defer and create harmony of the voices interlocutors realize that opposite poles are not

antagonistic, but necessary for any side to be meaningful and to exist.

Buddha taught the *Karma* rule: the western pole can stand by the existence of eastern pole. Intersubjectivity is an endless dialogue to share *juste milieu* voices.

Theme D-8: Intersubjectivity is to start from decentralization.

[40] Researcher E:
Our country consists of one tribe who use the same language, and live the same culture and tradition. Our country is smaller than one state of a big country, for example, the U.S.A. or Canada. If we consider the international-political situation, we need more tight solidarity. We are not yet prepared for educational decentralization. Some teachers asked me that if we established a decentralized educational system, how could the local curricula be different from each other. Nevertheless, do you think we need a decentralized educational system?

Teacher A:
When did you leave teaching practice? Did you forget the educational situation so soon?

Teacher C:
Are you so insensible? I felt the need for a decentralized educational system so many times since I was involved in this KEDI project, in terms of the ways of managing conferences related to curriculum development and selected curriculum content.

Teacher A:
I think you are saying this just for fun. I remember that when we were teaching students at the same school, you were very disappointed and embarrassed with the interference and order of curriculum content established by central government. How did you teach the *Saemaeul* education, loyalty and filial piety education, revitalizing reform education? I know that you interpreted the ideas of the education mentioned above and taught in your own style.

Researcher E:
At that time I did so. But after I changed my job from teacher to researcher, I changed my mind. How easy and convenient education is which follows central government!

Teacher C:
Many people blame teachers for teachers' lack of educational willingness. This is a different issue from easiness and convenience.

(A dialogue with teachers while having supper in a restaurant, November 1980.)

I was one of the people who supported decentralized education, felt the need for it, proclaimed it, and made efforts to actualize it. But, at that time, I was so frustrated with the way of thinking and managing educational practice, especially related to KEDI projects, that I paradoxically irritated teachers. To an extent that exceeded my expectations, teachers had firmly felt the need of educational decentralization. I saw so many cases of state manipulated education as a tool for keeping power in spite of their intents and original purposes: *Saemaeul* education, which means an education to encourage students to be diligent, self reliant, and cooperative of spirit in order to build a new and richer community; loyalty and filial piety education, which means respect-elders-and-rule-following education; revitalizing reform education, which means patriotic education through which students realize national identity, and anti-communism education. These forms of education appeared one time and disappeared at another time depending on the change of government. I saw so many times, through the process of writing curriculum materials, several conferences, and co-working with professors and researchers, how education could be distorted, totalized, and systematized. I saw how education could be degraded by irresponsible so-called professors and researchers (Texts [5], [7], [8], [12], [16], [21]). The Korean educational situation and practice was severely devastated by an extreme government-centralized educational system.

[41] Today Researcher E said something different from his usual stance. What was it he really meant today? Do we not really need decentralized educational system? He may have something which he really wanted to say. If we cannot achieve a decentralized educational system, where can we get vitality of schooling? Where can we have something worth teaching for? I don't think that a decentralized educational system is far away. I don't think that we don't need to carry out decentralized education. (Diary of teacher C, in the same day as the text [40])

Teacher C expected that we would have a decentralized educational system in the near future. In the decentralized educational system, people can carry out

their own educational practice as a vividly, dynamically living unit by themselves. They can plan their education attending to their own needs. They can pour their wisdom, willingness, and energy into one spot. This decentralization is not a conveyance but a kind of network which embraces difference, ambiguity, multiplicity and uniqueness in intersubjective relations without any deformation. In this system, teachers as the co-creator, with students of curriculum, can escape from their alienated feelings and feel worthy to teach sincerely. Consequently, this decentralized unit is not based on contrast but on the principle of love and responsibility in intersubjective relations.

[42] The more I was involved in the integrated curriculum in KEDI, the more I realized the fact that the Korean educational situation was devastated, and I was frustrated by the fact. I see the working relationship between supervisor and researcher E. I feel and re-realize that Korean education is tightly controlled by the central government. Sometimes I am amazed by KEDI people's endurance. What are they seeing? What are they anticipating? What kind of seeds of possibility do they find? For what are they enduring? The more I think, the more I am longing for the democratic citizenship education. (Diary of teacher B, November 1980)

Teacher B was worried about a fundamental problem for Korean education. In the transitory period from the fifth republic of Korea to the sixth republic people demanded their own ways and demonstrated fiercely for even their private claims. There were fashionable contemporary words spoken but which soon disappeared: as when we always see Buddha, we take after Buddha; because we have seen dictators for so long we ourselves become dictators as well. In Korea, teaching, by example, in which people educate students by practising moral virtues rather than by rational logical persuasion as in the modern West, is a very important element of education. Teacher B was worried that students would take after the old generation's acts. Educational decentralization is a necessary condition for intersubjectivity of the curriculum development process. Educational decentralization might be the premise of several themes which were discussed in sections B and D of this chapter. At the same time, when several themes for intersubjectivity are actualized in the Korean educational situation,

educational decentralization could be easily and fully realized.

E. Nonconcluding Conclusion

Here, I have finished only my first journey. I am in a position, in this study, to make a definite new beginning and conclusion and to show the on-going way from the former to the latter. This journey, which took place steering its way through the flux of my experience without ever making a knot, leaves the beginning and conclusion open. Here it comes only to an end which is not a conclusion. I will discuss some endings, without concluding, allowing suggestions for intersubjectivity to be made repetitiously by Others in their historicities and temporalities.

Firstly, spontaneity: Intersubjectivity is based on participants' spontaneity. Buddha taught us about three poisonous afflictions: avarice, malevolence, and ignorance. We have to erase these three poisonous afflictions from our flesh. In this mental state, we can open and empty our mind for Others. The more one seeks something as the object of avarice, the more one is faced with the necessity of the something. The more one hates someone, the more one is faced with the necessity of hatred. Avarice, malevolence, or ignorance have enlarged characteristics in proportion to the degree of our searching for them. When we are free from these three poisonous afflictions, we can wholeheartedly be responsible and care for Others. This is the state of our spontaneous mind. In the state of spontaneous mind, we can be responsible and care for Others without reluctance and/or artificiality. Reluctant and artificial caring or responsibility are other violences.

Secondly, naturality: we have to know our existence in nature. There is no thing more than nature. Humans take after land, land takes after heaven, heaven takes after Tao, Tao takes after nature. Nature means harmony, waiting for, and proper distancing. Nature does not intend to possess and control. Nature has the characteristics of giving endlessly. The opposite of naturality is humanism. Since humans are the center of nature, humans have some conflict with Others. Nature

means humility. Nature is not as arrogant as humans.

Thirdly, all-embracing: We have to be open in order to embrace everything in this world, including, of course Others. At the *Songkwang-Sa* in *Cheongue* Mountain, there is a ***Bul i Moon*** which means not-two-but-only-one gate. Good and evil, beauty and ugliness, and dark and light are not two opposite substances to each other. In origin, they are one and the same one. Humans try to divide them into two. A Korean is a person who loves life. ***Han***, which is an unfulfilled wish as a kind of living condition, originated from the love of life. The love for life rejects the Japanese *Kamikaze*, the German *Schutzstaffel* that persons admire the absolute disregarding of their lives. In this all-embracing, every Other, every Other's voice is vitally alive. The features of intersubjectivity are spontaneity, naturality, and all-embracing.

These three features are related to proximity in terms of absolute passive sensibility, not intentionality, and readiness in terms of waiting with openness and emptiness, not representational projection or anticipation. When, opening ourselves to Others based on these three kinds of mental states, we care for Others, we can make the adventure of our lives flow in the repetition which is a process of our existence by which we make our own way through the temporal movement of time, and we can be recharged with energy and the momentousness of eternal possibility in the play with actuality in our historicity. We can mutually transform ourselves through sharing these experiences.

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